ECONOMIES AND FIGURATIONS OF ACTION AND OBJECT IN THE TEXT AND DISCOURSE OF NARRATIVE FILM

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....5

Chapter One

Section 1: Theory (Verbal Categories and Filmic Narrative).....22

Section 2: Theory (The Grande Syntagmatique and Segmental Analysis).....58

Section 3: Analysis (An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge) 72

Section 4: Issues 112

Chapter Two

Section 5: Theory (Figuration of Action As Overdetermination).....126

Section 6: Analysis (The Maltese Falcon) 132

Section 7: Analysis (Open City) 164

Section 8: Issues 179

Chapter Three

Section 9: Theory (Narratological Theory, Narrative Film, Textual Analysis).....199

Section 10: Analysis (*The Maltese Falcon*) 212

Section 11: Issues 225

Chapter Four

Section 12: Theory (Actional Nameability and Filmic Narrativity).....229

Section 13: Analysis (*Psycho*) 258

Section 14: Analysis (*Hiroshima mon amour*) 343

Section 15: Issues 371

Bibliography 377

INTRODUCTION

This work in film theory and analysis can be introduced by an irregularly ordered scansion of the seven main elements of its hypotactic title.

1. Film is analyzed here as TEXT, that is to say, analyzed within the semiotic vision as a surface of material and abstract relationships, a surface whose patterns can be delineated by choosing elements which have force as 'codes' to read a semantic register of 'messages' across that surface. In this way we pass, by an incisive manhandling, from a perspective onto film as a 'work' to that of a 'text'.[1] This standpoint of relationality draws on an analogy, in textual analysis of film, to the concept of the 'double articulation' from linguistics: in banking on the relationality of text, the analyst confronts syntagmatic and paradigmatic levels of codes and units of text dictated by the codes' work of articulation. Levels articulated by formal codes are formed of units whose 'message' possesses very small semantic loads; these levels multiply articulate units on 'higher' levels whose units carry heavy semantic loading.[2] Inherently, such an approach concerns itself with formal and functional aspects of the text as the analyst pursues and specifies the patterns and factors around the meanings and effects aimed at by the always provisional, operational, and pragmatic choice of elements to be treated as codes. Because of its complexity and inherent concern with the movement, deployment, or unreeling/unfolding (<u>défilement</u>) of the text as a multiple pattern of signifiers, this textual approach to film is not

static or 'synchronic' even as it essays readings of 'individual' texts, but ineluctably--through its stress on the virtual place of the spectator as subject of the filmic signifier--textual analysis questions the dynamics of filmic figuration and discourse.

2. From the drive towards the most elaborate possible coding of the film as a multiple textual surface of signifiers (image, sound, music, writing, and speech)[3] stems the ideologically active and disruptive move of positioning filmic representation as FIGURATION. In contradiction to the ontological positing of filmic representation as a predominantly direct reproduction of reality (generally associated with Bazin's theory[4]), textual analysis is inclined to persistently question the mediated, figured representations of film: if representation cannot be analyzed or criticized as simple reproduction, then the issue becomes one of determining by analysis the turns of figuration patterned across the relations of the textual surface.[5] This is a gambit which effectively plays off the textual analysis of these figurative patterns of representation against 'fictions' of alternative figurations and representations--none of which has exclusively privileged status as representation.[6] On the constructed theoretical level of figuration, the analyst returns to the level of recognizable semantics and perceptible effects, with the imaginary and symbolic operations involved in the staging and communication of meaning via textuality. This marks another rupture with the fascination of the film as work and as spectacle.[7]

3. If figuration exploits and coordinates large areas of text into various figures of meaning and effect, the choice, succession and

passage of figures, their logic, must be analyzed on a comparatively more abstract level, that of the DISCOURSE of film.[8] If the summary question for the level of figuration could be very simplistically stated as '_How_ is a given element or area of meaning represented?', the pivot towards analysis of discourse might be expressed as 'How and _why_ is the film's representation ordered in such a way, in such a succession of patterns and figures?'. Analysis of figuration 'alone', without shuttling to the issue of discourse, can slip into a return to traditional rhetoric--an orientation which is static, atomistic, largely a classificatory dissecting of _énoncé_ as an inertly additive, not dynamic chain of figures. Figuration can be most effectively seen as a productive process only when the analyst positions figuration, within a global view, in a subordinate but _instrumental_ relation to its discourse and enunciation.

Analysis of the discourse of film will therefore turn even more heavily upon extrapolations deducing the strategy and relations of the figurational register and its processes. The analyst's deductive constructions about discursive processes and strategies will lay heavy stress on the virtual place of the spectator as a partner with the filmic discourse within the dimension of enunciation. The task of theory is therefore to propose, for testing, strong hypotheses of the strategic operations which deploy, maintain, remove, or omit either particular figures in the filmic text, or general frames or dimensions of figuration,[9] and which thereby in a more abstract way propose or induce the production of meaning as a process of contractual and

cooperative collaboration between spectator (as filmic subject) and text, in the register of enunciation.

4. A particular frame for analysis of discursive strategies and processes is that of ECONOMY. This general term encompasses concepts and metaphors such as:

--levels and circuits of figuration and dominant figures;

--equivalence and substitution of figures;

--exchange, transfer, conservation, repetition of figures between levels of the filmic text and moments of its unreeling;

--exploitation into figurational use of textual 'resources'.[10]

The strategies and regimes of discourse are thereby modelled as an economic 'management' or 'exploitation' of figuration and figurational processes.[11]

5. The principal concern of this work in film theory and analysis is NARRATIVE film. Under this heading, narrative is understood as a level in the film's semantic register, as a particular semi-autonomous zone of the text's signification, and as a dominant of filmic discourse.

The level of narrative semantics can be marked off as above the level of basic perceptual recognition/identification of objects, and below the level of thematic meaning. Narrative as a dominant[12] of discourse can be defined as the fashion in which the establishment, unreeling and conclusion of narrative semantics organizes other semantic levels: e.g., the basic perceptual level becomes a narrative scene, hodologically organized in terms of the narrative's time-space,

expectations, etc.; the thematic level, 'above' narrative, is largely formed on the basis of operations of abstraction out of narrative situations and turns.[13]

Narrative signification can furthermore be defined and marked off as a zone of semiosis with a certain autonomy, given the set of codes which are relevant to it: codes of actional nomination, actants, narrative logic, implication of action and character, vraisemblance, conclusion, and concinnity.[14] In this way, it involves a certain zone of semiotic competence.

As such a level in the semantic register or zone of coded signification, with a presupposed competence, narrative is a discursive regime which coordinates textual features with the (re-)production and disposition of a narrative subject,[15] who more or less competently attends to the relevant narrative distinctions, forms narrative expectations based on coded schemes of narrative progress or conclusion, and so on.

Since the process of discourse is vitally at stake, and since the substantive 'narrative' ought best be reserved for the delimited semantic construction as énoncé,[16] here the term 'narrativity' will be reserved to designate the discursive regime which is dominantly organized to dispose a narrative subject and to communicate narrative (with its significations and effects).[17]

6. An important further delimitation of focus is that this work aims at specific issues of ACTION and OBJECT in filmic narrativity. These two terms have therefore been chosen as points of entry into the problem: how do the discourse and text of film (as a signifying

system) relate to narrativity? 'Action' and 'object' are the concrete terms by which to ask: how does film dispose narrativity, and how does narrativity dispose the signifying system of film?

The focus on the former term entails specific concern with the articulation, intelligibility, interrelations, and implications of narrative ACTION in the figuration and discourse of film as text.

7. Concern with the OBJECT entails dual analysis of the object as signifier in relation to patterns of narrative action on one hand, and on the other, figuration of the object, object-relations, and narrativized effects around the object (e.g., the object as the cause of desire, as object of demand)--within the context of the figuration and discourse of film as text.

But the orientation of this work on film depends in an even more pivotal way on a term partially elided from the title: textual analysis. The specific practice of textual analysis is the 'site' where an effective intersection of the two large methodological frameworks of semiotics (with notions of message/code, syntagm/paradigm) and that of psychoanalysis (with notions of signifying chain, suture, symptomatic reading, imaginary and symbolic constructions and signification) can be exploited and interrogated--by playing terms such as 'discourse', 'text', 'figuration', and 'economy' against the strengths and tensions of these two large frame works while analyzing a film. Instead of recruiting these frameworks as given bodies of knowledge to be applied, we ask: how might these two frameworks enter most effectively into a

textual analysis aimed at narrative film by way of action and object? This work thus lies in an unstable entre-deux between these bodies of theory, and between conventional academic orientations towards master-knowledge of a delimited area of works[18] or toward theory (if this work were, say, catalogued as an essay in the theoretical-semiotic poetics of narrative in film).[19] Although some elements of theory presented here may possess a measure of originality within the context and discipline of 'film studies', this does not turn the overall orientation of this work towards the establishment of a theory or poetics of narrative film.

This work is thus not an 'application' of theoretical methods to a corpus, where the corpus is the dominant concern and value. The textual analyses are written chiefly around a group of narrative films from 1940-1962,[20] which are oftentimes treated in a comparative fashion, but the thesis does not propose either an autonomous 'theory of narrative film' supposedly adequate to this corpus, or any explicit factualist historical assertions or positioning of the films, in the recognized and traditional modes of writing 'film history', 'cinema history', or 'cultural history'.[21] The concern is the operational efficacy of theoretical concepts in textual analysis as a formal and functional mode of reading, situated between the practices of interpretation and poetics, following Todorov's 'topology' of critical discourses.[22] The concrete textual analyses of film presented here are given in their excess, errancy, and heterogeneity. This heterogeneity 'within' the filmic text, and 'within' critical action(s) of analysis

and writing, entails that the usual theoretical issue of 'cinematic specificity'--however defined[23]--has little urgency here. As a specific practice of reading, these textual analyses are not conventional examples, within the tuned, condensed, limited economy (i.e., the 'particular example' vis-à-vis the 'general theory') and willful consistency of dissertational discourse.

Since operational efficacy in textual analysis of narrative film is the 'criterion' of concern and value for this work--what can a given concept or framework do to choose, establish, and organize codes, forcing a deconstructive reading of a filmic work?--as this work shuffles theoretical frames, pursuing successive questions, we move through repeating cycles of three movements:

--theory: proposal or critique of theoretical constructs;

--analysis: textual analysis of a given film or fragment;

--issues: statement of issues emerging from the work of textual analysis, referring to further theoretical problems.

These cycles form the fifteen sections of the thesis. The emphasis is on the itinerary of succession of these moments of theorizing, analyzing, and drawing out of unresolved issues; therefore anticipation and retrospection are not emphasized in the passage of argument and analysis. Since analysis of the films moves, of course, often at a shot-by-shot level of detail, access to the filmic texts' materiality of images, sounds, music, etc. is a major difficulty of readers' access here. Reference is made to the detailed analytic découpages or quasi-complete picturebook scripts available for the films analyzed.[24]

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This work is dedicated in love to Claudia.

NOTES for Introduction

1. On the need to 'manhandle' (malmener) the text, Barthes 1974: sec. VIII; on the distinction 'work/text', Barthes 1975: 155-64. For the application of the semiotic notion of 'text' to film, Metz 1974b: Chs. 5-7, and Michel Marie, "Analyse textuelle" in Collet 1976: 18-28.

2. On relationality as a dominant principle for theoretical models, Saussure 1966: Parts One and Two; on 'message/code', Jakobson 1971, 1974: Chs. 1-2, 1980; on 'double articulation' of a signifying system, Martinet 1964: secs. 1.8 and 1.11. Metz's earliest formulations were skeptical about the status of any double articulation in the cinema as a signifying system (Metz 1974a: Chs. 3-5, esp. Ch. 5 sec. 3 "The Cinema as Such Has Nothing Corresponding to the Double Articulation of Verbal Languages"), at a time when no textual analyses (from Bellour or Kuntzel) had yet demonstrated the dense and multiple textual weave of films, in which the hierarchies and superimpositions of patterns of coded articulations allows for the doubly articulated weighting of formal and semantic differences onto distinct and separate levels. The most extensively elaborated example of this vision of the formation of a double articulation of the filmic text is found in the textual analysis of a scene from Psycho in Section 13.

3. Metz 1972: Ch. 4, 1974b: Ch. 10.

4. Bazin 1971: 9-22. It goes without saying that Bazin's name is invoked here as the blazon of the 'realist' approach to film theory.

5. 'Figuration' therefore has a rather wide scope of sense and application in this work. It supplants the term 'representation' or, better put, combines under one generalized heading the dimensions of figurative tropics and representation. A similar move--expanding the place of 'rhetoric' and treating all issues of discourse and text by way of tropology--is made in Group mu 1981.

6. Hence the workings of the commutation technique, as a key pivot of semiotic analysis, are left in the implicit background of this work's analyses. This operational/presentational protocol will be discussed in more detail below.

7. Kuntzel (1978: 41-42) provides a particularly apt formulation of this move in film analysis.

8. Valesio 1979 gives a cogent description of relations between 'text' and 'discourse'. What I want to stress in particular is the triangular relation between semiosis, text, and discourse: the 'relationality' of semiosis dominates and subsumes the 'structure' of relations of text and the 'process' of relations of discourse.

As an example differentiating figuration and discourse, consider a change of scene: the figuration (of action, time, space) changes at such a textual juncture, but the filmic discourse (its logic, its stra-

tegy, its disposition of the spectator) does not necessarily change at such a point.

9. Here in the argument stress falls especially onto the virtual place of the spectator in the triangle of text-discourse-spectator. It is obvious that large issues around spectatorship are being bypassed in this work. But in the field of film studies a clear priority is the elaboration of filmic textuality--so long misrecognized--before substantive progress can be made in the study of aspects of cinematic/filmic spectatorship. Undoubtedly, at this moment, much could be drawn from literary-critical theories of the reader, even though many of those theories lack at present a strong, dynamic textual perspective.

10. Compare to Heath's brief but very suggestive formulations, 1975a: 70, 1975b: 98-100.

11. 'Economy' here is therefore understood principally in a local way, i.e., in which the text is the locus and delimitation of the economy manipulated by discourse. De Beaugrande/Dressler, for instance, develop the notion of textual economy as a relation between 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' (1981: I.16, I.23, III.9, VIII.11). But this view nonetheless has strong links to:

(1) the general economy of language systems in the way Martinet applies the term 'economy' (1964: secs. 1.11 and 6.5-18, and Martinet in interview, Parret 1974: 238-39);

(2) the economic model of literary/esthetic systems proposed by the Formalist theory of Shklovskij (1929) and Tynjanov (1978); and

(3) the idealizing dream of an economic mapping which can exhaustively display both the total paradigmatic resources of a language system and the particular manifested articulations of a text. This is the implicit lure of systematicity apparent in Barthes' (1974) study of Balzac; it can be realized for exploitation only in the case of study of a few, unusually determined texts/language systems (e.g., a children's reading primer in words and drawings, analyzed in Crawford/Madden 1979).

Rossi-Landi (1975) draws the generalized, non-textual parallels between linguistic and economic theories of value and exchange (Rossi-Landi assumes, however, the atomistic perspective of early 1960's semiotics, treating language as 'signs' and 'messages', and thus he does not conceive of textual/discursive economies.)

12. For 'dominant', Jakobson 1978. Also, De Beaugrande/Dressler 1981: Chs. 3, 8.

13. Thus, we have the sort of stratified, asymmetrical semiotic structure described by Hjelmslev (1961: Ch. 21) and Barthes (1970: Part IV):



Levels

<== thematics
<== narrative (functions)
<== perceptual recognition

14. For action nomination, see Section 12 below; for actants, Greimas 1966, 1970, and Greimas/Courtés 1979; for narrative logic, Greimas, Greimas/Courtés, Courtés 1976, and Bremond 1966 and 1973; for vraisemblance (this term will usually be left in French throughout here), Communications 1968; for narrative conclusion, Shklovskij 1929: 68-90. I have applied the classical rhetorical term 'concinnity' to issues of global coordination of the preceding textual dimensions in unpublished work on the literary form of skaz.

15. 'Narrative subject' is understood as an inmixed subject of/for narrative signifiers, following Lacan's theory of subject and signifier (1966).

16. This narrative énoncé is what is signifiable grosso modo by manifestations of different signifying matters (dance, film, verbal language, and so on, as different signifying systems). Bal (1977) makes a particularly lucid--almost axiomatic--discussion of the relations between narrative, text, and discourse.

17. 'Narrativity' will therefore include, in specific cases discussed, the narrative énoncé signified by a given concrete text. In this work no insistence will be placed on an opposition of 'signification/communication' (see Culler 1981) because here we wish to put in question the relations of discourse, and the boundaries of determination/overdetermination which Culler's discussion assumes and presupposes.

18. 'Work' would here carry with it an ideological complex around terms of value, history, and author/auteur.

19. A perspective which carries with it the constraints of application, rigor, scientistic replicability, and so on.

20. There are brief sketches of textual-analytic work concerning films produced outside of this 1940-1962 period.

21. With regard to the latter, this work could be taken as a prolegomenon to historical-poetic research on cinema, i.e., as work which generates hypotheses about regimes of narrativity in films which could then be made the objects of historical-poetic researches. See Crawford (1983) as an attempt to distinguish textual analysis from Bordwell's

work for a historical poetics of cinema via historicity of technique and production practices.

22. Todorov 1977: Ch. 15, Crawford 1983a (concerning the divergence between textual analysis of film and Bordwell's historical-poetics of cinema), and Crawford 1977: 108-10 (concerning relations of general film theory and the practice of textual analysis of film). The focus on 'operational efficacy' as the criterion of pertinence is to be maintained here against the pull of the psychoanalytic framework towards interpretation, and against the (mis-)understanding of textual analysis as a practice of 'semiotic interpretation' (this latter phrase being not redundant, but oxymoronic: semiotics does not interpret).

23. Whether defined in terms of codes, of substances of expression, boundaries of narrative or diegesis, and so on.

24. Découpages available for: An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge, Open City, and Hiroshima Mon Amour. Picturebook scripts (photos plus dialogue, usually incomplete) for: The Maltese Falcon and Psycho. (These are listed by directors' names in the bibliography.) For detailed layouts of numbered shot-by-shot frame enlargements of fragments from the latter two films, see respectively Crawford 1980 and 1982.

CHAPTER ONE
Section 1
Section 2
Section 3
Section 4

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

The initial theoretical bases for these investigations concern the relations between two dimensions:

1) the proairetic chains of narrative film, considered as strings of semantic complexes, which are analyzed by establishing and applying in film analysis the structure of verbal categories which Jakobson proposed for natural verbal language; and

2) the figuration of action and object via a syntagmatics of large and obvious units of the filmic text, by using (in large part) the theory of verbal categories to criticize and situate Metz's _grande syntagmatique_ (hereafter abbreviated to GS) for use as an instrument for segmentation in textual analysis.

The stake is the correlation and interplay of the _semantics_ of the former versus the _syntactics_ of the latter.

These theoretical bases will then be put under pressure in a textual analysis of a short narrative film, _An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge_ by Robert Enrico (France, 1961) (reference will hereafter be made to the film with the abbreviation OOC). The gesture of choice mimicks that of Barthes in _S/Z_,[1] since this allows the analyst to grasp and theoretically 'figure' the economy of the object of analysis in its 'entirety'.

These two frameworks for the film analysis develop the main foci:

1) the economy of action in large textual units: the distribution of proairetics and syntagmatics;

2) polysemy: the role and power of filmic discourse to rewrite retrospectively the semantics of proairetic complexes; and

3) the overdetermination of proairetics: elements of text and figuration as symptomatic of overdetermined proairetics.

NOTE to CHAPTER ONE Introduction

1. On his gesture of choice, Barthes 1974: sec. 10.

SECTION 1: Theory

Verbal Categories And Filmic Narrative

Metaphoric reference has been made to the notion of a 'language of film' probably since the very inception of cinema. However, only in the last decade has rigorous and substantive use been made of linguistic theory by those seeking to establish a semiotics of the cinema.[1] Along these lines, what I propose here is an application, in the analysis of a narrative film like An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge, of Roman Jakobson's discussion of verbal categories.[2]

The restriction of scope to narrative film is basic but important. It entails that this theory of verbal categories in filmic discourse only claims relevance to films which represent a series of actions or events which move from a coherent opening state to a recognizably coherent final state of affairs. The sum of this chain of actions, its logic, the set of represented characters who initiate and receive actions and information, and the represented materials which support the narrative and its vraisemblance has been termed the 'diegesis' of a film. Aside from a few striking images, bits of dialogue, or impressions of acting ability, an organized skeleton of the diegesis is what is usually recalled of a film, and it is what can be more or less effectively retold in language about a film without the necessity of recreating the images or the precise dialogue/sounds of the film. 'A woman comes to two detectives' office; she reports her sister is missing. They agree to take the case. That night, one of the detectives is shot dead while taking up surveillance...' (The Maltese Falcon). As such, the diegetic 'armature' of the film can be roughly

broken down into a 'verbal chain' of narrated events/actions (plus a sufficient amount of accessory description).[3] It is onto such a verbal chain in the narrative film, its interrelations, and its relations to its filmic presentation[4] that I want to bring to bear Jakobson's categories.

As should become evident, in many ways this approach puts us at a certain theoretical node, where many formal aspects of cinema previously discussed in more limited contexts can be coherently articulated and placed in interrelation.

I. THE LOGICAL BASE OF THE CATEGORIES

Jakobson concisely defines the logical base of his classificatory scheme:

> In order to classify the verbal categories two basic distinctions are to be observed:
> 1) speech itself (^{S}), and its topic, the narrated matter (^{n})
> 2) the event itself (E), and any of its participants (P), whether "performer" or "undergoer".
> Consequently four items are to be distinguished: a narrated event (E^{n}), a speech event (E^{S}), a participant of the narrated event (P^{n}), and a participant of the speech event (P^{S}), whether addresser or addressee.[5]

Verbal categories characterize these items singly or in combinations. Categories which imply 'duplex' reference from the level of the narrated event (E^{n}) and/or participants (P^{n}) to that of the speech event or its participants (E^{S} and/or P^{S}) constitute a variety of the well-known shifter.[6]

Establishing an analogous structure for film is generally straightforward. The narrated events (E^{n}) are 'on' the screen, par-

ticipated in (P^n) by the actors. Instead of a 'live' and 'unitary' speech event,[7] here we evidently have to do with a temporally split film event (which we can designate with an appropriate new superscript as E^f). 'Split' because, in consequence of technological factors, it encompasses both the prior processes of filming and production and the process of projection, in which an audience participates by watching and listening (P^f). The camera, the film (the image- and sound-bands) which is edited, mixed and worked into a final version, and the projection apparatus all intervene as the linkage between the 'acted out' chain of narrated events and our participatory activity as spectators.[8]

Thus we have a set of four analogous items for film. We can now take up, in his order, the categories which Jakobson goes on to define on the basis of this inventory of items. [Note: (1) Categories which are shifters (nos. 2, 4, 6, and 8) are given dual symbolization: Jakobson's original formula, and an equivalent formula where the 'film' (^{f}) superscript replaces (^{s}) 'speech'; and (2) Each heading begins with a brief quotation from Jakobson's article.[9]]

II. THE EIGHT CATEGORIES

II.1 GENDER, NUMBER (P^n)

"Among categories involving the participants of the narrated event, gender and number characterize the participants themselves without reference to the speech event--gender qualifies, and number quantifies the participants."

At first glance, these categories appear trivial: if, on the basis of iconic codes of resemblance, I recognize on the screen the

activity of 'one' 'woman', what value can such characterizations have for analysis of film? One of the claims which I want to make for this line of approach is that, as a framework in which to 'read' the narrative film as 'text', it productively interrupts the 'natural flow' of the classically well-constructed narrative film (as actions and their consequences succeed one another, objects and characters appear and are defined, scenes shift, etc.), and exposes to analysis the heterogenous elements which constitute the images and sounds, their framed 'naturalness'.

The category of number can have analytic force and pertinence. As instances will show (in Sections 3 and 12), keeping this category in the foreground as a pertinence can help delimit both large syntagmatic units, and subsegments on the micro-textual level. (In a way, it functions as a more precise, pragmatic instrument for the classic concept of 'unity of character'.) Similarly, stressing the question of gender as a pertinent feature in figuration of narrative action has analytic force and value in exposing presupposed or implicit patterns of ideology in culture. Heath's study of Orson Welles' Touch of Evil[10] exemplifies the fashion in which analysis of gender qualifications in filmic narrative can productively dislocate the 'naturalness' of the represented world and its events: specifically, a film's figuration of a woman, or of 'women'. Welles' film is heavily and obviously marked in terms of 'style', and the chain of actions it represents is tantalizingly lurid--but overall the diegesis still falls well within our conventional boundaries of plausibility and 'realism'. However, if one

explicitly attends to the actions of the narrative chain in terms of 'male/female' (a gender characterization of the P^n), it is striking that--save for the opening twenty-five minutes (when the narrative is established and the major characters appear) and the film's final minute--Susan Vargas' (Janet Leigh) primary action throughout the course of the film is 'to prepare for, to be/to lie in bed': at the isolated rural motel, phoned by the absent, distracted husband, then attacked by a gang of hoodlums; at the red-light district hotel in town, drugged and half-conscious during a murder staged to frame her and her husband; and at the jail cell where Miguel Vargas (Charlton Heston) leaves her dazedly calling for him as he peremptorily rushes out to establish the 'truth'. This woman's role or participation (P^n) in the narrative's represented world seems 'natural' and passes, most likely for many spectators, accepted and unnoticed as such. Broken out of the flow of the filmic text in this way, in terms of the category of gender, it is less 'natural'--and it is easy at this point to imagine how 'unnatural' it would seem to 'figure' a leading male in such a line of actions in a similar narrative.[11] We might progress beyond and theorize this defamiliarizing recoil from what the film purports as 'natural' by asking, with Heath, "'where is the reality <u>in that</u>?'"[12] in order to grasp the ideological work of a film, what it reproduces and produces as 'natural' or 'real'. Explicitly 'framing' a film in terms of characterizations of the category of gender can help expose the manner in which a narrative fiction fabricates and marks its 'reality'.

II.2. PERSON (P^n/P^s):(P^n/P^f) "Person characterizes the participants of the narrated event with reference to the participants of the speech

event. Thus first person signals the identity of a participant of the narrated event with the performer of the speech event, and the second person, the identity with the actual or potential undergoer of the speech event." (Note: The slash mark in the formulas indicates that the reference crosses from the level of the narrated event to that of the speech or film event: a potential shifter.)

This adaptation of Jakobson's model can allow for a more precise formulation of this often confusing area and the terminology used here (e.g., 'subjective camera', 'point-of-view shot', 'subjective images', and so on). Above, when the logical base was adapted for film, the distinction of 'addresser, and 'addressee' was left without comment or specific relation to the film event (E^f). We can do this now. It is obvious that the projector in operation at the E^f is the performer/addresser, and that the audience (the other participant at the film event, the other P^f) is the spectator/addressee at the film event. Returning to the category of person, it can be seen that--in terms of an identity of the performer with a P^n--only the projector's 'alter ego', the camera, could constitute in a literal way a cinematic 'first person' ('I') by itself being a participant in the narrated events. And of course, in most conventional narrative film not only is great care taken that the camera be 'absent' (unnoticeably unseen) for the film audience, but as well the narrative's participants (P^n) do not ever look directly at the camera, addressing it and making the spectator aware of it as a first-person agency vis-à-vis the E^n and P^n.[13] To continue a literal interpretation of the model, neither is

the second person ('you') typically effected--since this would entail that actual or potential members of the viewing audience (P^f-spectator) would see themselves on the screen as a participant in the narrated events (P^f-spectator = P^n). For a variety of conventional and structural reasons, the narrative film--as we typically conceive it--is a fiction which seeks the interest and attention of a spectator, but without directly addressing him/her. Consequently, narrative film should then be understood as basically being in the 'third person' ('he/she/it'), which is more precisely impersonal, a 'non-person' according to Benveniste.[14]

With this 'literal' analysis and its clarifications achieved, we can take up and begin to sort out all the phenomena and lines of discourse in film criticism/theory which are knotted at this point. Essentially, what is at stake are not the strict identities defined by this structural model, but instead various conventional-rhetorical and psychological identifications by which images and actions 'in' the narrative are 'subjectivized' for the viewer (P^f). I can see four general areas of analysis. The first is the point-of-view shot, which seems to be both familiar to nearly every film viewer and a frequent, stable element in the standard narrative film. In Preminger's Anatomy of a Murder Lee Remick is shown having a difficult time on the witness stand under the aggressive questioning of a prosecuting attorney (George C. Scott). In the next shot the viewer sees Scott from the front, speaking and looking almost at the camera itself, and behind him at the defense table Remick's attorney (James Stewart), persistently

blocked from view by the movements of Scott's body: few viewers can fail to 'realize' this shot as positioned from Remick's point of view as she tries unsuccessfully to gain some psychological support from eye contact with her advocate. Various work in film theory[16] has effectively analyzed the formal structures on which this conventional identification depends: a relationship between the 'looks' of (1) the viewer at the screen, (2) the camera at the participants in the narrative (the P^n, the actors), and (3) these participants' looks at one another or at objects, on or off screen--or (potentially) at the camera. In the example just mentioned, the viewer is first cued as to what Remick wants to see, then presented with 'her' visual field and the difficulty she is having looking at her attorney.[17]

A second area comprises the less structured, but equally conventional items in film which are intended to be 'subjective' by implying a special relationship between a particular P^n, and what the viewer sees on the screen or hears:[18] memory images, imaginary narrative, purely mental images (i.e., an image of what a character is thinking about, but not seeing), etc.--as well as voice-over narration and shots representing a viewing/listening audience.[19] Most reference to 'subjective images'--as this name for the problem implies--only concern themselves with the image-band (e.g., the spatial positioning of a look and its object, the blurring of an image which indicates 'drunkenness', etc.); comparatively little detailed attention seems to have been given to the sound track as part of this problem.

The frontal shot of an audience's faces employed as a means of establishing an implicit second-person identification with the actual

film audience (= 'here you are...') seems far less frequent an item of rhetoric in narrative film than, say, the point-of-view shot. (In contrast, it can be noted that it occurs frequently in documentary films of music concerts, political meetings, sports). Again, this would seem to be so because the members of the film audience (P^f) are generally 'placed' outside the narrative film's fiction: the narrated event and film event, and their participants, are 'barred' from explicit reference to one another. One example of the rhetorical use of such shots of an audience can be given: in the final scene of My Son John a college graduating class is represented listening to a tape recording made by the now-dead hero, a clumsy admonition that in the heady collegiate atmosphere of free-thinking one is perilously exposed to communist infection, a danger to which the hero had succumbed. It seems clear that the ideological level of the film is intended to 'prop itself' onto a hoped-for partial identification, via similarity, effected between a sector of the film viewers and the represented sea of faces, thoughtfully absorbing this warning, carefully and repeatedly scanned in the film's visuals.

A third, very important but comparatively much more 'abstract' group of problems which can be distinguished and located by reference to our categorical model could be called the 'metapsychology' of cinema, since to a large part those who are working on it have drawn heavily from Freud's metapsychological theory: it is a questioning of the general bases of the viewer's cinematic perceptual experience, of a hypothetical 'primary identification' with the camera by the viewer,

accompanied by a psychic regression, and so on. This difficult problematic has been the object of a good deal of writing about the theory of film since the middle 1970's.[20] As an adjunct to this problem, and on its basis (but on a quite different methodological level) could be proposed a stylistics of the camera, its placement and movement, its articulation of the image for the viewer (P^f) without being itself a literal participant in the narrative (P^n). Accordingly when, for example in Resnais' and Ophuls' films, the camerawork is an elaborated and quasi-explicit element in the figuration of the narrated event, its description and analysis would seem to be crucial as a frame of reference for the imprint it makes onto the text: its imprint being the 'style' of a director, cameraman, or studio.[21] A precise understanding of the rapport between the viewer's experience of the film (as it is molded by the apparatus of film production and presentation) would seem to be a necessary basis for such a stylistics.

And finally there remains for comment the use of the category of person in the textual analysis of a given film. My claim would be that, with this clearcut categorical model as a frame of reference, the analyst is in a stronger position to gauge and trace the particular directions in which, and operations by which a typical narrative film fluctuatingly 'places' the viewer (P^f) vis-à-vis the narrative's participants (P^n), the flux of identification(s) it effects for the viewer throughout the course of the film event (E^f), and the manner in which the narrative works as an 'economy' of these spectatorial investments of identification in the narrative events/fiction (E^n). In general I

would suggest as a working hypothesis that the film begins in this general 'third person' mentioned above, then most often implicitly 'personalizes' the narrated events by 'centering' on a character or characters--ones which the spectator either already recognized as stars (a cinematic 'actor' code which inflects the experience of an individual film) or whom are 'favored' in the E^n through a comparative neglect of other P^n (i.e., Bellour's 'character code' as it more generally articulates the filmic text). All the other devices, which can function to 'privilege' a particular P^n and hence 'subjectivize' the E^n in his/her terms--subjective images, point-of-view shots, and so on--so that the film viewer (P^f) is induced into a more 'personalized' position onto the film, would seem to be particular means sustaining this overall process of 'centering'.[22]

It seems clear that in the study of such interplay between narrated fiction and its 'experience', this Jakobsonian model would constitute a cogent and forceful frame of reference, not a consummation of the experience of the text or a master-code which 'closes' the filmic text--but a disruptive 'reframing' of the film which assists in surfacing its heterogeneity of means and materials.

II.3 STATUS, ASPECT (E^n) "Status and aspect characterize the narrated event itself without involving its participants and without reference to the speech event." Following Whorf, Jakobson understands status as characterization of the logical quality of the narrated event. I should like to expand this definition to include 'existential quality' as well.

A first example of status consists of a distinction between what a fiction film's diegesis and figuration mark with 'affirmative' status (as 'real'), and other possible characterizations of status. Consider, in It's A Wonderful Life, the logically and existentially 'hypothetical' status of George Bailey's (James Stewart) return to sites in his home town 'if' he had not been born. The objects (a main street of saloons and dance halls) and actions (a police round-up of B-girls) prominently figured in this return to be seen by Bailey and the filmic spectator are explicitly situated as an argumentative 'fiction', produced intra-diegetically by the angel (Henry Travers), of the hypothetical causes-and-effects of Bailey's death and absence. Apart from status characterizations as 'real' and 'hypothetical', we could further distinguish the 'imagined' status of the actions given in voice-over in Psycho, as on Saturday Marion (Janet Leigh) imagines these future conversational actions (around the discovery of her theft) to take place on Monday.[23] A final example of another type of status, which might fall under the label 'fantastic', comes from Antonioni's Red Desert, in which a child's story, narrated on the sound-track by the mother's voice, suddenly begins to be figured on the image-track in figurative simultaneity. The aspect characterization covering all these actions in image, by contrast to their immediately contiguous contexts, is 'fantastic' in the particular sense of the fairytale genre.[24]

Turning to aspect, notice that in Wonderful Life the competent viewer is to understand the action of police round-up as a 'typical'

and 'recurrent' action (verbal-categorical characterizations of aspect) in order to properly comprehend the negative and 'dystopian' semantic dominant of this mini-fiction, figured en abyme as a subsidiary sphere. Another example of the role of aspect in figurative and semantic determination can be found in the commonly cited example of the breakfast sequence from Citizen Kane. Here the role of 'inchoative/terminative' aspectual characterization is decisive: successive breakfast episodes figure the opening, critical, and culminative moments of an action which can be labelled as 'estranging oneself from a marital partner'. These phases correspond to 'inchoative', 'continuative', and 'terminative' verbal-categorical characterizations of aspect, and thus the tripartite figuration of action gains its semantic cohesion and legibility by way of its economically laconic but 'complete' (saturated) manifestation of a particular sequence of characterization of verbal aspect. At the same time each of the three sub-actions is to be understood, in terms of aspect, as 'iterative': as a single, unique, figured 'token' of multiple, iterated, similar actions of confrontation and recrimination. Often, when such actions are figured only once, but remain readable (by the spectator, using hypotheses of narrative centrality, hierarchies of actional codes available for narrative discourse, and so on) as something 'iterated/habitual', we have to do with action being figured as a 'characterization seme' in the general way that Barthes has analyzed the status of character in representational fiction.[25] E.g., when, in The Big Sleep, the young Carmen Sternwood (Martha Vickers) lets herself 'fall' into the arms of Philip

Marlowe (Bogart), this action is less to be understood as a unique occurrence, than as a sign ('symptom') of what the fiction will offer as her chief character trait, 'nymphomania'.

Another important characterization of aspect is 'perfective/imperfective'. Again in The Big Sleep, at a certain point the dominant enigma becomes the identity of Vivian Sternwood's (Lauren Bacall) blackmailer, and consequently the dominant chain of action is oriented towards coming-to-know that identity, as hermeneutic resolution, and as dominant frame of spectatorial expectation. But just as the culprit's identity is revealed and he is being questioned about earlier events of the narrative, he answers the door of his apartment and is shot: a fresh sub-chain of actions is begun and quickly resolved as Marlowe apprehends the killer and turns him over to the police. In terms of 'hermeneutics' of the narrative, this is a dead end, a chain of actions which closes off any possible development for itself. The linguistic term 'perfective' (signalling a terminated action) is an apt designation for the characterization the viewer gives to this actional subchain the moment it becomes evident that the subchain is both 'self-cancelling' and completed. The general frame and flow of actions moving the narrative along (its aspect to which the viewer adapts by assuming a certain stance of expectation that the narrative is moving ahead) in its turn deserves being termed 'imperfective', "noncommittal with respect to completion or non-completion."[26] What is interesting is the shifting from one aspect to another: at the moment when the viewer, in this example, realizes that this little subordinate verbal

chain has been brought to a conclusion, s/he does not know exactly how the general, 'imperfective' flow of the narrative will 'return', how this open-ended chain will be taken up again or how the viewer will be placed in relation to it (to its characters, events, locations, meanings...). Posed in this way, the notion of aspect is undoubtedly a powerful way of approaching the problematic of the viewing subject's engagement in the narrative fiction, his/her desire to look at the screen and the represented unfolding of the narrative, the film's maintenance of the viewer both across the narrative fiction's trajectory as a whole, and 'to and fro' at the 'switch-points' of narrative and discourse.

II.4 TENSE (E^n/E^s):(E^n/E^f) "Tense characterizes the narrated event with reference to the speech event. Thus the preterit informs us that the narrated event is anterior to the speech event." To make the analogical application of Jakobson's model as profitable as possible with regard to the category of tense it is necessary to consider not only the dimension of temporal order ('before/after'), but that of duration. (Temporal frequency of an action--its 'distribution' in time--is characterized by the verbal category of aspect, discussed above).[27]

Cinema has often been commented on in terms of time--especially through a denial that it has any equivalent to the marked system of tenses in natural-verbal language ('I ran/I run/I will run').[28] Just as with the category of person, the value of this analogical categorical model consists in a precise formulation of the issue. Consider the present tense: in terms of the model, it would necessarily be a

characterization of the narrated event on the screen (E^n), in front of the viewer, as simultaneous with the film event, the viewing itself (E^f). Literally, what could such a characterization be like? Television/video can 'simultaneously' show the viewer looking at the screen, on which s/he can see themself looking... But not a film, since the technological base of cinema (e.g., chemical development of exposed filmstock, but also editing) always 'defers' the film's E^f vis-à-vis the E^n and renders impossible the 'immediacy' (the possibility of circularity) which TV/video seems to have. If the present tense (defined as a simultaneity of E^n and E^f) is impossible, the other two 'standard' tenses might seem possible. A historical film (Ford's Young Mr. Lincoln) could be proposed as a film in which the E^n (Lincoln's days as a lawyer, his commitment to justice) is understood as 'past', as prior to the E^f; alternately, a science-fiction fantasy narrative (Lucas' Star Wars) would seem to be characterized as an E^n which is 'future' tense, 'posterior' to the E^f. But, in a manner similar to that of the camera's being 'barred' from being a direct participant in the narrated event (according to the category of person), here it can be realized that in neither example is there direct reference to the film event in order to characterize the narrated event (as a whole) as 'past' or 'future' (E^n before E^f, E^n after E^f). In other words, the event of watching either film (the E^f) is simply an non-characterizable 'anytime'. A viewer can point out the date of a represented historical event (on the basis of personal knowledge, a written prologue to the film, voice-over commentary, or by interpreting

features such as differences in dress, and so on), the date of the film's production, and the date of the viewing of the film (E^f = 'now')--but the conventional narrative is, in important ways, indifferent to such specifications, and tends to avoid any reference that would make such temporal relations explicit (even though, on some other levels, the narrative fiction may need these temporal relations to be recognized by the viewer for the film to 'make sense' in some aspects). Even leaving aside the strict 'literalness' of the comparative example of TV/video mentioned above, the narrated events of a fiction film can be as 'contemporary' or 'immediate' as possible in an effort to characterize these events as 'simultaneous' but still not elude this gap, or lack of relation--half structural, half conventional--between E^n and E^f. The category of tense thus also leads (as did that of person) to a confrontation with the divergence of the two levels implied in the model, analyzed in linguistic terms by Benveniste,[29] whose analyses have been taken up in recent writing on film.[30]

Posing the question in terms of the categorical model can add some specifications to the discussions so far of this gap between énoncé and enunciation (the gap between the levels of E^n and E^f) with regard to film. In discussing the category of person we apprehended this gap in the alternate impossibility/conventional avoidance in cinema of what would be literal first and second person; then we went on to sketch out some of the ways that the narrative film 'slides' over this gap by rhetorical conventions of identification which bring the P^f into relation with the P^n. The categorical model pertinently focuses attention on

the apparent dissymmetry of the two categories of person and tense: the latter does not appear to have an equivalent set of isolable and structured rhetorical devices by which a narrative film would 'slide' the viewer across this temporal gap, and 'place' the viewer into the time of the fiction the way the point-of-view shot 'places' the viewer into the space of the fiction (acccording to the visual field of a P^n). The conventional fictional-narrative film clearly demands, not only that the 'temporal indifference' of the two levels not be noticed as such, but that the viewing subject be engaged into the fiction by the establishment of some sort of relation between the times of the E^n and E^f. Granted, there is a filmic 'rhetoric' of temporal order and duration inside the E^n, but the categorical model illuminates the question of this global temporal relation as well. On its basis, it seems that the answer should be sought not solely on the level of a filmic rhetoric (by, say, studying the 'opening scenes' of narrative films to see how they create a temporal framework for the total E^n to follow), but at the conjunction of rhetoric and the metapsychology of film.

This general problem aside, other more particular dimensions of temporal order and duration remain for discussion. First is the function of cinematic and extra-cinematic conventions in ordering or reordering particular events within the E^n as a whole, relative to the E^f. On the basis of general competence in understanding narrative (films, literature, jokes, etc.), primarily in terms of the conventions of what constitutes a cause-and-effect sequence, a viewer can 'reassemble' the events/actions making up the total narrative into a

coherent order--an order which of course is frequently different than that by which those events/actions appeared during the film event. But this theoretical truism about spectatorial cognition often precipitates a practical failure by the analyst to analyze an individual film in the incisive terms proposed by this verbal category: looking for the film's means of displaying or concealing temporal discontinuities, which is, again, an ideologically loaded fabrication of 'naturalness'.

II.5 VOICE ($P^{n}E^{n}$) "Voice characterizes the relation between the narrated event and its participants without reference to the speech event or speaker."

The standard linguistic distinction between active and passive voice is generally familiar. Late in The Big Sleep Vivian Sternwood (Bacall) is being pushed forward as a human shield by a vicious Canino (Mike Steele), as he stalks Marlowe (Bogart), but nonetheless Marlowe outwits and kills Canino. This turn of narrated events could be 'rewritten' (in a simplified fashion) and understood as a reversal of voice. (Focalization of the verbal category of person in the figuration allows the analyst to determine the dominant 'subject' or agent of narrative action.) Canino (the active agent) uses Vivian and searches for Marlowe (Marlowe and Vivian as passive objects in relation to the action). This is followed by Vivian tricking Canino and Marlowe shooting him (Canino now fatally passive in relation to the action: he 'is tricked, is shot'). Taken this far, the category of voice seems mostly trivial; it alone does not appear to put enough effective torsion on the object of analysis in order to produce a reading of it.

There is a possibility that, in conjunction with other categories, that it can be made more effective in considering issues of sexual difference as a dimension of representation, in bearing down on figuration of women in/by filmic texts. Returning to the earlier example from Touch of Evil, such a line of approach would address itself to the problem of Susan's (Janet Leigh) 'passive' place in the narrated events (as 'someone/something' which is 'attached', which must be 'escorted' to and fro, 'protected' by being 'placed at a safe lodging', who needs to be 'cleared of suspicion', etc.)--as well as her singularly problematic 'action' of desire and its effects in the film's textual system.[32]

A third, somewhat more subtle characterization of voice holds more force as a frame for analysis: the middle voice, particularly as it has been developed in a study by Benveniste.[33] As a distinctively marked verbal form it is absent from English, but it might be partially illustrated by comparing 'I am getting shaved' with 'I am shaving' (active) or 'I am being shaved' (passive), where in the first phrase the auxiliary 'get' and the particular verb establish an approximate middle voice. The subject of the phrase is both bodily 'affected' by and 'interested' in the action of the verb, hence 'interior' to that action, without it being specified who or what is the action's agent, or what the subject may have done to initiate the process/action which is affecting him.[34]

This middle voice--as a somewhat ambivalent or unstable characterization of the relations between a participant in the narrative

(P^n), his/her interests in the events of the narrative, and the narrated actions themselves (E^n)--is a peculiarly valuable frame of reference for tracing the way a participant gets 'caught up' into the narrative (at the beginning of the film, or, even far later when the narrative's action is well underway). Again, Welles' Touch of Evil and Heath's remarkable analysis of it can be turned to for a rich example. In the film's first, long tracking shot the viewer sees a bomb planted in an empty convertible, a couple come out of a night club, enter the car and drive through crowded streets and across the border into the U.S. Along the way, Susan and Miguel Vargas are seen strolling in the same direction, crossing the border at the same moment, then pausing for a kiss, which is interrupted by the sound of the explosion. The second, brief shot shows the burning car flying up, then crashing to the ground as the camera zooms in on it. In the third, the proximity and postures of the interrupted kiss are broken off, then in succeeding shots the camera tracks backwards as Vargas, looking towards and beyond it, comes hurriedly forward towards the violence. These brief and incomplete descriptions may suffice as a support for understanding what Heath exposes in these opening shots and across the entire narrative: the continuing and spreading violence of the film as a "contagion,"[35] a force which is overdetermined with regard to sexuality and its repercussions for what might appear to be (might well be recalled and retold as) a 'simple' confrontational drama between an honest policeman (Vargas) and a corrupt one (Quinlan, played by Welles). The murdered couple in the convertible (an older, apparently wealthy man and a young

blonde) are unknown, but the viewer has already 'picked out' and centered attention on Vargas/Susan (due to the 'star code': Heston, Leigh as recognizable faces), expecting their kiss (his 'interest' is heavily marked: "Do you realize I haven't kissed you for over an hour?") when this event is ruptured by the blast, held in abeyance until the film's conclusion, until a balance of the narrative and its violence can be made. But here, Vargas is figuratively pulled into a chain of violence, conflict, corruption: around the blazing car, he is quickly 'placed' as a Mexican official who will observe the investigation of the killing 'despite' Quinlan's immediate and explicit antagonism toward him. As noted above, Vargas is conducted and drawn bodily in the space of the image(s) of the narrative towards a magnetic but 'unviewable' scene of violence (and the camera itself[36]), just as later (1) his 'nationality' and sympathy for a young Mexican evidently being framed by Quinlan in the killing will 'draw' him more heavily into the narrative, and elicit action from him leading to a confrontation with Quinlan in an effort to clear the Mexican, and (2) the attacks on his wife (with which Quinlan is complicit) will 'motivate' him to violence beyond the law ("I'm not a policeman now, I'm a husband!") and to work to 'innocent her' as well ("How can I leave until her name is clean! Clean!"). What I would like to suggest here by reference to a 'middle voice' is the particular way the figure of Vargas (P^n) is 'enmeshed' into the action (E^n) and its contagion: he is compellingly 'worked' into the flux of actions, motives, and repercussions because of his interest in the original violence, but beyond his--and our--

expectations. (The ambivalence of the middle voice corresponds precisely to the manner in which, even in the early scenes around the murder car, his interest slides from 'official' to 'personal': by bits of dialogue he is established as an important official responsible for a successful drug-law crackdown, but who at the moment is "hot on the trail of a chocolate soda for my wife"; after witnessing the explosion, he corrects an American detective at the scene by pointing out that the origin of the bomb--Mexican, American?--is not yet certain; but most tellingly, when Susan comes up to him beside the flaming wreckage, he sends her back across the border into Mexico, saying, "This could be very bad for us." Susan: "For us?" "For Mexico, I mean.") Overall, the process of engaging Vargas into the action (a relationship of P^n and E^n), inflected in figuration by dialogue, by movement in frame, an attraction to an object/problem held out-of-frame, is well described by analogy to a 'forced' shifting from middle to active voice, from 'interested' observer to 'central' participant.

II.6 MOOD $(P^nE^n/P^s):(P^nE^n/P^f)$ "Mood characterizes the relations between the narrated event and its participants with reference to the participants of the speech event: in Vinogradov's formulation, this category 'reflects the speaker's view of the character of the connection between the action and the actor or the goal'."

Because the category of mood constitutes a shifter, and due to the peculiarity of the verbal category of person as it was developed here in relation to narrative film, characterization of mood falls into two types: first, the characterizations of mood which, in strict accor-

dance with the model, stem from a participant in the film event; and second, those characterizations of mood which 'originate' in a narrative participant (P^n) but which are 'shifted' to and 'shared' by a film-event participant (P^f) in consequence of an identification operating between these two participants (refer to discussion of person, above).

To begin with this first type, notice has to be taken of a small possible discord, in the quotation above, between Jakobson's and Vinogradov's formulations: the latter's would seem to restrict the 'source' of the mood characterization to the speaker, whereas Jakobson's seems to leave open the possibility that mood could be characterized somehow with reference to the listener(s) (addressee), the other participant in the speech event (E^s). This leads to another comparative examination of the film event (E^f) and its participants: which participant here, if any, produces mood characterization? The projector, it would seem, just 'delivers' the narrated events by projecting an image onto the screen and by playing back the sound track: how could it 'express' anything ('of its own') about the relation of E^n and P^n? It would seem, thus, to 'be' permanently in the indicative mood (= a zero modality, the simple declarative mood); it just presents the E^n and P^n to the spectator without offering up any 'characterization' of their relation by any reference to itself. The other film-event participants, the spectators, must be the 'source' of the mood characterizations--if they can be found in a film. Take Rocky, especially the culminating fight scene, as an example, and con-

sider its typical audience's vocal, verbal and bodily 'responses' to the film's narrated events and narrative participants. These responses on the part of the spectators seem to clearly 'express/reflect' a range of mood characterizations about the relations between the boxing match (E^n) (its momentarily unknown outcome) and its two participants, the reigning black champion and the hopeful white challenger for the title (the two P^n). 'Interpreted' and verbally transcribed, these spectatorial responses vary from 'Can Rocky win?' (interrogative mood, about a modality of 'potentiality/possibility'), 'He should win!' (optative mood, expressing a wish), to 'He must win!' (modality of assumed 'necessity/obligation' of the hero-challenger to win, as if it was 'owed' to the film spectator in reward for his/her sympathy).[37] All these responses are solicited by the film by unspecific means (by its sympathetic centering on the figure of the protagonist, its caricature of the black boxer) and by more cinematically specific means (the pace of the editing; the 'expressiveness' of the photographed faces, bodies, and gestures; the exchange of looks on screen; the intonation of the sports reporter's voice, etc.); the film is scripted, shot, scored, edited, and mixed--in short, articulated or produced[38]--with the intention of eliciting these responses and facilitating the film-product's success (financially, if not always critically) through such responses, with the general result of furthering the cinematic institution.[39]

The verbal category of mood offers the film analyst a frame by which to seize this meshing of the filmic text (its figuration) with

the film as it is experienced and exploited within the institutions of cinema and spectatorship.

II.7 TAXIS (E^nE^n) "Taxis characterizes the narrated event in relation to another narrated event and without reference to the speech event, thus Gilyak distinguishes three kinds of independent taxis--one requires, one admits, and one excludes a dependent taxis, and the dependent taxes express various relationships with the independent verb--simultaneity, anteriority, interruption, concessive connections, etc."

Jakobson offers examples which illustrate how this verbal category can characterize two (or more) narrated events as related temporally (as temporally contiguous or sequential) and/or causally ("consequential [signalling an internal connection between the two E^n] vs. non-consequential [without implying internal connection]"[40]): 'When meeting friends, he is delighted', 'Since he had never met actors, he did not know how to approach them'. The import of the category and concept of taxis to narrative film (and, it would seem, to the general theory of narrative) is evident: in narrative film dominantly figured actions/events are anticipated (with a fundamental code-elicited expectancy) to be coherently and logically connected in an acceptably cohesive time-space and causal framework. This is the basis on which a syntagmatics of narrative film was begun by Metz, although his development of the issue does not recognize clearly and explicitly enough the need to analyze the figuration of action, time, and space. Textual analyses therefore would include in their aim patterns of figuration

which promote or frustrate the reading of dominance of action as legible causality. As a counter-example of this kind of expectancy, consider a Candid Camera shot in which a person is 'spoken to' by a mail box, triggering off a set of events (stopping, looking, facial response, answering verbally or gesturally, exploring, etc.). Such a fragment of film hardly qualifies as narrative, but the point is precisely that spectators understand and expect--in the register of their enunciational relation to the film--this little series of events to be following one another totally 'fortuitously' (they are logically inter-related by chance, as 'whatever the particular victim happens to do [next]'). This framework for interpretation of action is fostered conventionally by figurational marks concerning the lighting of the image, zooms, long takes, or cuts from a single camera setup (or from different zooms in or out along a single axis)--in other words, by a figurational configuration of features associated with hidden-camera cinematography as a generic discourse of film.

Within the conventional narrative film[41] it is expected--if this is not immediately obvious and legible--that some logical dependency and some sort of temporal sequentiality will be made available for represented action/events. This expectation is so central to expectations about narrative-filmic discourse and to the practice of spectatorship of narrative-entertainment film that spectators are willing to wait a very long time before 'abandoning' it (and do so only with marked frustration). (A trivial example: a hypothetical spectator who kept waiting for Last Year at Marienbad to 'clarify' itself by establishing some conventional schemas for its actions as narrative).

Aside from this global characterization of narrated events, films may shift from one to another particular characterization of taxis. An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge will provide an example of this, discussed in Section 3 below.

In a somewhat less specific way the category of taxis is at work in the conclusion of the narrative film: this is the point when the 'general expectations' of taxis characterization are 'fulfilled', when the verbal chain as a whole is 'recuperated' into the filmic system's particular narrative logic (a relational map of actions and objects is completed--i.e., a network of events and their interrelations of taxis), when most outstanding ambiguity of characterization of individual actions/events in terms of status and aspect is clarified, and when the category of tense seems to 'break off' from 'present' and slide into the 'past' (the gap between the time of the narrated event and that of the film event becomes manifest as the attentional circuit between E^n-P^n and P^f-spectator is broken). This 'recuperation' and/or 'framing' within the scope of the verbal category of taxis is less specific since here we have to do with a narrative process of closure which seems to have high generality, in film, literature, and other cultural signifying systems.

II.8 EVIDENTIAL (E^nE^{ns}/E^s):(E^nE^{nf}/E^f) "Evidential is a tentative label for the verbal category which takes into account three events--a narrated event, a speech event, and a narrated speech event (E^{ns}), namely the alleged source of information about the narrated event. The speaker reports an event on the basis of someone else's report

(quotative, i.e., hearsay evidence), of a dream (revelative evidence), of a guess (presumptive evidence) or his own previous experience (memory evidence)."

Every 'competent' film viewer can recognize the cues (especially frequent in older films) which mark an ostensible shift from 'exterior' to 'interior' presentation of actions (i.e., memory flashback), with a corresponding shift of the evidential category characterizing what is seen/heard; cues such as zoom-in to a closeup, fades, and so forth, are thus correlative markers of changes in the evidential characterization. Aside from this characterization of the evidential category within the figuration, a somewhat more interesting example can be found in Truffaut's Jules and Jim. At a certain point in the film the next E^n is 'World War I breaks out'. The film 'reports' this narrated event by incorporating documentary footage of combat directly into the narrative, and this footage is not only noticeably grainier than what precedes and follows it, but these images are distorted due to a change of frame format as well. This constitutes a distinct example of one film event (E^f: Truffaut's film) referring to an anterior 'narrated' film event (E^{nf}: the production of documentary footage during the war[42]) as it presents a narrated event (E^n: 'the war')--and the means (graininess, distortion of image, and/or color-b/w, etc.) by which this reference is effected are analog,[43] by marks on the filmic text which are 'located' in the processes of (re)production intermediate to the E^{nf} and the P^f-spectator. Truffaut's film would seem to employ this figurative mode of reportage simply in order to jolt (momentarily) the

rather closed narrative centered on the trio of lovers, thus setting up the different narrative situation which follows the war and its 'effects'. In contrast, Makavejev's Sweet Movie bears down explosively on the semantics and 'propriety' of such cinematic 'quotations' by the film event. Consider, either the Nazi documentary footage of the exhumation of Polish officers massacred at Katyn Forest by the Soviets, or the clips of an instructional film of infants' exercises done by a German major, and their complexity of (intertexual) interrelations with the polyphonic scene of Makavejev's film--sociality, sexuality, therapy, politics, ideology, history/fiction--and the stunning effect of its ending sequence which conflicts directly on a relation to the massacre documentary clips immediately preceding it, and on a shift out of those clips' color/tones into a full-color freeze-frame. Makavejev's film vitally demonstrates what measure of violent filmic/textual force can be unblocked by 'fraying' away at cinematic conventions such as those of the evidential category.

SUMMARY

Along the way in this text I have made my claims for the 'use-value' of this model; there is no need to recoup them here. Only a few words more, then, about the methodological 'possibility' of what has been attempted here, and the relation of 'language' to 'film'. What makes this approach tenable is the fact that Jakobson's model is of general semiotic pertinence, and hence can in most respects be re-elaborated in relation to narrative film, an analog signifying system

(whereas what Jakobson goes on to do, on the basis of his model of categories, is to inventory the digital distinctions of these categories for the Russian verb as an element of a natural-verbal language). This application of Jakobson's model does not mean conceiving of film narrative as 'a retellable story illustrated with moving pictures and enlivened with recorded sound/music': the whole problem is of studying precisely how an analog system such as film is modulated--in specific ways, and even more so, at the locus of textual analysis, in specific filmic texts--to produce characterizations of narrative elements ('actions/events', 'verbs') equivalent to those marked digitally in natural language (and literature).[44]

NOTES for Section 1

1. See Metz on the importation of generally pertinent semiotic concepts, 1972: 196-200.

2. Jakobson 1957.

3. Using semiotic parlance, the film has a string of signifieds--among a non-finite number of signifieds--which can be acceptably translated into non-filmic signifiers (such as into purely verbal language). On this key idea of a 'verbal chain' of actions, see Barthes on the literary text and its proairetics, 1974 and 1971a.

4. Thus, as often as possible in this theoretical sketch, I will put some emphasis, for purpose of argument, on cinematically specific figurations and determinations of characterization of these verbal categories as semantic dimensions.

5. Jakobson 1957: 133.

6. Jakobson takes over the term 'shifter' from Otto Jesperson. The typical examples of shifters are words such as 'I', 'now', and 'here' whose meaning is directly tied to the actual situation of utterance (deixis). The two levels of 'what is talked about' and 'the event of speech' have received a wide variety of labels and further specifications for analysis of discourse and narrative, such as: narrated event/speech event (Jakobson), énoncé/enunciation, enounced/enunciation, history/discourse, récit/discours (Genette 1972), statement/enunciation (Nowell-Smith 1976), and narrative/discourse (Heath 1975a,b). Here we distinguish between the 'narrated events' on screen as the film's figuration--without this term restricting itself to voice-over narration of action--versus the process/action of spectatorial participation in the unreeling of the film (the film event, as discourse). Félix Guattari mentions a 'film-viewing act' (in Communications 1975: 96), but by way of analogy with Searle's theory of speech acts--a notion quite different from Jakobson's theory and its 'speech event'.

7. On the problematic notion of live speech as an 'originary' event or 'unified present origin', see Derrida 1976. Also cf. Benveniste on the 'formal apparatus of enunciation', 1974: 79-88.

8. Notice that, given to this technical base and cultural practice of the cinematic apparatus, the spectator cannot 'reply' or 'interrupt' in the film event in any closely similar way to a listener in a speech event: a dialogic reciprocity is at stake in the practice of the technological base of cinema.

9. Jakobson 1957: 133-35.

10. Heath 1975a,b.

11. James Stewart is immobilized in Hitchcock's Rear Window, for example, but this state is explained, rendered plausible, and then is the constant basis and stressed 'point' of the narrative action and sense. With Leigh's role, we must draw into awareness something occulted as 'natural' and hence left beyond particularizing attention.

12. Heath 1976: 254.

13. A mirror image of the camera and camera operator (Haskell Wexler) are seen, for instance, in Mary Lampson and Emile de Antonio's Underground.

14. Benveniste 1971: Chs. 18-21, discusses the particular semantics of the 'third' person. In Ophuls' La Ronde the master of ceremonies looks directly to the camera and addresses the audience in the second person on the sound-track ('you'): because of our coded conventions, this is 'not' the film's 'action itself', but something 'added on' which suspends the narrative as it comments upon and shifts it. Thus actors speak to one another, on and off-screen, but conventionally do not address the audience. Ben Brewster made such a point in his argument about the use of linguistic concepts in film study, but he failed to go further to determine--as done here--what types of quasi-personality films do establish with their rhetorics of figuration (Brewster 1971: 54).

15. I leave the concept of 'identification' without further specification here; without a doubt, this understanding of it is open to the same criticism which Jacqueline Rose addressed to Metz (Rose 1975). For the basis of its Freudian elaboration, Laplanche-Pontalis 1973: 205-208.

16. Branigan 1975, 1981; Heath 1976, 1981: Ch. 2; and Browne 1975.

17. Point of view was taken to its apparent limit in The Lady in the Lake (1946), where nearly the entire film is figured in point-of-view. The Big Sleep is structured so that each scene begins and ends with the detective figure present (the film spectator then seeing or hearing nothing he does not). This latter figuration would be a less elaborate effort, using the 'character code', to effect a centering on a dominant protagonist.

18. Cf. the category of status of a narrated event: if a spectator sees a 'dreamt' action and recognizes it as such, its recognized existential status is the way a 'shared' rapport is figuratively indicated between the filmic spectator and the dreamer in the filmic diegesis (P^n/P^f).

19. Metz analyzes examples, 1972: Ch. 2.

20. Hence the insistence, in recent theory, on the necessary 'barring' of the camera from the image so that the fiction on the screen retains its dream-like fascination for the immobile spectator in the darkened

theater, and so on. Cf. Metz 1977a, Baudry 1974 and 1976, other essays in Communications 1975, Kuntzel 1976, Mulvey 1975, and Rose 1976.

21. Cf. the way Heath relates Welles' style to the filmic text of Touch of Evil, 1975a: 37-38, 1975b: 107-108.

22. Textual analysis of film mimicks the disruption of deconstructive readings in the way it decenters film--given the centrality and weight which cinematic spectatorship enjoys in constituting the cultural subject. For the issues of 'center', Derrida 1978: Ch. 10.

23. In contrast to the example above from It's a Wonderful Life, here the starting premise is 'real'--the real theft in the diegesis.

24. These inflections of status depend heavily on context: voice-over narration, introduction by a zoom-in onto a face, optical (fades), and so on. If they can be ascribed to a particular character (who is 'hypothesizing'), then their existential status is marked as 'mental' (a mental image which is shared). The crime film Black Widow ascribes several varying represented versions of action (in hypothetical status) to the character of a detective as a narrating, hypothesizing source.

25. A minimum semantic unit linked to a proper name; see Barthes 1974: sec. XXVIII.

26. Jakobson 1957: 137. Also see the section on taxis, as a general, logical, connective frame or mode of action.

27. The tense structure of language is of course more complex; see Lyons 1968: sec. 7.5.

28. One example from a popular text on film: "film has no tenses--past, present, future. When we watch a film, it is just something happening--now" (Stephenson/Debrix 1965: 100-101). It would seem that what is being described here is more precisely the 'reality-effect' of cinema. Ben Brewster has also noted that "flashbacks are clearly not analogous to a past tense, their past tense being indicated syntagmatically at their introduction into the film rather than by any change in the signs indicating the actions in the flashback"(1971: 54). This repetition of the linguistic terminology--the uncanny 'necessity' of its repetition, the unsettlingly precise designation it affords to someone trying to analyze a filmic fact: 'not an analogous past tense', yet a 'syntagmatically indicated past tense' nonetheless--underscores my contention that the temporal structuring of actions in film is sufficiently analogous to demand the use of the linguistic 'names' of these structures of figuration of temporality. Brewster does not press the point to see how this factor of equivalence bridges the gap between film as a more weakly codified, analog system (which can only indicate tense at the syntagmatic level or by voice-off) and natural-verbal language as a precise, tightly coded digital system (which makes the distinction of tense at the morphological level, with 'verb endings'). On 'codified/coded',

Bellour 1979: 130; for 'analog/digital', Wilden 1972. Brewster did later approach a more comprehensive position on filmic textuality and codification in a later theoretical article, Brewster 1973.

29. Benveniste 1971: Section Five.

30. Metz 1977a, and Nowell-Smith 1976. Brewster noted this 'indifference' in his early article on the possibility of a 'film structuralism' (1971; see notes 14 and 28 above), and it was more or less taken to constitute sufficient demonstration that a structural model such as this one is irrelevant to film. Brewster arrived at such a conclusion by pointing out (correctly) that it is difficult to imagine any kind of specification of tense in film which would be ungrammatical. But it is clear that this model does not postulate anything 'normative' for film, anything like a quasi-'grammar' of film. It has become more clear that in textual analysis, what is needed is not a grammar, but the most wide and encompassing range of frames to trace the movements and patterns of figuration, discourse, semantics, and spectatorship as dynamic processes.

31. The Russian Formalists first made this point explicit with their distinction of fabula and sjuzhet.

32. Heath 1975a: 42, 73-77, and 1975b: sec. 7.

33. Benveniste 1971: Ch. 14.

34. Notice that the passive would tend to be employed to indicate an action in which the subject is an unwilling participant, 'exterior' to the action, 'antagonistic' to it. Cf. the middle voice with the reflexive, Lyons 1968: sec. 8.3.

35. Heath 1975a: 38; Barthes 1974.

36. Heath's writing acutely points to the confused scene of violence and sexuality, to which Vargas is drawn, as articulated in terms of codes of framing and the look: the murder man's daughter is brought to the scene to identify her father's body ("I...I guess that's my father."), but disdains to look at the body of his female companion, "the response and the disdain. . .mark the bad object, and that object is erased from the screen, in and from the diegetic space: the characters facing the camera in near close shot look down but the bodies are never seen; unless it be to place us in the reflection of violence: a low angle shot shows the doctor crouching and bending forward ('now you can strain him through a sieve') with a group of onlookers behind--we are in the impossible position, the object is the loss of position, of point of view, our death" (1975a: 40).

37. These 'interpretations' are necessarily formulated here in the present tense: as Lyons points out, in the English past tense the categories of mood and aspect meld together (Lyons 1968: sec. 7.5).

38. Thus it is now fully evident why it would be naive to hold to an assumption--mentioned above as a provisional starting point--of the neutrality of the 'projector' as a component in the cinematic apparatus and enunciation of film, of its being simply and neutrally in the 'declarative mood' vis-à-vis the filmic diegesis and figuration.

39. As a mark of the implicit conventions of cinematic spectatorship, consider as a counter-example the arrangement (offered once as a World's Fair attraction) by which a multiple-version film was projected: the projection stopped at periodic intervals, alternative narrative progressions were described, for which spectators voted by pushing buttons. We could say that the filmic discourse, and cinematic apparatus were placed subject to the spectators' 'imperative mood'; this practice of cinema exhibition and spectatorship is instructively different from conventional practices.

40. Jakobson 1957: 141.

41. This leaves aside consideration of the ways in which spectators are 'tuned' to contexts of expectation by/before the film event by other instruments of the cinematic apparatus (titles, advertising, genre, star system, 'author' system, theater system, and so on).

42. The documentary film would pose its own separate range of problems concerning this evidential category.

43. For 'analog/digital', Wilden 1972.

44. Section 12 below expands on the issues of marking and nomination, by developing a hypothesis of a discursive process of inner speech connected to determination of actional semantics.

SECTION 2: Theory

The Grande Syntagmatique and Segmental Analysis

What can the GS do as a mode of segmentation in film analysis? Posing the question--in terms of the force of a conceptual frame for the work of textual analysis--already shifts the context and ground of Metz's proposal.[1] For in 1966 (the date of the second version of the GS), Metz was exploring the general semiotics of the cinema as an abstract system. This viewpoint is only obliquely related to the perspective of textual analysis of film.[2] His avowed concern was with a mixed grammar and rhetoric of cinematic discourse.[3] The (in)famous "inventory" of the film Adieu Phillipine,[4] subsequent to the elaboration of the GS, accordingly, was not aimed at the film as a text, in terms of reading its semantics or figuration in a strong sense, but only as an inaugurating exercise in syntagmatic division.[5] Precisely because the large unit is a fairly obvious feature of the discourse of classic narrative film, applying the GS is not by itself a particularly strong analytic move, since (as Metz's own evaluative and interpretive conclusions after the Adieu Phillipine study demonstrate) this framework yields little information from the syntagmatic cutting for a reading of the text.[6] But the GS can function with force as an analytic frame onto figuration, if it is joined to other frames which will bear on the semantics of the dominant of the GS--narrative relations and articulations. Instead of a model (implying a strict articulation), the GS can take part in textual analysis, along with other frames of incision into a text, as a mode of segmentation (as an instrument, generating possible articulations). Accordingly,

here the frame of verbal-categorical semantics is to be coordinated to the GS.

The goal of this theoretical argument is to sketch a brief but critical review of the GS, not in the general terms of an architectonic film theory, not even especially in terms of the general semiotics of cinema within which Metz proposed the GS. Instead, this argument is aimed at the ways in which the semantics of narrative action examined above by way of verbal categories, and the pertinences of figuration of narrative action (in particular, the distribution of action into textual units such as the shot and syntagm), must be deployed and meshed with the GS in order to refashion it into a stronger instrument of textual analysis. At many points this argument takes the form of exposing the ways in which these semantic dimensions and figurational pertinences are either misconstrued in Metz's formulations, or are surreptitiously at work in his proposal in ways which weaken their availability and operational power for textual-analytic use.[7]

Since the GS is generally familiar, it will not be recapitulated here; the series of issues moves through the GS in the order in which Metz presents it.[8]

1) A first overall difficulty is that the GS is not designed with regard for analysis of textuality, and complex textual manifestations. Metz holds to the idea that, in analyzing a film, the GS describes an autonomous and coherent level of signification.[9] The units of the GS are treated only in terms of sequential co-occurrence as syntagms: as exclusive units which succeed each other as syntagms. Metz does

acknowledge that the GS has a paradigmatic dimension,[10] and that a syntagmatic analysis will confront units which are, in a strict sense, not syntagms.[11] But he gives little consideration, in formulating the GS, to the ways in which textuality can dispose of the units in simultaneous, concatenated, or embedded form. Analysis of OOC will show instances in which GS types are deployed simultaneously without the sorts of syntagmatic separations (on the figurational levels of the shot, editing, and image track) which, Metz assumes, hold instances of the GS apart as syntagms. The GS is a 'flat' logical map with its own validity in the semiotics of the cinema (as a general poetics), but concrete textual analyses here will encounter and demonstrate the ways in which figurational means (e.g., shot découpage, alternation, iteration, editing) 'distort' such an abstract, flat, and distributional map into particular manifested textual instances.

2) A second objection is that, because Metz has not begun theorization of the GS through a sorting out of crucial pertinences (figuration and discourse, action and object, time and space as figurational matter for the representation of action and object), certain categories of autonomous units are incoherent, because they are defined by unexamined mixtures of pertinences.

The first unit in the GS which Metz defines is a prime example. Metz suspects that the "bulge" of types which fall under the definition of the autonomous shot indicates the need for further specification.[12] From the theoretical perspective already established here by application of verbal categories to narrative film, the slippage of

pertinence can be better explained. Metz starts by seeking to define the autonomous shot as a certain relation of narrative (an "episode of plot") to figuration (i.e., the figurational unit established by a single textual unit of the image track: a shot). But because each of these items contain implicitly a number of large theoretical notions, which Metz does not develop, the definition of this first syntagmatic category wobbles from pertinence to pertinence, and becomes a mare's nest of heterogeneous subtypes. On one hand Metz puts forward the plan-séquence as an autonomous shot, as a relation of one "action" to one shot; on the other hand are the four kinds of inserts as autonomous shots. Metz's initial definition of the category cannot cover both, if the notion of figuration--and with it the concept of filmic textuality--has not been introduced as a starting point.

The inserts do not depend on a ratio of 'action' versus 'textual unit', although Metz implies they do. The non-diegetic insert of an object can only be fully defined in discursive terms, as a rupture of figurational time-space, i.e., in terms of spheres of figuration of action and object, where action has hierarchically dominant status in defining the primary (supposedly 'denotational') diegetic sphere.

But also, here (and for the rest of the inserts) Metz forgets that a displaced diegetic insert need not, on figurational or discursive grounds, be manifested in a single shot. Hence the coherence of the syntagmatic category--as a defined complex of pertinences--comes apart.

The subjective insert involves many pertinences of discourse and figuration which Metz leaves unexamined. To be effectively described

in a theoretical way, the subjective insert should be delineated as a discursive shift of 'embedding', which explicitly figures the 'topic'[13] of a mental action. Verbal categories of tense, person, status, aspect, and evidential would accordingly specify the relations between the dominant and embedded figurations of action/object.

The 'displaced' diegetic insert can only be understood if displacement is analyzed as a particular but major discursive-figurational operation affecting represented time-space; the designation of "normal" and "foreign" simply are not compatible with Metz's pertinences for the GS, and they offer only a weak and non-dynamic description of displacement. The example Metz offers ("an image that, while remaining entirely 'real', is displaced from its normal filmic position and is purposely intruded into a foreign syntagm. Example: within a sequence showing the pursuers, a single shot of the pursued is inserted"[14]) depends in the economy of signification and figuration, on a break of discursively dominant time-space continuity of action by a passage from the verbal categories of 'agent' (pursuer) to 'patient' (pursued), into a hierarchically subsidiary representation of the object of action.[15] Economically, the displacement works a recuperative exchange between figurational rupture ("intrusion"), and semantic intelligibility and expansion. (Again, notice that displacement of diegesis, as an overarching discursive-figurational operation, need not operate in an 'insert' of one shot.)

Last, the explanatory insert can only be weakly defined, if held in isolation from issues of text and discourse. As given by Metz, the

explanatory insert can hardly be kept separate from the subjective insert. A more powerful definition would stress that in an explanatory insert an action or object undergoes a shift in figuration designed to ensure its explicit and legible transmission, as discourse, to the filmic spectator. (A closeup of a letter is therefore a moment in which the discourse, after focussing the spectator onto the object as a dominant and significant element of figuration, then 'delivers' the object in a figurational disposition calculated for legibility for spectators.)

3) Another difficulty is that Metz's distinctions of syntagms depend, covertly, on a differential pertinence between narrative action and narrative object. Consider the second and third types in the GS, which Metz isolates in tandem by way of a pertinence of the temporary absence of denotative temporality. What further pertinence subsequently distinguishes the parallel from the bracket syntagm? A pertinence of semantics or semantic structure--'alternating' or contrastive semantics (for example, 'rich/poor' or 'country/city') for parallel, versus the unified semantics of the bracket syntagm (for example, a string of various 'scenettes' with the same symbolic signifieds)? This would appear to be so on the surface, but this kind of pertinence is not compatible with the GS as a whole, as a syntagmatics of narrative film figuration. Another pertinence undoubtedly operating surreptitiously here, in Metz's GS, is a distinction between object and action (as these are figured, respectively, in the given examples of parallel and bracket syntagms). But this distinction needs

to be put explicitly into the foreground of analysis of narrative film. A more powerful model of these two syntagms would call on economic concepts such as 'dominant/subsidiary' figurational spheres, 'density' of figuration, and anaphoric and cataphoric discursive relations. Accordingly, a bracket syntagm is a densely figured subsidiary sphere of objects, whose semantic links are to be made in discourse to the dominant narrative chains of action/object in cataphoric relation to the bracket. The parallel syntagm is further defined by the figurative foregrounding of some sort of semantic opposition which dominant narrative action will re-employ in a thematic, but less dense disposition. In both cases issues of semantics--which take us quite beyond the ostensible set of pertinences with which Metz claims to develop the GS--are the links between 'dense' and 'dominant' spheres of figuration. Other, more powerful concepts must be called upon to theorize the filmic facts Metz is broaching.

4) Furthermore, the semantics of verbal categories--particularly that of the aspectual categories of completion (i.e., perfective/imperfective aspect) and iteration (i.e., iterative frequency), or taxis --operate at many points across Metz's GS, but in a confused way, partly explicit, partly implicit and unacknowledged.

In an earlier, smaller version of the GS,[16] Metz made the 'frequentative' modality the main pertinent trait of a separate category of the syntagmatic (with three sub-types). But in the final (to date) version of the GS, he redistributed these types, evidently out of a desire to restrict as much as possible the pertinences which differentiate the syntagmatic types.[17]

Consider the bracket syntagm again. It is patent in Metz's examples here that this unit has a marked verbal-categorical characterization of frequency (iterative aspect), and that this feature of frequency, therefore, should be an explicit, general, and operative pertinence in the syntagmatic. (In the earlier version of the GS, Metz made it explicit as a criterion.) Or consider the episodic syntagm (the seventh type on the GS). Its figuration depends on the condensed, partial figuration of phases of a continuing action. Metz had earlier specified this type as 'semi-frequentative'; in the final version of the GS he insists that it is more a matter of figurational condensation than iteration (i.e., verbal-categorical aspect) which is pertinent in delineating the unit. However, although he mentions that it is a "phase" of a "process", Metz has mistaken the relevant verbal-categorical characterization of aspect: the episodic sequence depends, for its intelligibility, not on an aspect of iteration, but on an imperfective aspect. The gap of time-space in the action's figuration is economized against the continuity of continuing and unitary action. Metz claims of the ordinary sequence that "on se contente de 'sauter' les moments jugés sans interêt pour l'intrigue," and of the episodic sequence that "aucune de ces évocations n'est traitée avec toute l'ampleur syntagmatique qu'elle peut comporter,"[18] but that cognitive process of acceptable elision, this problem of economy of figuration, both precisely call for much more precise and detailed analysis in any concrete textual analysis.

And, therefore, the alternating syntagm (the fifth type on the the GS), demands a more powerful definition than Metz can give it with the

range of pertinences he has deployed. Alternation would be better approached by way of spatial discontinuity of figuration, temporal simultaneity or consecution in figuration, plus verbal-categorical characterizations of aspect (continuing action, 'imperfective' aspect marked to individual actions) and taxis (taxic characterization of simultaneity covering both actions[19]).

Thus, this re-transcription of the parallel and bracket syntagms from the GS into explicit terms of action and object, figuration, economy, and semantics of verbal categories shows how the GS can be made to serve as more supple and forceful frame for textual analysis as reading.

5) Another difficulty is Metz's untested belief that an exclusive binary opposition of denotation versus connotation can serve well to delineate syntagms. Consider, for instance, the way in which a pertinence of temporality of figuration is employed to separate the two nonchronological syntagms (the second and third types on the GS): Metz writes of "a temporary withdrawal of the signified of temporal denotation."[20] Metz therefore assumes that the temporality of these two figurational types is connotative, and isolated from the 'main' diegesis. But, as an example from OOC to be analyzed below will demonstrate, a viewpoint of exclusive binarity (such as 'denotation/connotation') serves poorly as a working pertinence in textual analysis, where a workable and much stronger perspective is afforded by questioning the levels of figurational diegetization.[21] In particular, the parallel syntagm can be rather heavily diegetized into the temporal-spatial figuration of a narrative by embedding.

In the series of textual analyses interspersed in this work, no effort will be made to mark a sharp and exclusive distinction of zones of denotative versus connotative semantics.

6) Sometimes in presenting the GS, Metz loses a semiotic stance, sliding towards a viewpoint which could perhaps be called quasi-nominalist (in which the world of things represented in film signifies by its innate properties or essence, rather than in a dynamic semiotic interplay via codes). This bears, in a particular instance, on the problem of action, codes, intelligibility, figuration, and discourse. Metz claims that a descriptive syntagm (the fourth syntagmatic type of the GS) "may very well cover an action, provided that it is an action whose only intelligible internal relationship is one of spatial parallelism at any given moment in time."[22] But this avoids the key issues pertinent to any syntagmatic division: the coded intelligibility of action, and the focus achieved by figuration on the level of actional detail. (These problems will be taken up in section 12 below, and addressed by a theory of actional nameability.) Metz's example of a descriptive syntagm ("Example: a flock of sheep being herded [views of the sheep, the shepherd, the sheepdog, etc.]"[23]) demonstrates the nub of the problem with good precision, since consecution (as an "intelligible internal relation" of action, of phases within action, or of an action to another action) can appear (1) if the viewer has codes of proairesis which allow him/her to delineate phases of such an action, or (2) if the figuration has focussed expectation onto consecution at a very low level (e.g., a discursive effect of

'suspense'[24]). There is nothing innate here in the action: consecution is a dynamic discursive production of legible relations of temporal relations and phases, and, when dealing with filmic representation, the effect and signification of consecution must be analyzed by way of the concepts of figuration and codes.[25]

7) A final point concerns the delineation of a scene: "a spatial-temporal integrality (ensemble) experienced as being without 'flaws'", "a unit. . .experienced as being 'concrete': a place, a moment in time, an action, compact and specific."[26] While the methodological choice of exclusive focus on the image track, which Metz made in preparing the GS, has its validity, it still must be marked as a criticism of the GS that many scenes, whose figuration does not seem, say, markedly fantastic, still demand that the figurational role of the sound-track (noises, speech) be necessarily be called into consideration for the textual analyst to construct and explicate the delimitation of the scene and its 'experienced' unity. The 'artificial context' (such as exclusion of the sound track) under which the GS was developed, as an abstract syntagm, cannot be carried over into the working practice of textual analysis.

A good way to sum up this review of the GS is to refer to the closing portion of Metz's chapter, where he avows the difficulty of locating the object of analysis of the GS: "it is no easy matter to decide whether the GS of film involves the cinema, or the cinematic narrative."[27] In this work, by its grounding on a series of concrete textual analyses, by its aim for a consistent focus onto issues of

figuration, discourse, economy, and text, we can avoid this sort of slippage or symptomatic oscillation of topic--which Metz in 1968, before the practice of textual analysis of films had effectively begun, could only avow _après coup_.

NOTES for Section 2

1. Metz 1966 and 1974a: Ch. 5.

2. This oblique orientation of textual analysis of film with regard to cinema semiotics, and the skewed intersection of their emphases and projects, goes far to explain the difficulty of a direct and full collaboration between the two; cf. the story of Metz and Bellour's miscarried effort to collaborate on a textual analysis of Notorious, Bellour 1979: 18.

3. Metz 1974a: 117-19.

4. Metz 1974a: Ch. 6.

5. Much of the American debate around Metz has misconstrued the basic premises of his arguments and theory. Brian Henderson, for one example, has even claimed that Barthes' notion of the 'lexia' (an operationally manageable fragment cut from the text for reading), because of its variability, demonstrates the irrelevance of the sort of determined syntagmatic articulation of units attempted in Metz's GS (Henderson 1980: Ch. 7).

6. As Metz says, the scene, not the shot, is the dominant concern of classical narrative film. But draw from this fact the challenging consequence that a syntagmatic découpage of a film, constrained by the discursive parameters of that narrative-representational cinematic practice, will necessarily yield very little about the film's semantics. His own chapter presenting interpretive conclusions, based on the syntagmatic analysis of Adieu Phillipine, demonstrates this distance from textual analysis and reading (Metz 1974a: Ch. 7).

7. See Metz 1974a: Ch. 5, sec. 3, where he discusses the non-pertinence of the linguistic double articulation to cinema, by way of an argument about the status of the shot (versus the linguistic articulations of the word or sentence). Once again, Metz was not aware of the ways in which textual analyses could dispose of codes and their articulations in order to read a level of semantically loaded textual patterns (where codes and articulations converge and diverge)--which is the effective application of the model of the double articulation in film analysis.

8. The GS is developed in Metz 1974a: 119-33. Because the English translation is occasionally imprecise, I will cite the French original in a few instances below (Metz 1968: 121-34). Also see Metz's (1972: Ch. 10) and Bellour's (1979: 247-70) later discussions of the GS.

9. Metz 1974a: 120 (note).

10. Metz 1974a: 137-40, 1972: 201.

11. Metz 1974a: 124.

12. Metz 1974a: 133. Bellour sharply exposes this problem while questioning Metz in interview (Metz 1972: Ch. 10, and Bellour 1979: 248-49).

13. I.e., the 'object' or 'content', in the logical sense, of the action: comparable to the phenomenological 'noema'.

14. Metz 1974a: 125.

15. The most extensive discussion and application of the linguistic category of agent/patient to narrative is offered by Bremond 1973.

16. Metz 1966. According to Metz, this comprises the second version of the GS (the first is from 1964, unpublished).

17. Or, possibly, out of a realization that the pertinence of verbal categories for a syntagmatics of narrative film was larger than he was prepared to treat.

18. Metz 1968: 131-32. Ampleur hints at the sort of economic models of a ratio of figuration/proairetics, via minima and thresholds of size, which will be sketched out in section 12 below.

19. And: the characterization could of course cover more than two actions.

20. Metz 1974a: 125.

21. Cf. Metz's later theoretical work, which treats figuration in terms of degrees of and paths of secondarization (Metz 1977a: Part IV).

22. Metz 1974a: 128.

23. Metz 1974a: 128.

24. In, for instance, a Hitchcockian suspense scene: the description/narration opposition falters, since attention is intensely focussed onto any signifier in what is described in image/sound, which could be the possible and expected (narrative) succession of a violence. In such an intensity, whether the figuration is describing or narrating is undecidable.

25. And therefore, the 'narration/description' opposition does not function as an exclusive, binary concept in textual analysis.

26. Metz 1974a: 130.

27. Metz 1974a: 143.

SECTION 3: Analysis

An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge

Notes on method and protocols of presentation of the analysis

1. The shot number references correspond to the shot analysis of the film prepared by Barrett and Erskine.[1] Shot numbers are given in parentheses in the text.

2. The analysis is laid out in a series of twelves 'segments', a unit which here has only an operational status (following Bellour): a fragment of the text bounded by sharp figurational changes.[2] Each segment is characterized in terms of the GS as a Metzian "autonomous segment" or group of them, along with discussion of the issues and difficulties presented by the film's discourse and figuration for such syntagmatic cutting.

3. The codes used in the analytic description are drawn, with adaptions, from textual analyses of film and literature by Bellour and Barthes.[3] The codes and their abbreviations are:

--FRM: the framing/scale of the image;
--S/M: static versus moving camera during the shot;
--ANG: camera angle;
--CHR: specification of characters present within the image frame;
--TOS: comparative duration of the shot;
--ST: specification of music, noise, speech of the sound track;
--HER: the hermeneutic code of posed narrative enigmas;

--ACT: the proairetic code of intelligible action sequences;

--SYM: the general symbolic code of semantics;

--SEM: the code of local connotative semes;

--REF: the code of referential-cultural 'knowledge'.

The codes adapted from Bellour tend to have pertinence for the 'material' of figuration (in Hjelmslev's terminology, codes of expression); those from Barthes have pertinence for the logic of figuration and representation (in a general way, codes of content in Hjelmslev's terminology).[4]

4. The 'grain' of detail of the writing of the analysis moves--almost --at the shot-by-shot level. However, in contrast to Bellour's practice of textual analysis and some other textual analyses done below here, in this version of the analysis of OOC the codes were not exploited methodically to analyze the textuality or semantics of each shot (as, for instance, a fragment from Psycho will be analyzed later, in order to construct an analytic table to represent the textual surface). Instead, within each segment the most salient features for a reading were described by reference to the largest number of pertinent codes from the ensemble.

5. Implicitly, the method effecting the syntagmatic cutting of the text was Hjelmslev's commutation test.[5] However, verbally and explicitly detailing this see-sawing movement[6] between signifier and signified is too lengthy and tedious when the grain of analysis is comparatively 'fine' and the target is a large text.

6. The two main theoretical issues addressed throughout the textual analysis--semantics of verbal categories tied to the proairetic code, and the segmentation of large units--will lead to a first examination of issues of economy of action, its semantics, and its figuration into textual segments. Therefore the textual analysis seeks to outline the increasing, but also self-effacing and self-revising 'contexture' of the actional chain across the unreeling of the text and figuration.

7. The proairetic code will be provisionally and operationally listed here in separate units, and in generic sequences at what seems to be an appropriate level of specificity/generality of nomination, guided by the large units of the text determined by segmentation.[7] Later, in its turn, what might seem to be only an 'operational' problem of describing or naming the text will be scrutinized (in Section 12) as a facet of a fundamental discursive operation relating text to spectator in enunciation.

Analysis of the film

SEGMENT 1: shot 1

While of course the minimum unit of a film is not the frame, but the shot, the shot is not necessarily autonomous; Metz's GS begins its branching tree format with an opposition of the autonomous shot versus syntagms of two or more shots. This first segment of OOC is a quite clear-cut example of the GS's autonomous shot: a medium close shot (FRM) tilting up along a charred tree stump, freezing in mid-shot (S/M)

when a notice attached to the stump comes into frame (which warns of summary military execution by hanging for any civilian attempting sabotage), then continuing the tilt movement up to a gray sky. Among Metz's five sub-types of the autonomous shot this would seem most closely a non-diegetic insert, since the warning notice in its space is not directly inserted into the diegetic space of action. It 'logically' precedes the action as a semantic context for the hanging in abstract time. But it also shares an important function of the explanatory insert, since the freeze-frame, as a presentational figure of the object, has the function of assuring the readable transmission of the writing (i.e., an instance of the discourse of the film figuring the filmic text for a particular spectatorial access, by manipulation of the S/M code). REF: the typography, date ("April, 1862"), and daggered ornamentation of the notice signal the 'nineteenth century' and the 'Civil War'. The written text amidst the general filmic text provides an abstract but sequential ACTional program ('sabotage' + 'execution') which is not (yet) figured in image, and for which the CHR code is blank. But even at this point, the HER code is invested with a diffuse anticipation of the prospective figurational filling of these action/object slots of the small narrative program. The superimposed title of the film, towards the end of the shot, re-charges economically the HER code concerning action--while provisionally specifying the space of the future representation with a toponymic label ("Owl Creek"). This verbal-written actional label, at the highest level of abstract generality (an "occurrence"), poses the major and continuing

enigma of the narrative: will it be semantically saturated by representation of some "interference" of sabotage or a hanging (or: both)? The extreme, even 'Olympian' generality of the title ("occurrence") signifies an irony of pseudo-designation (SYM: ironic distance). The SEM and SYM codes mutually pick up on the charred stump, smoke drifting through the frame, and the loud martial drum roll continuing through the shot's duration (ST) for signifieds of 'desolation of war', 'struggle', and 'death'. Retrospectively, this segment is in strong contrast to the following segments in terms of TOS and ANG: the freeze makes this shot longer (36 seconds) than the brief shots typical of the violent action to follow (some shots as brief as 2 seconds), and the tilt up is in strong and immediate contrast to the flat and down angles of the immediately following shots.

SEGMENT 2: shots 2-30

After long lateral tracking shots through a wooded ravine, a railway bridge comes into view, and a civilian ('Peyton Farquhar', hereafter abbreviated to PF[8]) is prepared for an execution by hanging from the bridge (as a file of soldiers watch, the noose is placed, PF is positioned on a plank out over the creek, and so on). Because of the tight spatial and temporally successive unity of the actional sequence figured here, over and beyond the breaks of figuration in the shot changes, these shots comprise one of the types of linear narrative syntagms of the GS: a <u>scene</u>. Since on the ACT code now appear successive articulations of the actional chain, the beginning of an

intelligible narrativity is clearly offered for the spectator; it is this successiveness of action which forms the relevant and distinctive trait marking off the scene from the descriptive syntagm. It should be noted that, in terms of the CHR code, all the characters of the diegesis have appeared save one (PF's wife). The HER code poses the questions: 'Who is he?', 'Is he guilty of sabotage?', 'Will he be hanged?'. The figuration breaks off from the first segment by the S/M and ST codes: as the very long (TOS) left-to-right tracking shots (S/M) move through the bare branches of the ravine's trees as if to unveil the execution site (SEM: the kinesic significations[9] of 'approach' and 'uncover'), the harsh cries of the 'owls' (presumably) begin to be intermingled with military commands, with a bugle call (ST and REF: 'birds as omens', 'military routine'). Thus, at first, the ACT code is actualized not by the image-track, but by speech off. These bird cries, which grow to a crescendo during a shot of the rising sun, the stark branches and trees swept past in the tracking shots, plus two shots with 'absent' human CHR coding (shot 25: a log sluggishly floating along the stream; shot 27: the sun just risen above a ridge-crest) all interplay to yield SEM: 'indifferent Nature'. A number of banal items are indicated on REF: 'harshness of a civil war', traditional 'death at dawn for spies', and so on; and playing on even more traditional iconographics, the 'river of time' and an ironic conjunction of death and new daylight (for this last two, SYM: ironical antitheses of elements).

As the narrative begins to unfold in the later shots of this segment, there is an economic overloading of establishing information[10]

signified through the SEM and SYM codes: 78

(1) Vestimentary codings (PF's embroidered vest, frilly dress shirt versus a redundant mass of dark uniforms, together with flags, tents, orders, bugle calls, etc.) work together with sheer numbers to signal PF as an 'isolated civilian' amidst a 'military crowd'.

(2) The onlooking file of soldiers, plus another two separate shots in closeup (FRM, CHR) (shot 6: an officer's bored and expressionless face; shot 15: his hands twisting his sabre hilt) give 'the boring theater of ritual execution and official death as a repetitious job'.

(3) Vestimentary coding again as the collar of PF's shirt is rolled back by the executioner to be replaced by the noose (13): SEM: kinesics of a threatening bodily constraint or touching; vestimentary 'decoration' is replaced by a deadly 'utility'.

(4) The long tracking shots (2-5) establishing the scene give SEM: 'scene of violence hidden away, in a veiled and remote place'.

(5) The shot of the officer's fidgeting hands on the sword hilt, as well as those of his bored face or the captain's impassive face (28, 38) are ironically juxtaposed (SYM) to two matched closeups of PF's agonized visage, and legs and hands struggling in their bonds (36, 37).

(6) All the proxemic semes (SEM: 'being physically close to someone at intimate range', 'touching and arranging someone's body') of the actions preparing the hanging will be ironically mirrored and reversed (SYM) in the next segment of the text.

Many important signifieds of this segment, especially kinesic ones, are opened up for scrutiny by way of the FRM, S/M, TOS, and ANG codes and their figurational work. Just as other veils are to be penetrated or

pulled back into place in the course of the film, the figurative unveiling mentioned above should also be noted as one in which the characters are first seen at an extreme distance (2, 5) in mobile shots, the camera then 'moving into' the actional space of the diegesis, interpolating itself among the acting bodies and their space of action/movement. The initial tracking shots give way to briefer static medium and close shots except for a few tracking and zoom shots (18, 20, 21) which are importantly marked as 'subjective': these shots figure PF's vision, in motion, as he imagines his path if he were to free himself and run along the bridge in an attempt to escape (S/M homogenous and congruent with PF's 'psychological'/hodological motion through space).

The lateral motion of the shots figuratively embodying PF's look are played against two very extreme camera angles which figuratively emphasize a vertical kinesic axis (which is, very precisely, the axis of 'real' future movement of PF's body in the action of hanging): shot 11, a nearly vertical low-angle shot of the hangman's face and hands as he forms the noose (through its unusualness and distortion, SEM: 'horribleness'), and shot 14, a vertical high-angle shot, with slight hand-held camera swaying, down past PF's feet at the end of the plank, with the stream flowing below (ANG, S/M, SEM: subjective vision, coenesthesic vertigo). These two shots, together with those of PF's look and imagined escape, map out an striking figuration of hodological/kinesic axes patterning the 'real' and 'imaginary' space of action:



The disposition of the ACT code for this segment could be characterized as a passage from general notation ('military activity') to a specific actional program ('execute by hanging'), a program whose intelligible phases are distributed and figured into separate shots of the scene (as the military agents of actions carry out preparations). The segment thus actualizes into manifest and 'specific' figuration the abstract narrative program of segment 1: 'interfering' (sabotage is logically implied, and retrospectively ascribed as an action to PF-as-agent) ==> 'hanging' (the specific actional instance delivered as figuration to the spectator). On the other side, PF as the 'patient' of the dominant actional program, is figured--without obvious rupture of the scenic figuration--in a mental action ('wishing/imagining to escape').

Verbal-categorical characterization is a strong way to specify actional relation, and to aim the analysis of the figuration of action. The actional program of hanging is a strongly conventional sequence of phases and actions, and therefore forms the principal armature of the scene's figuration. The majority of shots figure soldiers' actions as phases of that actional program, and this figurational dominance produces and is matched to the dominant verbal-categorical charac-

terization of taxis among phases of action: the phases are semantically marked as a causally dependent and successive taxic relation. This semantic continuity thus stands hierarchically superior to the figurational discontinuity (e.g., shot changes) of the text. The mental action of PF (his imagining) stands in a subsidiary taxic relation: in mere 'simultaneity' with the dominant taxis, but without any interruptive taxic characterization. Shots 17-20 can be examined in some detail to show how the discourse shifts figuration to PF's subjectivity, and thereby establishes the verbal-categorical characterization of person and status for his action. The shift of focalization depends upon the conventional pattern of point-of-view editing[11] at the level of the shot, and of shot-to-shot relations of imaginary space(s) organized by an action of looking. In shots 17 and 19 PF looks off screen, and in shots 18 and 20 the camera tracks and zooms at eye-level angle out along the bridge and beyond it. Point-of-view editing is a figurational (rhetorical) convention to mark semantically the succeeding shot with first-person characterization. But the figuration goes further by joining that characterization to a distinctive S/M coding of camera movement. This economic 'excess' of movement in the figuration, inside the point-of-view pattern (beyond or over the first-person characterization of shots 18 and 20), operates figuratively as a metaphor and displacement. A metaphor <u>for</u> bodily movement, by a figurative displacement of the look <u>from</u> his body, it signifies an <u>action</u> of escape by PF, 'abstract' in verbal-categorical status and 'potential/conditional' in verbal-categorical mood. The action could

be verbally notated as 'if I could break free I could run along the bridge and...'.[8] Notice that the figurative identification of spectator's and diegetic character's looks in shots 18 and 20 is the discursive operation which elicits the 'shifted' and 'shared' intelligibility of action (P^nE^n/P^f, where P^n and P^f 'share' the same understanding of a modalized action, since $P^n = P^f$).

The rationale of the repetition of this complex modal figuration of an action of escape--with two successive 'minimum cells' of point-of-view editing, operations of displacement, metaphor, and verbal-categorical characterizations of an abstract action--seems to depend upon an economy of balance, establishing the active subjectivity of a passive patient of a main actional chain by a subtle but repeated figure of subjectivity with the CHR, FRM, S/M, and ANG codes.

It is worthwhile to pursue the particular issues of the figuration of an action of looking in this second segment a little further. In shots 25-28 the subjectivity of PF is again figured by point-of-view editing and a metaphoric prolepsis through a figured object, but here a repetition works to annul that subjectivity by 'sharing' it with the captain. Shot 25 (a log floating downstream, figured in high angle) is retrospectively subjectivized by shot 26 (PF, head turned, watching the log, turns his head back to the camera, grimaces, and closes his eyes); shot 27 provides a retrospective cause for the grimace and closing of the eyes (the glaring sun, just risen above the ridgeline, with an upsurge of loud bird cries), and is in turn retrospectively subjectivized into a point-of-view figure by shot 28 (the captain turns his

head and look away from PF, and looks back at the sunrise. The first retrospective discursive embedding produces a metaphor: PF's body, swimming in escape, would be like the log moving in the water. But the subjectivity of that metaphor (figured by a rhetoric of subjectivity in looking, which operates at the level of discursive linkages of shot-to-shot) is checked or annulled by the subsequent and inclusive embedding of PF's look into the captain's look, and the manifest 'sharing' there of an object of looking. In the prior figures of shots 17-20, the filmic discourse figured PF's subjectivity in an action of looking as 'private' (i.e., figured directly from PF to the viewer, not to the soldiers); now that privileging by discourse and figuration is withdrawn and cancelled.[13]

SEGMENT 3: shot 31

This segment--a single shot figuring a tableau of PF's wife and children on the lawn in front of an antebellum mansion, his wife rising and approaching the camera at eye level (ANG)--is introduced in shot 30 by a pan movement right out along the plank over the stream on which PF stands, then changing into a tilt up to his face, and a zoom-in to his features with eyes closed. These aspects of camera motion and framing (S/M, FRM) signify, according to a conventional rhetoric, the subjective insert, a subtype of the first category of the GS, the autonomous shot. This syntagm--the woman's action, the family members as object--cannot be temporally oriented in the diegesis except by stipulating that at this moment in the diegesis, these figured elements are the

object of PF's mental action. ACT and REF: 'to dream, imagine, hallucinate before an imminent violent death'. SEM and REF: 'the Southern belle' (via the vestimentary code: her hoop skirt, locket, white skin, dark hair, sewing articles in her lap), and 'family life, home, safety, Heimlichkeit', even an antithetical opposition between the children's rope swing and the noose around PF's neck at the bridge. The HER code poses: 'Does she know he is dying?' and 'Will she be able to see him again?' (as it re-asks implicitly 'Will he die by hanging?'). The conventional REF reference stabilizing the disruption and shifting of figuration is that of 'psychology of extreme situations and mental states of panic' along with the folkloristic commonplace of 'having one's life or loved ones flash before the mind's eye' (ACT: imagining). For CHR, of course, we have PF absent as the image-track figures the topic of his mental action. The 'subjective' and 'distorted' nature (SEM, SYM) of the material figured in the insert's image is 'discreetly' figured by the sound-track (a male voice off, which a spectator must presume to be PF's, repeats the name "Abby" three times; the wife does not speak as she arises and approaches in slow motion; another sound, a distorted ticking, presumably off, begins and increases in volume).

The change in the CHR code, with the concomitant ruptures of figurational space-time and diegetic level of reality, form this major turn of discourse and figuration. Verbal categories participate fully in this turn: person (the segment is marked by a rhetoric of narrative film narration/enunciation as 'first-person' for PF), gender (a marked change from the male and military scene of ritual execution), status

(the woman's actions--rising, looking, smiling--have no easy, plausible context against the prior text, and therefore these actions take on a status characterization not as 'actual', but as actions 'desired'/imagined by PF), mood (the status defined for the woman's actions is figured by way of PF as enunciator of the image-track, as the marked 'mental subject' of the visually figured actions), taxis (the discursive shift into representation of the topic of PF's mental action is itself figured by a mobile metonymy--a pan from a closeup of the soldier's foot on the plank, out to PF's own feet at the other, unsupported end of the plank--a metonymy which delivers the taxic characterization of causality between the impending action of hanging and the caused action of imagining), and aspect (the metonymic/ synedochic focalization by the closeup of the soldier's boot, holding the plank in place, signifies the 'perfective'/completed aspect of the sequence of preparatory actions, and the 'inceptive' aspect of the terminal action of hanging itself).

In terms of an economy of figuration, this segment and its mental action of 'imagining' present themselves for accounting as the most marked figurational turn in the text so far unreeled, splitting the scene's terms of image and sound continuity around its dominant actional sequence. But this move of the filmic discourse nonetheless takes its place and functions within a defined rhythmic pattern of past and anticipated 'future' actions, intensities, and actional relations. Consider, for instance, this chain of figured internal and external actions:

1) PF's mental action imagining escape;

2) PF's look is seen and cancelled;

3) PF's imagining of his wife's action of greeting;

4) the plausibly anticipated action of hanging PF.

From 1 to 4, the representational and figurational intensity[14] rises, and the second and fourth actions mark a figured overcoming or eclipsing of PF's mental actions and the actions embedded in them with imaginary status ('imagined escape', 'imagined return to home').

SEGMENT 4: shots 32-40

Again these nine shots, because of their spatial-temporal unity, form a scene: the final wait on the bridge before the execution, and the drop. It could be considered as the second part of a scene begun in segment 3, interrupted by the subjective insert of segment 4; one value in taking it as a separate segment lies in focussing on the manner in which it noticeably 'harshly' breaks away from the subjective insert. Just before segment 3 ends a quite loud male voice (revealed to be the captain's) says "Take his watch!" and the image-track cuts to PF's surprised face in a medium closeup (ST, FRM, CHR) as he is 'returned to reality' and relieved of his watch. This 'punctuational' effect, by disruptive graphic and sonic change, has been analyzed by Metz under the label "montage with effect".[15] The figurational violence of the rupture for PF, and discursive violence of the rupture for the spectator, can be delineated by the verbal-category of person. In segment 4, the textual unit of the shot, as a continuum of the

image-track, was discursively marked as a subjective frame in terms of the category of person. Accordingly, the sound-track with that shot is similarly marked--therefore the accompanying speech (calling the woman's name) is ascribed to the same 'locus' of subjectivity. But the captain's command to seize PF's watch intrudes into the bounds of the subjective frame of discourse, forming a figure or trope of anacoluthon.

Theft of the watch gives SEM: 'squalidity of war' (as it reinforces, along with PF's vestimentary codings, his figuration as a wealthy civilian); SYM: loss of ('real') time as a metaphor of death; REF: robbing the dead in wartime. The following two shots are of especial interest. As if to recapitulate once again the SEM thematics of 'spectacle of death as ritual', a call to attention is heard, and in an extreme long shot (FRM) the motionless party of figures on the bridge, under the eyes of the file of soldiers, is seen standing motionless (34). In 35, SEM/REF 'still life' is formed by the FRM, S/M, and ANG codes which present the group on the bridge from below. These articulations economically intensify the 'incipient' action (in its aspectual characterization) through their silence (ST) and probably unexpected dilation of waiting for the spectactor. The HER code would seem to register the question 'Will he in fact die by hanging?' as well as the implicit voyeuristic speculation about the interplay of discourse and figuration for the spectator, 'How much will be seen/shown?'. PF's sobs supplant the previous elements of 'anguish-laden' sounds (the sharp bird cries, creaking of bridge timbers) as his face and hands are

figured in two closeup views (36, 37). Then, in three brief shots (39-41) the vertical kinesic axis of the fall is reinforced by downward camera tilts which keep continuity of PF's body moving downward in relation to framelines (FRM, S/M, ANG, TOS), in a remarkable piece of cinematography. But in shot 40, the last of segment 4, PF's body falls out of frame, an important articulation of the CHR code for later readings of the filmic text.

This fourth segment is bridged over to the next, once again, by sound which works both to punctuate separate units and to signify (an economy of figurational 'double duty': the representational filmic text has a certain genius in its expense of resources). A loud, somewhat gong-like sound figures the hangman's noose and rope snapping taut and breaking, plunging PF into the creek's water. ACT: in the place of execution, 'to escape death by hanging through a freakish accident'.

SEGMENT 5: shots 41-54

PF plunges into the creek, sinks to the bottom, releases his noose and bonds, removes his boots, and swims up to the surface. This summary actional notation would seem to indicate just how smoothly these fourteen shots flow from the preceding segment without any overt breaks of diegesis, in accord with a typical cause-and-effect linear actional chain as narrative armature. But these shots can be rather clearly marked off as an autonomous syntagmatic unit on the tandem bases of the CHR code and the verbal category of number inflecting the semantics of

action (PF now is alone in action and in the figurational space of the image track). We could say that, in terms of its 'verbs' as notated units of narrative action, the category of number here signifies the beginning of a separable unit as the specification of number changes from plural to singular (e.g., 'They march PF out' is succeeded by 'He frees his hands').[16] Somewhat less distinctively, the shift is marked by the HER code, where 'Will he drown?' supplants 'Will he hang?' as the chief actional enigma, since now a new non-anthropomorphic threat is spurring the diegesis. Again on the basis of its linear unity and lack of marked figurational discontinuity,[17] these shots form a separate scene in terms of the Metzian GS. ANG, FRM, and S/M work to sluggishly reverse the downward kinesic axis established in the preceding scene. The gurgling 'water sounds' of the ST--a sharply different turn of sonic figuration--with the underwater photography give SEM: 'exoticity', SYM: a 'different' world of nature, but equally menacing for PF. These signifieds are reinforced in shot 53 when one of PF's boots, after being removed, drifts slowly down toward the creek bottom, the camera 'floating' with it in a lazy tilt down (ANG, S/M, CHR: for the phase of the shot, PF absent). The figure weaves together metaphor and metonymy in a condensed, laconic, and yet economically quite expressive node: a part of PF which he must discard to save his life, an equivalent for him as threatened, sinking victim of the water. The filmic discourse 'naturally' and subtly makes its semantic progress by spinning figures, by a passage from acting body to mobile object.

As the last shot ends, PF is seen from underwater below as he breaks the surface, thus saturating and rendering legible the dominant

actional label for the fifth segment, ACT: 'to save oneself from drowning'; REF: the human 'instinct of self-preservation'.

SEGMENT 6: shots 55-62

This segment presents theoretically interesting difficulties of reading and classification. The ACTional summary could be given as: 'PF breaks the surface of the creek, and, realizing he is alive, contemplates Life and Nature'. Shot 55, a medium closeup framed in a slight high angle from above the water, ends with his look around him; the seven shots following are closeups of nature (trees, backlit tree leaves, insects) with vocal-musical accompaniment. Now it may be the case that the first shot of the segment, 55, could be considered as a distinct diegetic and figurative step, therefore as an autonomous sequence shot (albeit a brief one) according to the GS. More likely, it could be--despite the figurational change from underwater framing--assimilated to the preceding fifth segment. That syntagmatic cutting would leave the seven shots of 'nature' (CHR: zero human presence in image) as a bracket syntagm in terms of the GS (SYM: 'Nature' and 'Life'). But the figurational drive here, in its use of CHR and ST codes and of point-of-view rhetoric and logic (although it is somewhat excessive, the logic of point-of-view ascription dictates that all seven of the shots are marked as objects of PF's look), rather decisively identifies all eight shots together (55-62) as a descriptive syntagm. The GS specifies the latter as a chronological unit (i.e., it can be inserted at a definite temporal position in the diegesis), but

also as a unit within which there is no discernible narrative order or consecution of action. Here there is no particular order or consecution beyond the negligible movement from PF's look to the object of his look, which is mainly eclipsed in discourse as the figurational movement from shot (his look) to shot (object of his look). In this particular instance, it is difficult to see any way that coded actional consecution could be read between the seven shots of natural elements.

ST takes an important role in the general modulation of semantics away from the prior situation: PF's shriek as he breaks the water's surface gives way to soft bird chirps and relaxed extra-diegetic music as the seven telephoto long shots (FRM) of nature begin. Thus the musical theme also figures the semantic cohesion of these seven shots as a general 'topic' of experience and vision. In them, 'nature' steps forward onto the figurational stage, in order to designate itself (assisted by music), representing another diegetic and SYM reversal: a spectacle of natural life instead of a spectacle of ritual death (e.g., shots 34-35); an indifferent or hostile Nature has given place to a benign one; the dense, close, murky underwater world of segment 5 is transformed into one of air, depth of vision, and play of light (around PF's look and the power of the telephoto lenses as effects of figuration). REF: 'human rebirth, salvation'. HER: 'The end?'

This segment's figuration suggests some possibilities of specifying the figuration of action and object with notion of dominance and embedding. First, the notions of a ratio and/or dominant: in segment 5, for the final phase of shot 53, after PF has removed one of his

boots, he is out of frame as the camera tilts down to follow the sinking boot. Action is the figurational dominant there; an object, even one heavily figuratively marked (SYM: irony of one's own clothing as a 'deadly weight') in relation to action, can only figure in a subsidiary way. The object can only be figured alone in frame as a phase in a shot in which PF--the figuratively central acting body--previously figured. In contrast, in the shots making up segment 6, we can use this conceptual frame of figurational dominance to precisely specify the effect, impressionistically dubbed 'change of mood/pace', obtained by an economic change of dominance here when many separate shots figure only objects, in which no action can be read which fits into prior dominant actional programs. Hence, a dominance of object over action in the figuration. Here is where the notion of embedding enters.

A distinct segmental unit--given the argument above--figures and distributes action and objects into separate textual units (here, the shots of the image-track) in a very different ratio. The action of looking is figured explicitly in the first shot of the segment, and thereby the following seven shots--objects of the natural world--are discursively embedded under that action according to the convention rule/rhetoric of point-of-view editing. And the song's lyrics throughout the shots also figure this relation in the way they label objects, redundantly but effectively focalizing the spectator. Dominance of frames of figuration, and embedding of figurational frames are powerfully analytic concepts in an economic theory of filmic discourse.

SEGMENT 7: shots 63-93

The segment gains its unity by a return to representations of PF and soldiers as antagonists (CHR, verbal category of number), and by a transformation of actional sequence proposed ('to hang' ==> 'to shoot', figured in separate phases of identifying a target, taking aim at it, firing, and so on in multiple variations and repetitions). These shots, in which narrative action again 'picks up speed', comprise an alternate syntagm for the GS. The distinctive feature is that alternation between shots of PF swimming frantically along the stream and shots of soldiers aiming and firing down at him does not signify, in Metz's terms, consecutive but simultaneous actions. However, the verbal category of aspect further specifies this figuration of action, in a somewhat more precise and powerful fashion. PF's action is continuous, whereas the soldiers' is discontinuous (aiming, firing a volley, firing at will, firing a cannon: all these are very legible phases of a general actional sequence; indeed, because of the audible military commands from the officers, the ST presents to the spectator very forcefully the readable diversity of action on the military side). Furthermore, the figuration economically trades spatial discontinuity (the spatial relations between the soldiers and PF are much less clear than in segment 2, since the shots of segment 7 lack the usual 180° line of continuity editing which provides overlapping background space among separate shots for coded/conventional spatial legibility) against the imaginary actional continuity, dependent on the continuous 'nature' of PF's action.

A loud and shrill bird call (ST) punctuates the segmental change, straddling shots 62-63. SEM: 'theatricality' is given again in the longer early shots of the syntagm (TOS), which alternate between medium-long shots of the officers and men on the bridge pointing and aiming down at PF, and progressive closeup zoom-ins on PF looking up from the creek surface (FRM, S/M, ANG, CHR; this alternation, the 'spine' of the figuration all along, here becomes quite pronounced, and is maintained consistently through the syntagm with one exception to be noted below). ST plays a key role in setting up the signifieds of the syntagm; the officer points to PF and calls out (in a distorted, 'slow-motion' voice) "He must be hanged!... PF you are caught like a rat in a trap...trap...TRAP!"; SEM: the slow-motion effect of the speech and actions of men on the bridge signifies 'fear-induced distortion' with REF: 'psycho-physiology of intense states of bodily stress'. The officer's verbal message (one of the few in the nearly 'speechless' filmic text) gives SEM: being 'singled out' for punishment, 'implacable justice'; as well as REF: the cliché of the 'hopeless predicament' and 'official indictment by name for punishment'. The redundancy of verbal labelling of action, and the repeated embedding of PF's look (here, the look by PF which extends across the textual breadth of segment 6) by the captain's look, reveals a certain economic function of restating, reloading, or recharging of action--retying the newly begun segment to the actional interrelations ('hang/escape') and implications of the previous segments, even as it transforms those actional contexts. In particular, the verbal category of taxis points

towards the intense, shot-by-shot causal relation between separate actional chains, which had been discarded in segment 6.

Alternating shots of soldiers firing and PF swimming complete the segment; zoom and static shots give way to violent lateral kinesics, through pans and tracks (S/M). REF, ACT: 'to run the gauntlet of fire'; HER: 'Will he be shot?'. At one point the cannon on the shore is fired down at PF, at another moment PF escapes a volley of rifle fire by diving underwater: SEM: 'awkwardness of the instruments of death', REF: 'to kill a fly with a hammer' (for SYM, this sort of excess or 'over-expenditure' in the figuration begins to hint at an overdetermination of the premises of diegesis, figuration, and discourse). At another point a separate shot (89) is given to figure a snake swimming along the surface of the creek (CHR: zero human presence in the image-track), which PF avoids and escapes by diving underwater again (SYM: 'escape, difficult safety from all danger, natural and human'). ST: the soft bird chirps and music of segment 6 have been alternated to the harsh breathing (with a noticeable aural 'closeup' effect), splashing, and roars of gunfire in segment 7--this shift motivating a new regime or phase of diegetic interest and spectatorial investment. The aural oscillation between PF's swimming and the gunfire is varied at intervals by the silence of the underwater shots of PF after he dives (82, 91) (now, here, in a new actional context, underwater sounds or silence signify SEM: 'safety'). A first hypothesis or line of inquiry would therefore be the fundamental distribution of semantics as an oscillation between constant variations of a basic polar semantic opposition 'death/safety'.

SEGMENT 8: shots 94-108

ACTional notation: out of range, PF manages to pass safely down through some rapids in the stream, and on a beach beyond them, cavorts in the success of his 'escape'. Syntagmatically, with CHR isolating PF as a principal differential feature, these shots form a separable scene. Other figurational codes too are in play to delimit this segment by economically concentrating distinctive traits into its first shot (94): this near-vertical 360° pan of swirling treetops (FRM, S/M, ANG) is in sharp contrast to preceding tracking shots and lateral pans of segment 7, and is also very sharply marked by the absence of any human figure in the image (CHR). When, in shots 95 on, PF is again seen, it is in extreme long shots which hence present his figure in much smaller scale than before (FRM). Now that another diegetic danger is being figured for PF (HER, again: 'Will he drown?'), the ST makes an economically continuous but legible shift from roaring gunfire to roaring, rushing water--thus assuring the pseudo-natural flow of the figuration at the same time as it makes the new sound readable.

On the beach, his safety seemingly assured, PF rolls to and fro on the sand, his arms and legs flung out (SEM: 'safety', a kinesic 'freedom from being bound and constrained' leads to SYM: antitheses between the 'free horizontal movement' on the beach versus the 'passive vertical movement of the hanging', the 'solid' beach versus the 'unsolid' footing of the executioners' plank, the ironically trivial lacerated hand (FRM: figured in extreme closeup) versus the broken neck escaped, and a triumph over the creek which was both a threat and

means of escape in turn). To this semantic mass (the filmic text seems, economically, semantically gorged at this point) is then added a restatement on the SEM and SYM codes of the principal signified of segment 6: 'rebirth of awareness to a transformed world and to life': PF tosses sand about, laughs uncontrollably, (SEM, SYM: antithesis to the agonized sobs before death in segment 4), and, in the final shot of the segment, crawls up to and smells a flower (here the ACT code is providing an extremely cliched REFerential notation or commonplace: 'the gratuitous, aesthetic gesture'). SYM: 'Nature' is reiterated by a shot (107) of swaying branches and leaves (assisted by CHR: PF absent; and a fairly definite point-of-view figure which reiterates the structure of segment 6). These signifieds are supplemented by the melody of the song from segment 6 on the ST. Thus we have for HER: 'The conclusion with PF safe?', as if the figuration of these actions and object of the beach could assure diegetic conclusion and closure.

SEGMENT 9: shots 109-128

After their decompression and loss of momentum in the idyll of segment 8, the HER and ACT codes (the fundamental armature of narrative film) are charged with energy in this segment, which reconnects, in a fresh movement of oscillation, to prior dominants of action and situation. As before, the ST is instrumental in figuring the segmental shift; the discourse works this as a metonymy and an ellipsis of figured time-space--a loud explosion of a cannon shell straddles shots 108/109. Tentative discursive conclusion or narrative

equilibrium are disrupted; SEM: 'danger even at a distance', HER: 'Will he be caught or killed?' (again); ACT: 'escape on foot'. Shot 109 sharply distinguishes itself in figurative terms of FRM and ANG codes from the closeups and low-angle shots of segment 8: it is an extreme long shot, down-angle (ST is silent after the explosion dies away). PF can be seen along the creek bank in very small scale while the just-heard smoky shellburst drifts above the trees behind him. This, and the other following discontinuous sequence of shots show PF running through the woodland, brush, and forest; this continuity of action against a open temporal-spatial discontinuity (an economic ratio of figuration) marks this syntagm as an ordinary sequence according to the GS, since no substantive diegetic signified can be attached to the gaps between the shots.[18]

These discontinuous shots are bound up together by the effects of codes such as ST and its rhythm with FRM and S/M changes. For example, the bouncing, jagged, predominantly left-to-right hand-held camera pans and tracks of these shots are overlaid with a loud, staccato, rim-shooting drum solo (SEM: psycho-physiological agitation, kinesthetics of violent activity). The discourse elaborates its figuration and the diegetic fiction in a economically parsimonious way, maintaining vraisemblance by respecting a need for plausible variation, as it transforms its semantics of action ('swim' ==> 'run') and objects as materials of figuration (gunfire ==> drumming).

The drumming of the very long (TOS) shot 114 is bridged to the silence of the next shot by another (but unseen) explosion as PF runs.

In the brief shot 115 PF runs along with ST figuring only his gasping breathing; the drums return and grow acceleratingly louder in volume for four more shots (116-119), after which he falls heavily against a tree, exhausted. Silence is broken by the 'threatening' and harsh bird calls (SEM, SYM: 'indifferent or threatening Nature'). This analytic description reveals, therefore, the way in which the filmic discourse economically redistributes the figurative-semantic rhythm of oscillation 'safety/danger' from the textual level of segments, to groups of shots within a segment, and then to the level of individual shots.

The long-duration (TOS) shot 122 and following shots attenuate the attentional investment of the spectator, charged to HER and ACT codes of the text. These shots nevertheless remain part of a coherent and unitary syntagm. What happens is that the violent, spatially patternless action 'running' and camera motion of previous shots are stabilized, and the spectator is given a figurative frame for spatial organization of the image, of the sort which had been diminishing since segment 7. In a long shot (FRM) (122), PF emerges from the forest, onto a dirt road along which the camera is oriented (FRM, SYM: a purposeful, 'hodological' axis of orientation of action in space). As he turns to face the camera and begins running towards it along the road, the camera begins a backward tracking motion (S/M) and again the drums begin to play (ST). He falls, the camera coasts to a stop, and the music gives way to several of the harsh bird calls--which, by this point of saturation, form a figuratively obvious signifier of threat (SEM: 'danger'). The road serves as orientation for the remainder of shots in the segment.

Shots 123-128 are of especial interest first in terms of CHR, FRM, and ANG, and the ways that these codes figure PF's acting body as a symbolic object. Shots 123 and 127 are closeups of PF's feet slowly treading the turf of the roadway (FRM, CHR); shot 124 is a medium-close shot from sharply below PF's head and chest, figuring prominently the noose scar on his neck, which he touches with a hand (ANG works to articulate: SEM: 'bearing the marks of bodily injury, body as a scarified trace' together with 'desperation' figured by his tattered clothes). Despite the overall message of SEM: 'relaxation of pressure' through the ACT code ('walk' has replaced 'run'), and ST code (the silence and soft bird calls versus the agitated drumming), some other, rather perceptibly heterogeneous references seemingly inhabit these shots (REF: 'the Road of Life', 'Christ and the Via Dolorosa'), through conventional iconographics of religious painting and art. Such references are extended and culminated in the figuration of action in the syntagm's final shot (128): in a medium-close shot, from below (FRM, ANG) PF approaches from the background, out of shadow as soft bird chirps sound (ST); a light from above illuminates his face, he opens his eyes, incredulous, smiles. The classical religious-iconographic pose of the uplifted visage, bathed in a heavenly light from above (REF, SYM: 'salvation'). The HER message/enigma produced here, overlapping into the next syntagm, is 'Where is he?' or 'What place has he reached?'

SEGMENT 10: shots 129-140

Here especially, a preference for Bellour's more loosely delimited term 'segment' frames a number of shots which, in more strict accord with Metz's GS, would have to be segmented into, at the least, probably three autonomous segments:

1) an ordinary sequence: the first two shots of PF's entry (129: he passes through a large metal gate and runs into the woods beyond; 130: he walks through a glade); these would also, undoubtedly, qualify to remain attached to the preceding syntagm;

2) an alternate syntagm: shots 131-139 are of PF's wife emerging from their mansion and approaching with arms outstretched, alternating with shots of PF running towards her;

3) an autonomous sequence shot (140), in which PF and his wife meet and embrace within the framed space of a single shot; this shot, as a key action, caps the alternating shots beforehand, but has it own autonomy due to the heavily figurationally emphasized union of the bodies--at last--within the visual frame (CHR code).

In the last segment we identified the modulation of the code into a painterly figuration of action and object, away from an overall message of SEM: 'danger', towards a more or less implicit one of 'end of danger' (i.e., the irrelevance of the sort of hermeneutic tension previously maintained by the textual economy). Here in this segment this modulation is brought all the way to an explicit SEM message of 'safety/salvation'. REF/SYM: 'Elysian Fields' appears in the first shot, when PF stands before the two opening gates. The visuals do not figure PF opening them, his arms are at his sides; this absence of

figuration of action, as a 'zero sign', clearly figures SEM: 'mystery', even an uncanny 'air of unreality'. The figuration and REF coding of the gates ('heaven', 'home') is heavily secondarized, clichéd. The cluster of semes is redundantly multiplied in the succeeding shots: the soft sounds of the birds (ST), the contrast to the forest shots of the preceding syntagm effected by a static (S/M) medium-long telephoto shot (FRM) (130), which 'flattens' and stabilizes intra-frame action unlike earlier shots, as PF picks his way through the glade (ACT: 'to walk relaxedly'). The narrative armature--continuing its rhythm of tension and release--is given a fresh potential or charge: ACT: 'to enter ---?'; HER: 'Where is he?', and correlatively but far less explicitly, 'What level of reality is being figured for this action?'

Now REF, SYM, and SEM codes come into play and are conjoined with articulations of codes of expression such as (FRM, S/M, and ST) to complete the terms of a general semantic antithesis. SEM: 'unveiling' is invoked again when in shot 131 the camera 'pushes through' a curtain of boughs and leaves (SEM: 'approaching' as a kinesics of physical proximity, attentional focussing, intimate detail--a coded articulation produced through the S/M code) to expose to view a large white mansion (REF: Southern plantation architecture; the planter class of white Southern gentlemen) with columns, a veranda, lawn, hedges, and potted plants (SEM: 'home' as well as 'gentility', a subdued, cultivated and amenable Nature). For SYM we have, therefore, the distinct and explicit antithesis of the diegesis's two <u>sites</u>: the

house and the bridge, their figurations of unveiling, their semantics of accessible and very readable connotation. PF's wife descends from the veranda, looking at him off-screen (once again, vestimentarily, REF: 'the Southern belle'). ST: music, similarly orchestrated as that of earlier segments, but without the lyrics, begins in shot (131), pauses, and then resumes and overlays from shots 133 on an accelerating rhythmic alternation between shots of PF (three identical static medium-long telephoto shots: S/M, FRM), running with outstretched arms, calling "Abby!" (134, 136, 138), and shots of the wife, jump cut so as to be overlapping on her action but progressively more advanced, showing her descending the steps and extending a hand (133, 135, 137, 139). Her tears, visage, and gesture give REF/SEM: a 'feminine-conjugal compassion and comfort', yet her restraint and silence register again on REF: 'Southern belle' (apparently, though retrospectively this textual feature will take a different determination). The accelerating quickness and brevity of the shots's rhythm (TOS) and the swelling music (ST), the closing-in onto the wife (FRM), the intra-frame spatial organization of action and movement (her left-to-right movement with camera pans and tracks right [S/M] versus PF's telephoto-produced 'immobility' even as he runs), their reciprocal absence from the alternating shots (CHR)--all this mass of cinematically specific textual codings gives a SYM proverbial signified: 'so close, yet so far' antithesis, as well as distinctly changing the determination of PF's action and motion (from escape <u>away</u> from danger, to a determination of movement <u>towards</u> a specific safety, comfort).

HER/SEM: 'an innocuous tension', but also, given the overlapping repetition of actional figuration, there is discreetly SEM: 'unreality'. ACT: 'to be reunited with a loved one (wife)' is completed in the twelfth and final shot of the segment (140).

Here, in a longer-duration non-telephoto medium shot (TOS, FRM), PF approaches, and a pan-left includes the wife in frame (S/M, CHR); he utters her name for the third time, and as she silently (now ST allows a discreet SEM: 'uncanniness') places her hands on his neck (SEM: proxemics of intimacy), his neck and head stiffen, he screams and drops down out of frame (CHR: PF absent). His scream, aurally backgrounded by the rather high-pitched gong-like sound heard before at shot 41/42 (ST figures the noose and rope snapping taut), forms--once again--an inter-shot and inter-segment bridge.

SEGMENT 11: shots 141-144

At this moment of enormous figurational and diegetic discontinuity, the body in the action of hanging provides the strongest figurational-graphic element of continuity: downward motion. Extending the downward kinesics of the preceding shot, PF falls and hangs at the Owl Creek bridge. ACT: 'die by hanging'. Provisionally, HER: 'solution of enigmas, end of narrative hermeneutic'. SEM/SYM: irony, 'implacable military justice' as well as the locational 'circularity' of the diegesis and figuration. The 'cosmic irony' of the conventional hermeneutic resolution is redundantly mirrored on the ST: the soft bird chirping continues despite death. As if to give

SEM: 'to avert one's eyes from too brutal a reality' and to ensure the ironic (i.e., distanced) perspective for figuring the action of dying and the body as dead object, the camera zooms out from its medium-long shot from below and begins a pan-right (FRM, ANG, S/M); the death scene is (re-)veiled by trees and branches, then falls out of frame altogether. This shot dissolves into other track-right shots along the creek (during which are superimposed the French titles, credits, and a translation of the notice of segment 1), until at the end of shot 144 the camera stops, framing an extreme long shot of the bridge and PF's corpse body as object, as spectacle, from a distance. ACT/REF: 'to display an executed man's corpse'.

Although these shots are distinctly situated chronologically into the diegesis through the action of hanging, since no substantive diegetic steps of actional consecution can be easily established <u>within</u> these four shots, it is most precise to identify this segment as a <u>descriptive syntagm</u> (a chronological, but not narrative syntagm). This is because the consecutive chain of events in the film's diegesis concludes here with PF's death, but this last segment of the diegetic chain here is <u>principally</u> figured as a description, receiving the action nearly terminated from a previous segment, and figuring its termination without clear implication to further, independent links of an actional-narrative chain. ('Principally' here signals the troubled way that this segmental choice is playing an uncertain opposition of 'narration/description' for the greatest possible distinction, or distinguishing force.)

The eleventh segment makes large shifts in figuration (a jump in time, space, and narrative action from segment 10), and in discourse (in the organizational logic of that figuration offered for the spectator's comprehension and belief). These shifts reverse the codings and semantics of the prior majority of the text. Verbal categories are an effective and precise way to read this upheaval and reversal of meaning in segment 11.

--Person: the figurative focalization on PF--as an acting subject, beginning with his 'privileging' with a subjective insert and point-of-view shots, and, from segment 7 on, as an exclusive agent of action--is overturned, replaced by an 'objective' discourse onto his body as object, as spectacle, from a distance. This rupture both in the evident flow of the narrative (E^n) and on the level of spectatorial 'participation' (via his/her centered identification with the hero, the expected stability of this orientation towards the narrated events) is a precise example of Jakobson's shifter. Here the 'shift' is a decentering of a quasi-first-person focus on the protagonist in favor of a more anonymous positioning vis-à-vis the fiction and the figuration of narrated events and participants. Spectatorial 'sympathy' may linger (as a produced effect), but the positioning of the viewer in relation to the P^n has been decisively altered, not just because of the diegetic 'death' of a P^n, but in consequence of the disruption produced by this particular narrated event in the enunciational rapport of spectator-to-film managed by the filmic discourse: the viewer is 'cast out' of intimacy with this P^n.

--Status: the 'real' status of the complex actional chain of escape[19] from segments 5 through 10 is rewritten to a 'dreamt' or 'fantasized' status, a profound change of the semantic base and stability of the text's message as *énoncé*.

--Aspect: after segment 4, where the action 'hanging' is aspectually figured as begun but unterminated (because 'failed'), segment 11 resumes its figuration, and terminates the action, 'saturating' it semantically as a completed action and 'fact'.

--Tense: tense, as *duration*, is changed in that the explicit and implicit duration figured for the actions of segments 5 to 10 is collapsed or compressed into an 'instant' of hallucination or fantasy.

--Voice: the irony of the narrative turn is marked with precision by the category of voice, as PF's relation to the major actional chain is moved from passive (segments 2 to 4), to active (segments 5 to 10), to a final and determining passive voice (segment 11), as the other verbal categories of actional semantics circumscribe and rewrite this second 'active' phase as hallucination or fantasy.

--Mood: segment 11 puts the preceding five syntagms of narrative text (about 15 minutes of screen time, i.e., over half the film's duration) into the *conditional* mood (as a now-past fantasy, '*if* the rope would break I could...') at the same time that it characterizes the new, general action/event covering all of these segments ('to *fantasize* that: the rope could break, etc.') as being in the *injunctive* mood, defined by Jakobson as "signalling the E^n as imposed upon the participant". In other words, to grasp the sense of the narrative, the

basic but critical change in the spectator's cognition is to reinterpret the preceding events as an 'unmarked' fantasy, the action of fantasy itself being imposed upon the fictional character by the force of the preceding narrative situation (helped by referential codes of human psychology). The spectator may intimately sense the effect of this rupture in the narrative on the basis of an identification with PF (in a predominantly formal-structural way), but the imposition of the change, the realization that the fantasy is terminated and embedded (as a caused effect inside the diegesis) cannot 'originate' in the protagonist, nor is it 'shared' with him, since--within what the fiction now figures and frames as 'reality'--he is now 'dead'. The filmic discourse here threads a subtle economy of split investment and effect, meaning and interpretation.

--Taxis: the escape, represented from from segment 5 on, was characterized by an independent taxis (i.e., 'pure chance'), independent from the logically, causally dependent taxic characterization of action in segments 2 to 4. Much of the actions of escape also carry this taxic and status characterization: actions/events in the 'favor' of PF, in which he is active, but which must be understood as succeeding more out a logic of 'chance' than by a causality of means and ends. Finally, when segment 11 ruptures the fantasy of escape, two taxes are signalled: (1) an overall return to the completion of the earlier dependent series and its taxis (that of the executioners' actions), and (2) along with the shift in existential status of the actions of escape, the entire actional chain of the escape is put under a depen-

dent taxis (i.e., 'to hang' is not independently and fortuitously succeeded by 'to escape'--as had been lured and figured by the text together with the cinematic 'reality-effect'--; 'to hang' caused 'to-dream-of-escape' following the stereotypes of a referential code of human psychology).

The enormous figurational and semantic shifts which collaborate in the conclusive turn of the film as diegesis and as text can most effectively be unthreaded and analyzed in dynamic terms, under the theoretical framework of filmic text and discourse as economy.

NOTES to Section 3

1. Enrico 1973.

2. Bellour 1979: 123.

3. Bellour 1979: Part III, Barthes 1974.

4. Hjelmslev 1961: sec. 13; Metz 1972: Ch. 4, 1974b: Ch. 10.

5. Commutation is an efficient algorithm for the work of textual analysis, but that does not mean it can be efficiently written. On commutation, Hjelmslev 1961: sec. 14, Barthes 1970: sec. III.2.3.

6. See Metz 1974a: 143.

7. Each large figurative unit will presumably--this is only a hypothesis to be tested--figure at least one nameable, retellable, plausibly nameable large actional unit.

8. The name is given in segment 7 when the captain calls out to PF in the creek below.

9. Here we take the science of kinesics and proxemics as a pragmatic branch of semiotics, in which human-bodily space and movement are social/cultural signifiers.

10. This economic need of any text to quickly set up a semantic base for itself has been discussed by Barthes and Marin, who point to the use of dense, privileged, and heavily pre-constructed codes of history and toponymy at work in Biblical narratives (Barthes 1971b, Marin 1980). Another versant of this work on film is a small contribution to the toponymic code: Owl Creek, San Francisco, Hiroshima, etc. are the toponyms/signifiers encountered here, and whose semiotic/textual working is to be scrutinized.

11. Branigan 1975 is the standard reference for a complete inventory of filmic point-of-view rhetoric and form.

12. The metaphor works by a displacement from PF's look to the camera's moving view (without PF in frame). This kind of inmixing of figurational processes confirms Metz's recent claims (1977a: Part IV) that textually manifested figures can only rarely be found in 'pure' form (and therefore, for instance, 'metaphor/metonymy' as an opposition remains only an abstract, systematic description: not a working principle of actual, exclusive sorting-out of tropes).

13. On textual 'lines of communication', Barthes 1974: sec. LVII.

14. We can provisionally define 'intensity' in terms of factors such as: change in figuration, violence, actional interrelation and consequences.

15. Metz 1974a: 149-50.

16. In the first passage across the text, it was this segmental separation through the verbal category of number which spurred the discovery of the fundamental semantic oscillation of the text between 'safety' and 'danger'.

17. These shots are relatively under-determined since it would seem difficult for any average spectator to read their background spatial orientation in any coherent fashion. It appears, in fact, that they are all shot in a scenicked water tank.

18. Here is a good example of the reciprocal interplay between figurational factors of determination of action and determination of background. Because the temporal-spatial is not determined (except by its final goal, the house and wife), while the gaps in the action are perceptible, they are not readable in semantic terms. If the spectator had a determined spatial map of the pathway home, then a gap in figuration eliding some significant element would be semantically loaded, and the sequence would perhaps become episodic (wherein the figurative gaps function as zero-signifiers). But because the coded actional unit 'run' has no significant determination, and the changes in spatial background offer no such determination, the spectator is left (by force) to construe the figuration as an ordinary sequence.

19. There are some subtly signified markers of reality (or: 'un'-reality) in the mise-en-scène and editing: the change from bare autumnal trees at the beginning to the leafy, spring-summer foliage as PF nears home, the repetition of the woman's movement in different shots. But more critical is the the use and elision of other conventional markers on the image- and sound-tracks (zoom-in on a face in closeup, sonic distortion, freeze-frame, dissolve, and so on). This set of conventions was adhered to early in the text (thus confirming a certain discursive/enunciational contract about use of cinematic conventions for the spectator), but then was violated at the junction of segments 4 and 5.

SECTION 4: Issues

What are the most important issues which stand out, after this textual analysis of OOC stressing segmentation and verbal-categorical semantics of actions? These issues can be briefly sketched, and put under three headings as pertinent lines for subsequent research.

1) ECONOMY

First, the figuration of action in OOC suggests the strong possibility of an economic analysis using concepts of 'redundancy', 'repetition', 'variation', and 'entropy' as these terms apply to texts.[1] The particular issue is the figuration of action, which, considered as a chain across the text, could be characterized as redundant with regard to the warning notice figured in segment 1 ("ORDER: Any civilian caught interfering with the railroad bridges, tunnels, or trains will be SUMMARILY HANGED."), or as redundantly entropizing the repertoire of diegetic possibilities opened by that notice. Consider, within the limits of vraisemblance, all the diegetic lines of development and expansion which could intersect and incorporate that warning notice. If 'information' in a 'quantitive' or economic sense is defined as directly related to the size of the repertoire of possible messages and inversely related to the frequency of any given message, we can characterize the actional chain in OOC--beginning with the hanging scene, the escapes from various successive dangers, through the interrupted reunion--as an apparent quasi-linear development in space and time away from an opening abstract premise (the notice), which in fact is an informationally redundant series of equivalences to

that notice's predictive threat at the outset (at the 'original state' of information). At the final segment--where ironically a 'redundant' French translation of the notice is optically superimposed onto the image--the dozen swings to and fro between the poles of 'danger' and 'safety' are left as informationally empty and essentially repetitive difference--as differences which do not inform, or, to vary Bateson's parlance, as 'differences which do not make a difference'. The semantic field of narrative has been 'devalued', in the sense that the differential value (in Saussure's view) underwriting its semantics has been annulled. The diegetic closure is achieved at the expense of that fundamental 'difference' for the text's semantics. Despite figurative variety, the diegesis the filmic text represents is restricted in its ultimate resolution to the notice, literally, to the notice's literality.

This hypothesis does not accord, superficially, with Barthes' view of the artistic text as pure signal or information,[2] but his claim can only be a non-textual or pre-textual view, since in a text layers of signifiers and codes do work redundantly.[3]

However, this cues us to the fact that the issue remains still too vaguely formulated. Therefore, the most precise and productive way to pose this issue is to focus exclusively on figuration of action, as a dynamic and 'informative' process of variation. Against the redundancies of the written warning (which provides, in advance of the images and sounds of segments 2 to 11, the most final information 'someone will be hung') and the semantic oscillation of diegetic action (the

more than a dozen swings between 'danger' and 'safety' figured in actions and objects), the issue would be the constraint on discourse and figuration to extend the paradigm of action, as an economic reserve, as far as possible. That limit of possibility is economic: it is the constraint of vraisemblance, for which Genette even sought to give a quasi-mathematic formula.[4] In a filmic representation, vraisemblance is complicated by the factor of the filmic 'illusion of reality'.[5] Thus an economy of figuration can be treated as a process of exhausting a paradigmatic resource, against an edge and ending dictated by factors of vraisemblance and illusion of reality. A model of this economy would be a tree structure with two main branches forming the dominant semantic binary opposition. The textual expansion would be a recursive operation, choosing from two finite and dwindling sets of actions (e.g., 'hang, drown, be shot, be snake-bitten,...' might be the beginning of the branch for the semantic-actional pole of 'danger'), in which choice is limited by the limit of vraisemblance (e.g., 'drown' is probably at its limit, in its two varied figurations: drown while bound and unable to swim, drown while being carried down into a rapids), and by prior choices (the order in the preceding parenthesized example 'seems' logical and vraisemblable, in the way the text follows it). The singular way in which the discourse and text of OOC follow the format of this economy suggests that the film could be read as, in the Formalists' parlance, a 'baring of the device' of redundancy of figuration of action.

A second angle onto the issue of economy consists of the ratio or distribution of action and segments. In particular, OOC presents the issue of the distribution of the binary movement of figuration into different, marked segments. As noted earlier, segment 2 presents the general actional unit 'hanging', while including within its segmental boundaries a subtle figure of an action of escape which oscillates back to the semantic pole of 'safety'. Next, in a very marked segmental unit (segment 3), the discourse figures a mental action on the pole of 'safety' which stands as an independent segmental unit. This line of analysis points to the need to these discursive distributions of actional figuration as a global economy in the segmental frame.

Also, on this point, arises the issue of the interdependence of segmental figuration and actional figuration. Does each segment, with its figurational autonomy, produce or confirm the closure or autonomy of the actional figuration inside its segmental boundaries--or vice versa? This circular and reciprocal interplay deserves further analysis, possibly in terms of the vertical range of actional semantics, between specific levels and general and functional levels. For example, since any action figured in image (in, for instance, shot 36) can be verbally designated (1) very specifically ('blinking' and 'crying'), (2) generally ('agonizing over impending death'), or (3) 'functionally' (i.e., in terms of narratologically defined, general functions: as with Greimas's 'test'), perhaps each segment achieves certain levels of specificity, generality, or functionality in its figuration of action. Specifying these movements among levels would be

an economic perspective onto the text, figuration, and discourse of a film, since if a representational-narrative film has limited resources to make determinations, the issue becomes that of 'What determination(s), exclusively or in hierarchy, does the film's text/figuration/discourse effect within a given and marked segmental unit?'.

A third aspect of the issue of economy turns on the figuration of 'mental' action in the diegesis (such as 'imagining' or 'seeing') as opposed to exterior, more overt physical action.[6] Again, an economic framework could focus on the relations of the segments and verbal-categorical characterization of actions. A starting point for reading would (again) be the subtly marked figurations of PF's action of looking in segment, the conventionally and heavily marked action of imagining in segment 3, and the overturning and rewriting of segments 5 to 10 as an action of imagining by segment 11. Notice that, in this three-element example, the concept of economy of figuration (figurational marking, positioning of action) also interlocks with <u>levels</u> of figuration--intra-segmental, segmental, supra-segmental.

2) POLYSEMY OF ACTIONAL FIGURATION

A second issue, opened by the semantics of the actional chain, concerns the reversible polysemy of the chain, operated and manifested by segment 11. That semantic shift--affecting especially verbal categories of status and taxis, along with many others--seems to rewrite the meaning of a large portion of the actional chain, by <u>concatenating</u>

actions under a dominant determinant verbal-categorical status ('imagined'), and by assigning this concatenated set of actions as a causal object of a different level of action (verbal category of taxis: the action 'hang' is dominant and causes the action and topic of 'imagining-escape'). The issue involves, in its general terms, the relation of discourse to figuration in constructing narrative. Since OOC shows in a distinct way that figuration of action is not fixed or stable, but instead very open to rewriting by discourse--when the filmic discourse figures an action in a way that reverses and modifies previously figured action and its meaning--, how can this power of filmic discourse over figuration be schematized, mapped, considered as a strategy or economy? Is this reversibility solely an effect of discursive conclusion (closure)? Is such rewriting of actional figuration exclusively tied to re-figuration of 'subjective' or 'mental' action (i.e., 'imagining')? How is the retrospective rewriting of actional figuration and semantics itself a meaningful narrative 'function'?

3) OVERDETERMINATION IN/OF ACTIONAL FIGURATION

The notion of polysemy, developed above, depends however on a view of the text, its figuration, its representation, which is rather positivistic--i.e., in which the actional chain is a chain of signifiers (with reversible, polysemous complex signifieds) which are individual, yet cohesive and co-present in a continuous chain.[7] But textuality is not such a continuous plenum, and a more incisive analysis can

demonstrate that the figuration of the large moment of polysemic reversal at shots 140/141 (the shot change between them marking the delimitation of segments 10 and 11) operates even more importantly as overdetermination, as overdetermination of action and object. The action of reunion and embrace, and the woman as an objectal 'goal' of action(s) (escape, imagination, vision) are the signifiers whose figuration is troped in ways which exceed the secondarized, 'conventional' boundaries of 'irony', 'ironic reversal' and 'trick ending' of narrative semantics. ('Overdetermination' as an large scale discursive process would thereby affect a significantly greater portion of the text than an instance of polysemy.)

If overdetermination of signifiers can be read in the text and figuration of OOC, a first gambit is to read its signifiers as 'letter', taking up a perspective of analysis drawn from Lacanian psychoanalysis.[8] Thus once again, as above, the particular and peculiar status of the written warning notice, and its literality for the text's figuration, representation and diegesis, comes to the fore. Second, instead of a reversible but predominantly stable, fixed, additive chain, the text and figuration would call to be analyzed by way of floating, mobile signifiers. Since text and figuration do not form a positive plenum, analysis would also have to mark into account absences, erasures, and withdrawals in figuration and text. Mobility, absence: these first two factors point to a third one, in which figurative element move in return, after, around absences. While Laplanche-Pontalis define overdetermination in terms of different, pre-

sumably non-homogenous or non-congruent semantic determinations on multiple levels of interpretation,[9] what the issue of a reading of a factor of overdetermination in OOC seems to demand is, instead, analysis of the multiple contexts in which signifiers are determined (secondarized) by figuration as representation. The major instance of polysemy of figuration in OOC points the way to the larger, more decisive and effective working of figuration and overdetermination. An explanation of overdetermination of filmic figuration therefore forms the next theoretical effort of this work. A brief reading of this instance of overdetermination in OOC can serve well as a pointer for that theory.

A reading aiming to follow a network of determinations must begin with the warning notice of segment 1, first of all, in the way that it writes a law of prohibition (against "interference", tampering, touching) and violence (a mortal threat, in capital letters, of summary hanging). Second, consider that the violation of the prohibition, in whatever action this took shape, is not figured in the filmic text's images, sounds, or words. Third, consider sexual difference as figured in the film's representation: the ritual punishment of a single male at the hands of a largely anonymous male group, and the figured role and place of a woman as a semantic and figurative opposition to this scene of violence.

The warning notice functions as a floating signifier for the text's manifest representation, giving it manifest and conscious causal logic, but in a way that splits and overdetermines action with regard

to:

--what is figured, manifestly, as an absent object: the woman, and beyond this,

--what is not figured, the violation of the prohibition.

The notice as the letter of the law stands, "implanted", at the head of the text's unreeling in an innocuous position--defining an 'other scene', as it conceals itself by way of the cinematic code/convention of the 'harmless' and accessory explanatory note at the head of a film.[10]

But the notice institutes an economic relation between desire (to interfere or touch something) and the law (its violence in retribution). That dual context overdetermines the figuration of the action of escape and in particular the figuration of PF's acting body as object. The escape finds its semantic context, in a split and over-determined way,

--as an action, out of instinctual self-preservational need, against the real violence of the men (action of escape);

--as an action, out of instinctual sexual desire, towards the symbolic object figured as a woman (action of pursuit).

The economy of the figuration is to extend, preserve, and vary the threat, and thus in a second movement, defer the junction of the bodies of PF and the woman. The economy is anaclitic in the way it props these two dynamics of action and semantics of context upon each other, and plays them off against each other.[11]

The most symptomatic instance of this overdetermination of the filmic figuration consists in the displacement, or barring from frame,

of PF's body as the locus of these semantic movements which condense and displace the opposed contexts:

--in shot 39, as he is hanged, his body drops out of frame-bottom;

--in shot 140--after a long temporal dilation of alternation between shots of PF and of the woman[12]--at the moment when she touches his neck, with a markedly unusual gesture of her hands, his body is stiffened and made erect, and then falls out of frame-bottom.[13]

--in shot 141 his body snaps at the end of the rope as the action of hanging is achieved.

The text, in the metaphoric relations of figurative similarity between shots, in the interstices of editing junctions of shots, is working a barring of the bodies as signifiers, of their 'union' in the figurative space of the frame (the CHR code is the node of this conflictual determination), as an overdetermined, multiple interdiction. The other scene of the text is an interdicted sexual encounter, interdicted and barred from figuration in a way that--at a moment of culmination and crisis for the figuration--the discourse ejects a body-signifier from manifest figuration in frame, and the manifest representation returns to a dominant scene where the punishment of the law is carried out.

If figuring both bodies into a single visual frame is the text's "unmediatable synthesis,"[14] this figurational 'violence' at the junction of segments 10 and 11 forms the sharpest symptomatic indication of the two 'scenes', the one of obvious diegesis of punishment, and an other scene in which that obvious scene of punitive violence is 'posterior' to a sexual phantasy (search, touching, union). But the two scenes or

two semantic contexts are not completely disjunctive, but textually intermeshed.[15] The figurative prolepsis which omits the transgression of military law produces a figurational 'gap', an absence where the sexual transgression tied to the woman's body can retroactively figure by implication. Even the semantic context of conventional popular sexual folklore of hanging (orgasm, the mandrake root, etc.), which is in play as a referential code, overdetermines the action of hanging, splitting its determination as diegesis.

Economy and overdetermination seem to depend upon a systematic and logically temporal examination of positions of agent and patient around elements of the actional chain.[16] This forms the starting point for the next theoretical excursus.

NOTES to Section 4

1. Wilden 1972, Barthes 1970 and 1977, Jakobson 1971 and 1974, Martinet 1964.

2. Barthes 1977: 89.

3. For an example, consider shot 11 of OOC, where the figurative codes of ST, ANG, FRM, and so on, are orchestrated multiply, but with a necessary redundancy, to signify SEM: 'horribleness'. This is a quite frequent doubly articulated textual pattern between codes of expression and codes of content (to use Hjelmslev's terms).

4. Genette 1969: 92, 97. Also see Communications 1968.

5. For the 'impression of reality', see Michel Marie's article in Collet 1976: 115-24. Since film is a dominantly analog signifying system, we can say that it 'lacks' the reality markers in its image- and sound-tracks which natural-verbal language possesses. On analog/digital signification, Wilden 1972.

6. Greimas has recently made this a fundamental dichotomy of semic categories: see 'interoceptive' and 'exteroceptive' in Greimas/Courtés 1979.

7. Veltrusky's model of semantic contexts (1976) is sufficiently dynamically developmental to model polysemy (and is better than Greimas's 1966 model of semantic isotopies), but because it does not model a split of the signifying chain (as theorized in psychoanalysis) it cannot account for overdetermination of context.

8. For Lacan's discussion of the signifier as 'letter', see "L'instance de la lettre" and "Séminaire sur 'La lettre volée'" in Lacan 1966, and Nancy/Lacoue-Labarthe 1973.

9. See "Overdetermination" in Laplanche/Pontalis 1973.

10. See "Symbolic" in Laplanche/Pontalis 1973 for the (indistinct) place and agency from which the interdicting law is announced. On the (metaphorically overdetermining) "implantation" of a signifier into a signifying/actional chain, Laplanche/Leclaire 1972: 156. On the concealment, overdetermination, and multiple action of a letter, see Lacan 1966 on Poe's "The Purloined Letter."

11. On anaclisis as a propping of sexual drives onto self-preservational instincts, see "Anaclisis" in Laplanche/Pontalis 1973, and Laplanche 1976.

12. The accelerating rhythm of the encounter and its music (whose volume and rhythm increase), finds its overdetermining context in the

heavily sexualized context of the bodily romping on the beach in segment 8.

13. Note the sound-track repetition of the sound of the rope (and neck) snapping at these two points: the figurative similarity which folds (even, 'invaginates') the filmic figuration back into itself.

14. Barthes 1974: secs. XIV, XXVII.

15. See Freud on the mushroom-like meshwork of the dream-text, Freud: 1965a: 564.

16. This kind of analysis of overdetermination is described in Freud 1963, Lacan on logical time in Lacan 1966, and Crawford 1983b.

CHAPTER TWO

Section 5
Section 6
Section 7
Section 8

SECTION 5: Theory

Figuration of Action as Overdetermination: The Bar

A theoretical investigation of the ways in which the discourse of narrative film figures its text in an overdetermined way might find a strong starting point in a theoretical fiction of a uni-determined text. The latter might well be a discourse, say a narrative, that escapes figures by deploying straight, literal anaphora for actional agents, and a chain of absolutely different actions and objects. In this admittedly impossible and impoverished fiction, the reduced semantic determination and context would aim to escape any plural determination of agent by the absolute continuity of anaphora (using the most abstract forms, without variation), and to escape any plural determination of action enabled by similarity, through the absolute discontinuity of action and object as constituents of narrative. Unwittingly or not, most narratological theories usually postulate such an exemplary 'minimum story' from which to begin theorizing, seeking to reduce narrative semantics as far as possible in that initial example in order to facilitate the building of narratological theory (patterns, canonic functions, and so on) from a minimally determined (semantically) narrative text of minimum expansion (of elements). Gerald Prince, for example, begins his narrative grammar with the example: "A man was very happy, then he married a vain and domineering woman, then, as a result, he was very unhappy."[1]

But in the regime of narrative film examined here, any single determination of action[2] is a multiple elaboration through a range of textual matters and figurative codes, because the discursive economy of

the film needs a redundantly multiple elaboration in order to ensure the readable determination of an action. But this multiple elaboration ineluctably overdetermines, in the sense that the multiple elaboration of the filmic text is an economy which cannot be limited and restricted into a single, uni-determining figure. Relations of similarity, reversal, exchange, and contrast in this multiple determination of the filmic text and its figuration by force produce other semantic contexts, across the filmic text, for any single figured action.

Hypothetically, it could be argued in economic terms that as the 'necessary' elaboration of figuration increases, thus increasing the power of discursive determination of a dominant and obvious semantic context, so does directly the 'probability' that other figurative patterns will be produced in the text which can form different semantic contexts. These form a counter-discourse[3] by playing the figured action against those other contexts which produce overdetermined signification of action.

We can diagram this version of overdetermination by figuration in the following (oversimplified) schema. Semantic representations 1 and 2 are each formed as an ordered relation of a set of elements. SR1 determines elements (a,b,c,d), SR2 determines elements (m,n,o,p). These two semantic representations are at considerable semantic distance, when considered abstractly; they do not map each other (in the <u>form</u> of the relations among their elements), neither one contains the other (as a subset of elements), nor do they share any common elements. Consider these semantic representations and elements as codes

and signifiers in a textual disposition (here figured as a linear string). The symbol 'y' will stand for other signifying material, and the underlined and slashed junction of elements signals an overdetermining figurational instance.

a.b.y.m.y.c/n.y.o.d.p

Before the overdetermining relation is encountered in the textual unreeling, both semantic representations were being unfolded as codes to determine the text. The figuration of elements c and n forces those semantic representations together into a divisive relation and mapping. This is not a succession or incorporation of contexts,[4] but an excessive and troubling signifier whose figuration 'jams' together semantic contexts (as ordered maps or representations).

The analysis of OOC, and the fragments from The Maltese Falcon and Open City to be analyzed here, suggest the existence and operation of a particular figurational agency of overdetermination, which assumes many forms. This agency could be called barring, and it will be found (in the analyses conducted here) to include the figurative and textual factors of:

--frame lines of the image;
--maskage of actor or object within the frame;
--the gap in the image-track formed by a shot change;
--the disjunctive gap between image and sound.

After the first theoretical move here in sketching a theory of overdetermination, an argument which seemed to depend on the 'plenitude' of elaborated materials and codes of the filmic text as

surface, it may appear paradoxical to postulate the agency of overdetermination in figurative movements involving bars, margins, interstices, or sensorial separations. But reconsider, in OOC, the way in which the materiality of the framelines was textually dynamized to serve as a figurative bar, and the figurative similarity of the action of expulsion of PF's body out of the space of the frame produced an excessive[5] and overdetermining figurative equation between the semantic contexts of 'military punishment' and 'PF's desire', confusing sexuality, transgression, punitive violence, and law into multiple, heterogeneously overdetermined relations. The agency of the bar therefore is the figurative division and hinge which makes a single figured action divide and relate different semantic contexts.[6]

The agency of barring can be theoretically expanded in relation to:

--levels of operation;
--codes;
--actional relations;
--textual temporality (the structural unreeling of the filmic text).

The agency of barring can be distributed at various textual levels:

(1) within the shot;
(2) in the interstice between two shots at a shot change;
(3) between two shots across the textual space of other shots.

(These three levels follow, in a general way, Ejxenbaum's concept of the split between a 'semantics of the shot' and a 'semantics of

montage'.[7]) Codes which saliently operate overdetermination in these textual analyses include FRM, CHR (including the effect of maskage), and ST. It seems that a major component or tendency of actional overdetermination is the reversal or complication of the agent/patient roles around an action (this runs parallel to Freud's 'transformation' of a phantasy with a basic actional kernel, in which the transformational variants are formed by shifts in the assignment of actants to the positions of agent and patient[8]). And last, overdetermination must be understood as a radical figurational-textual operation, beyond the constraints and dominance of diegesis and representation,[9] in which the overdetermination not only works at a given, 'present' textual juncture, but reaches to syntagmatically 'prior' textual space, and ahead to posterior 'future' textual space (in a virtual and anticipatory mode of determination).[10]

The instance of overdetermination in OOC discussed involves a configuration of figurational elements such as framelines and shot changes, a gap in the image-track, with the CHR code (PF's absence/exit from frame), and ST code (the repeated noise). Some of the instances to be analyzed from The Maltese Falcon and Open City will turn on a configuration of synchronization of CHR and ST codes, which produces within a shot an overdetermining figure of maskage, or a shot-to-shot displacement of an anticipated action of violence which is elided in the gap of a shot change.

NOTES to Section 5

1. Prince 1973: 9.

2. Since this mini-theory of filmic overdetermination is taking a particular instance in OOC--an overdetermined action--as its point of departure, for purpose of coherence and argumentative simplicity, we will focus exclusively on action.

3. 'Counter' as opposed to 'dominant', in economic terms. This claim about a counter discourse runs counter to Barthes' and Kuntzel's view that the primary task of multiple codage/determination in the photographic/filmic text functions more or less exclusively to fix, bind, and delimit meaning (cf. Kuntzel 1980a: sec. 1.3.5).

4. As in Veltrusky 1976.

5. 'Excessive', that is, in terms of the dominant diegesis and its hypothetical 'minimum' requirements for figuration.

6. Obviously, the label of the 'bar' has been chosen here for its theoretical resonances: to the bar in Lacan's formula of the sign, as he develops this in "The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious" (Lacan 1977a), or as modelled by Laplanche/Leclaire 1972 (also see Nancy/Lacoue-Labarthe 1973), to Lacan's later theory of the 'unary trait', to the barring effect of the framelines stressed by Metz in his discussion of cinematic fetishism (Metz 1977: 104-106). For the 'hinge' (brisure) as a privileged figure, see Derrida 1972: 65-73. In all these cases the paradox of Freudian overdetermination is pursued with material or mathematical metaphors.

7. Ejxenbaum 1974: 28.

8. See Freud 1963a. Although Freud does point to the re-determination of the three 'phases' when he calls them 'tranformations', he does not use the term 'overdetermination' to describe the transformational process operating on the phantasy of the beaten child. The analysis of Open City in Sections 7 and 8 takes up this topic.

9. The polysemy in OOC is bound in this way--as a retroactive writing which still can be dominated by the diegesis and its premises. Even after the polysemic upheaval there remains a carefully determined diegetic context which accounts for the disturbance, recuperating it back to the original premises of the diegesis.

10. Cf. Lacan on logical time in 1966: 192-213. Also see Crawford 1983b.

SECTION 6: Analysis

The Maltese Falcon

The fragment chosen here for textual analysis from Huston's The Maltese Falcon (1941),[1] in which Brigid O'Shaughnessy/'Miss Wonderly' (Mary Astor) visits detective Sam Spade (Humphrey Bogart) to obtain his help, rather certainly constitutes a scene: there is unity of place, overall unity of character, and unity of time seems assured by continuities of dialog and action across the shots. The particular concerns for analysis here are (1) the local economy of the scene, questioned in the working of overdetermination of action/object, and the symmetries and balances articulated to effect a perceptible closure for the scene; and (2) the global economy, which interlocks many of the threads introduced in the scene to the larger text of the film, replaying, repeating and varying these across the film's textual surface. The 29 shots of the scene are broken down into five lexias primarily according to an operational principle of signifying density: this articulation is only obliquely justified as a textual subsegementation of the scene (as an autonomous segment).

LEXIA I: 'A CUSTOMER TO SEE YOU' SHOTS 1-6

Breaks, Continuity, Parentheses

What precedes the scene--the first in the film--obviously constitutes a descriptive syntagm: four long shots slowly panning to the right, linked by dissolves, which show San Francisco (overprinted onto the first shot), its bay and what would appear to be the Golden Gate

Bridge.[2] The first shot of the scene is linked by a dissolve to this descriptive ensemble, but breaks with its movement and framing: a close shot which descends along a window through which the bridge, quite emblematic of the city, can be seen again (shot 1a). The strong and animated music, instantly recognizable as 'theme music' without diegetic tension, is suddenly accentuated in volume at the start of shot 1, but its basic theme persists as an audible sound background for precisely the six shots of lexia I, and works as a unifying thread between them. Economized continuity and rupture: preservation of object viewed, movement, and musical theme, but change in direction and framing. Name/object: here the typical 'pseudo-nature'[3] implied by camera movement--as it discovers, as if by chance, Spade's body below this window bearing his and his partner's names (shot 1b)--must be put in relation with (1) the general factor of spatial coexistence invoked in the preceding descriptive syntagm, and (2) the rhyming repetition of names ("San Francisco" over the view of the bridge, the reversed names of the detectives inscribed on their office window through which the bridge is visible). Aside from the visual metonymy established here is the kind of rhyming effect which will function as a closing parenthesis to the scene when these two men's names are repeated at the end of shot 29 as legible shadows projected onto the office floor when the codes of the camera movement and angle will again produce a moment of absence of any subject in the image track.

<u>The Detective: Indifference, Privileges</u>

Already in shot 1 several semes have been established by the code of the look and the cigarette code (the latter is more than an index; it is so extensively articulated and utilized in film noir that it is codified), semes which concern verbal-categorical interrelations between actants, the actional chain, and spectator. Spade's work on a cigarette first indicates, together with his non-look (in shots 2, 4, and part of 5), in a non-marked fashion his 'distance', indifference to the client who has come, his non-engagement. This attitude, which can be approached with regard to the category of voice, will later assure a strong and functional contrast between the two masculine actants. A second verbal category, aspect, comes into play when the competent spectator realizes that Spade's activity with his cigarette simply is 'habitual', that this action is outside/beside the diegesis proper--an element of characterization. Contextual markers--music, diegetic location, initial position in the diegesis, discovery by camera movement, the cigarette code itself--all support this nuance. (A counter-example would be the hand of Bogart on the doorbell of a mansion in the first shot of The Big Sleep: a spectator must realize that the aspect of the action is 'unique' and a part of an 'already begun' diegetic-actional chain, thus assigning 'functional' and not just 'incidental' status and semantic distinction to the figured action.[4])

With the pleasure of recognition offered the spectator in the explicit figuration of the star (Bogart as a 'good object'), the sound track now intervenes in 1b and a second privilege is accorded to Bogart as the action chain of the film begins: a sound of a door off, Spade

asks without looking up "Yes, sweetheart?" Privileged by being presented first and by speaking first, Bogart will also enjoy the figurational-textual privilege of speaking the last words of the scene, the ironical judgement of his partner "You've got brains, yes you have!". The film The Maltese Falcon, as is said in the history of the cinematic institution, will fix his image as a 'tough guy' within the Hollywood star system. Here this privilege, marked with respect to the character code, simultaneously functions as a message a propos of the star code, constructing it, helping to teach it: a duplex functioning, 'circular' or autonymic in Jakobson's formulation,[5] but nonetheless one which could be informative and non-redundant for those spectators unsure of Bogart's visage and in need of some clue to his role in the fiction.

The Two Women

"Sweetheart": a referential code of speech, that of the colloquial slang of the detective, is obviously invoked; other epithets in the paradigm used in the film include 'angel', 'honey', 'precious', 'lady', 'good girl'. The exhaustive extension of this discursive subcode across the film's text indicates the figurational need and pressure it has to accommodate and bear, even so far as the oxymoronic "You're a good man, sister!" (Spade to his secretary, later in the film). Its function in the text's figuration seems clear: to 'place' the represented female interlocutor without a direct address by the use of her name--assuring a certain 'distance' for the figure of the detec-

tive. In shot 2 we see Spade's interlocutor, his secretary Effie, who announces "There's a girl who wants to see you. Her name's Wonderly." The first hermeneutic trickery is thus put in place: Brigid's false name, which is repeated three times in lexia I. Within the representation the politeness code will dictate these three repetitions of Brigid's name, whereas in terms of the textual functioning of a Hollywood film this repetition is linked to a necessary informational redundance. (In contrast the text is content to let Spade's name be written, not spoken, in the scene whereas he will introduce his partner Archer by name in lexia III).

"...a girl who wants to see you.": an inert statement, evidently without excess in relation to the diegetic development it reports--except that it is taken up, repeated anaphorically, inverted and relabelled by Effie in shot 3: "You'll want to see her. She's a knockout." Spade's (future) desire is spoken out by a woman, the woman at the door...but the object of desire, which will provoke desire, has already been there in the visuals from shot 2: in the background, behind the glass, moving, a visual-perceptual lure, a figurative 'blot'[6] or veil indicating itself--but framed so as to effect a metonymy of the two female bodies, their desires, a crossing of desires with a certain masking of Effie's desire for Spade. In such a perspective one can better comprehend the logic of the close shots 3 and 4: a 'natural' displacement from Spade which shows more closely Effie's look at him, then his non-look, thus his indifference to her entry, his limited interest in the announced client. "Shoo her in", he says (shot 4): Spade has the air of amusing himself with this affair.

The Entry, The Looks

After this displacement the long shot 5 is rather rich: the proairetic notation of action 'to pay a visit to a detective' is quite stereotyped, but what is important is the emphasis on the spatial axis of motion and looks--which will not be repeated as such in the scene--between the desk and door which Brigid traverses. Over Spade's shoulder the spectator sees her look, sees his head rise to look, then a slight camera lift reproduces the gestural sign of politeness which Spade accords to Brigid as he rises from his chair. Attention is focused on the activity at the door: a second star, Mary Astor, is revealed full face, but sharing this shot with the other woman--by opposition to Archer on the male side, who receives his own shot when he enters. Across the women's exchange of politenesses at the door (Brigid will say "Thank you" six times in the scene) the play of desire and the look progresses: Brigid's look is quickly fixed on Spade, but even more interesting is the brief and direct glance Effie makes to Spade, just before she is in turn masked by Brigid's body. In this look is a 'knowing confirmation' of Spade's desire, a reflection of his future desire, a signifier in fading. At first a visual blot, veiled by glass, Brigid's seduction of Spade--and her first deception of him--have already been conducted through this other woman in Spade's employ: this first lexia works the first of the diversions of relations and exchange of place, desire, loyalty, and money which constitute the overall diegesis. The two women, again: in the rest of the shot there is no dialog as Brigid advances across the room, leaving the play of

looks and something else to be seen: her fur, which marks a strong contrast to Effie's simple dress, and which will be reutilized in the film's symbolic economy later when Spade will force her to pawn it to obtain more money to give to him to conceal the truth from the police.

Completion, Reversal, Politenesses

Shot 6 completes a small actional chain (enter/approach/arrive/sit down): this momentary saturation of a proairetic thread is joined by other marks (code of speech: Brigid and Spade for the first time share the speech of a shot; a code of spatial figuration: the reappearance of the window and names from shot 1) to stabilize the lexia. This effect is furthered by the shot/reverse-shot of shots 5 and 6; Spade's look is now presented from an angle which visually reverses the door-desk axis, emphasized by as slight camera movement forward. (This coupled interplay between 5 and 6 would be lost, for example, in a commutation which would use camera movement to extend 5 to include Brigid's arrival at the desk).

At the end of 6, aided by a slight pan to the right, the two characters are framed in a left-right balance: figuration. Politenesses: Spade has politely asked Brigid to be seated, and now she in turn thanks him and says "I inquired at the hotel for the name of a reliable private detective. They mentioned yours." Guided by the 'name' of Spade, Brigid has come to contact, to contract him: but there will be a slippage of names which will put another name and another body in her mortal contract with the detectives. A final

polite invitation from Spade caps the lexia and reinforces the new axis of discursive exchange where the hermeneutic chain will be carried forward in the next lexia: "Suppose you tell me all about it from the very beginning."

Shot 6, textually analyzed against the previous shots of the first lexia, discloses a good deal about the operation of the filmic economy of figuration--in its movement and phasing between saturations of readable proairetic chains, and figurational manipulations of acting bodies, space, and objects into marked visual symmetry.

LEXIA II: THE STORY SHOTS 7-13

Pluricodic Balancing

Let us change our perspective somewhat and, by concentrating on an ensemble of specific and semi-specific codes, question the principles of unity of this lexia (or subsegment) of the scene. A certain homogeneity of these seven shots is quite obvious, both on the level of action--Brigid describes her problem to Spade, with cutting and alternation between the interlocutors motivated by their questions and answers--and on that of figuration: all the shots are fixed, include one or both the characters, and are all medium-close shots (a set of two paired framings for each character is employed: close shot of Brigid or Spade, medium-close shot of Brigid or Spade angled past the other's shoulder). Analysis shows that in general Brigid is privileged in terms of these codes, but Spade does receive certain marks of balance amidst the diegetically motivated centering on her.

The first shot of the lexia (7) 'fulfills' Spade's invitation to Brigid to speak by its presentation of her full face, but includes Spade from behind so as not to make too abrupt a break with the balance of shot 6. Brigid speaks alone in this comparatively long-duration shot. Shot 8 'naturally' begins the lexia's alternation by moving to a symmetrical framing of Spade, but the shot is shorter and while Spade now again speaks he does so while sharing the soundtrack with Brigid. A question from Spade in 8 and the small discursive tension it creates motivate the alternation back to a close shot of Brigid, alone, full face (9): the 'less intimate' framing of shot 7 (which includes Spade) will not be used again (except as a brief insert in another lexia). Again, shot 9 privileges Brigid with a longer duration and exclusive presence on the soundtrack. Shot 10: instead of a symmetrical close shot of Spade alone, the framing of 8 is re-used; furthermore, Spade's shot is shorter and once again he shares the soundtrack with Brigid. Next Brigid is accorded a second close shot alone (11) in which she alone speaks, but now this privilege is partly balanced by the code of duration--the shot is about as long as the preceding. Then a further balancing is accomplished by shot 12 when Spade finally is given his own close shot to match those of Brigid, but at the price of the usual shorter duration and with an unusual feature on the code of speech: Spade does not speak at all, while Brigid does. This alternating chain is markedly broken off on Brigid's side in shot 13 (close shot, Brigid alone in the image and sound tracks, longer duration) with the sound of a door off, her interrupted speech, and her look off left; the alter-

nation will be resumed in lexia IV on the male side, but Brigid's terminal position in the chain again marks her preeminence in this lexia.

A table serves well to display these symmetries and rhymes:

Shot	Framing*	Sound Track-Speech	Image	Duration
7	IB	B	BS	(+)
8	IS	B,S	SB	-
9	IIB	B	B	+
10	IS	B,S	SB	-
11	IIB	B	B	0
12	IIS	B	S	-
13	IIB	B	B	+

(*Framings: IS, IB, medium-close shots of Spade or Brigid, across the other's shoulder; IIS, IIb, facial close-up shots of Spade or Brigid).

The Cigarette

'Certain marks of balance' for Spade: it is necessary to look beyond these basic and 'technical' figurational codes to discern another element worked even more strongly to afford Spade a sort of balance. Consider the successive proairetic articulations of the cigarette: Spade lights it (1), he toys with the lighter (10), he draws on it (12). With typical economy of function, the filmic text puts these little actions to work in several ways. It is worth noting that, aside from the exchange of dialog as the dominant action, Spade is subtly characterized as 'active', is given something to do while he listens (especially shot 12) and speaks, whereas, aside from her speech, Brigid is left characterized as passive, only given something to wear (the luxurious fur, rippling as she moves, as a hook for perceptual/visual attention). Aside from this stereotypical contrast of the verbal category of voice (active/passive) between the couple, shot

12 offers something more which tends to specify him in terms of voice (rapport between actant and action) in a somewhat different way. In this shot Brigid is making her first clearly and strongly 'emotional' statement ("It was horrible! Waiting!"), implicitly setting a lure for a remark of personal sympathy in exchange-response: but Spade looks, listens, and works his cigarette without any overt sign of emotion. This type of 'distance', whose initial signalling is aided by the cigarette code, will be a major element of the scene's overall semantics. And last, this spaced chain of operations with the cigarette naturalizes the passage of time and discourse, glosses it with vraisemblance by meshing a referentially well-known rhythm with the filmic temporality of figuration (shot duration, tempo of shot changes).

Beyond A Politeness: What To Do?

Brigid: "I wrote her that I was coming. I shouldn't have done that, should I?" Spade: "Oh, it's not always easy to know what to do" (shots 9-10). In the temps mort of this small detour in the conversation (a retardation of the informative unreeling of the action 'recite a story-problem') and in the platitude Spade offers back for Brigid's question is knotted the major kernel of the diegesis, the very difficulty of the couple's (future) relations, their complications: what to do? Whole later scenes will stage and expand this question of action, such as the first meeting at Brigid's apartment where Spade's burst of anger about this enigma induces Brigid's second payment of

money to Spade, along with her second deception of him. Here a politeness (from a linguistic-discursive subcode) dissimulates a dense anchoring point of the diegetic semantics; later the code of politeness will take a dominant and paradigmatic role in establishing Spade's relations with other characters: an absence of politeness marks his dealings with 'honest' adversaries (police) as with partners (Archer, Effie), overcoded and formal ('European') politeness heavily marks the dialog with Joel Cairo (an opponent who follows this politeness with open but ineffectual violence), equally overcoded cordiality and compliments are obviously featured in the discussions with Gutman (the main opponent who accompanies these with effective but covert violence), and finally there is the 'anti-politeness', the elaborate insults traded between Spade and the young gunman Wilmer. With this platitude from Spade we have the first indication how the filmic text will work over and shift the linguistic domain (the symbolic) to assist in the fabricating and filling out of imaginary referents (characters) and their structured oppositions--leaving the filmic spectatorial subject secured, meaningfully positioned vis-à-vis the filmic figuration.

Toponymies, Transformations

At the lexia's debut, the first words Brigid utters after Spade's invitation to speak: "I'm from New York." A toponymic code (of the United States) being invoked in speech for the first time, toponymy in general goes on to be one of the most widespread threads of the filmic text, in large measure assuring the legible solidity of the narrative

on many levels. From the title itself, followed by the fifty-word roll up title giving the falcon's history and the descriptive syntagm with its overprinted title ("San Francisco"), the spectator has already been situated as a "voyageur immobile" (Kuntzel[7]). The falcon's itinerary, from the Mediterranean to Paris, Istanbul, and across Asia, of course plays a predominant role in establishing the diegetic-actional base, but toponymy figures elsewhere: in the origins of characters (a large close up of a clothing label will be seen as Spade discovers that Brigid has come from Hong Kong, not New York), their destinations (at the denouement, Spade will rebuff Brigid by telling her she is going to Tehachapi, a prison for women), in their relations (Spade's ridicule of the punk New York gunman Wilmer), even in their names (Joel 'Cairo', whose various passports are displayed in close up; 'Miss Wonderly', Brigid's first 'American' name gives way to a 'French' alias, 'Miss LeBlanc', before the full and prototypically 'Irish' 'Brigid O'Shaughnessy' is given). And the toponymic code not only dominates the representation, but, in a materialized and everyday form, inhabits its margins as well--in nearly all the scenes at Spade's office the characters speak and move in front of a large globe which stands in the background.

Not surprisingly, geographical specifications structure the account Brigid gives of her 'problem': a young sister has been lured to San Francisco from the family home in New York by a man named Thursby, who himself has a wife and children in England. Brigid's younger sister must be found quickly before their parents soon return

from Honolulu. In terms of the overall diegesis, it would seem plausible to take this sum of informations as a simple dissimulation of a 'true' diegetic situation, an 'information overload' formed of toponymic notations which serves as a snare for the detectives, and which a spectator also probably experiences and remembers as such. Within our frame of textual analysis, however, this information can be broken down, productively remanipulated, submitted to some discursive transformations which can rewrite it--even on its own digetic level--as an overdeterminately elaborated, masked formulation of 'other' diegetic kernels.[8] (1) 'Someone is not at the proper place, is detached, is lost or stolen': not someone, something--the falcon, the lost object--animates the diegetic activity. The imaginary: this 'sister' Brigid dissimulates as being 'stolen' by Thursby is a double of her image, the image of the timid, young, well brought up girl which she establishes under the detective's eyes. (2) 'What has been stolen must be found and secured before--a return, an arrival, after a period of time.' On one hand one can immediately rewrite this as a reference to the falcon and its possession, once it arrives in San Francisco, yet it dually refers to the threat posed by the possible arrival of competitors for the statuette. (3) 'It is an anxious and painful waiting': the source of this anxiety is not familial concern over a lost sister as object, but an anxiety of greed and the planning of Thursby's betrayal over the possession of the object. (4) 'Thursby is the problem, he must be dealt with.' It is not a question of two sisters, one searching, the other seduced and lost, but of two men, two accomplices of Brigid, one

arriving later with the statuette, the other on the scene but marked for betrayal--Thursby. (5) 'At stake is a family's honor.' At stake in the violences unclenched with Brigid's story are the dishonors of at least two 'families'. After Archer's death his widow comes to Spade to ask if the latter has killed her husband so that they could be free for each other; when Gutman turns over his accomplice Wilmer to Spade, Gutman justifies his treachery by claiming that he can replace a "son" like Wilmer but no other falcon can be found. Thus five principal strands of the narrative can be read, in transcribed combinations and condensations, in this recital of the inaugural scene which is itself quickly forgotten or judged as empty speech.

LEXIA III: INTERRUPTION SHOTS 14-16b

Archer's Dustuchia, The Woman At The Door

Immediately, a possible small default in the vraisemblance of the figuration could be questioned: where has Effie gone? Apparently one must conclude that she has somehow disappeared from the outer office, cannot warn Archer, the partner, that a conference is in progress inside. Thus when Archer quite impolitely bursts into the office (13-14) without warning, a sort of (Lacanian) dustuchia[9] begins to stage itself: an abrupt, traumatic encounter with the real, as if by chance.

In this perspective the interest of Effie's role, her post at the door, whether absent or present, is redoubled; in considering 'the figuration of woman' in The Maltese Falcon it would be a mistake to

underestimate the power her figure enjoys. She has already 'predicted' the desires about to be put into play before she admits Brigid to meet Spade; here she critically facilitates Archer's dustuchia, his sudden and unexpected delivery to the fascination of Brigid's look. In a later scene, Spade will hear Effie announce over the intercom her departure from the office and he will ask her to lock the door behind her, then as he leans back in his chair the gun Joel Cairo has just drawn is revealed: Effie's absence again facilitates a violence. And the unexpected appearance of the sought-for object is staged as a further and late variant in this chain: Effie is inside, with Spade at his desk, when the sound of the door is heard off as the dying ship's captain stumbles into the office with the falcon, the unannounced victim of violence who surprises the pair. She then shares with Spade a scopic privilege not (yet) accorded to the spectator, viewing the statuette, which she will re-deliver to Spade in her last, brief appearance--at Spade's apartment, at the door.

Masking the Sutures

It would certainly seem possible to take this lexia as a single shot split by the insertion of shot 15, this insert being motivated principally by a codified 'necessity' of presenting Spade in the image-track as the speaking origin of his introduction of Archer and invitation to him to enter. But it also serves to deliver a small measure of information about Brigid, consolidating the seme 'nervousness': her conspicuous but ambiguous breaks of eye contact in lexia II, her

interrupted speech and glance off in shot 13, her glances in 15 off at Archer, back to Spade, then off again at Archer. The spectator's eye is drawn to Brigid's shifting looks, his attention to their 'psychological' interest (itself imaginary: the constitution of a plenitude of 'character')[10]; this movement screens another, more fundamental functioning--the simple but effective suturing of a coherent imaginary scenic space by the cutting, the sounds/voices on and off, and looks of shots 13-15.[11]

Multiple Use

The action of interrupting the interview between Spade and Brigid seems to be exploited in at least three ways by the figuration. First, it accrues a banal 'true-to-reality' effect to the benefit of the general vraisemblance of the scene--a textual effect which immediately glosses over the small lacuna of vraisemblance created by Effie's apparent absence. The verbal category of taxis is pertinent in highlighting this: the actions of lexia II, questioning and answering, manifest a deliberate, intentional linkage, against which Archer's action presents itself as a 'simple', 'natural' accident--the unexpected appearance of the partner whose name has already figured with Spade's. Second, while the action of interrupting is invested in an overall feature such as vraisemblance, the figurative element brought into play by that event--Archer's body--is quickly utilized by a compositional code to constitute a momentary effect. Consider all the symmetries set up in 16b: two men, two windows with their lettering,

the men's matched kinesic poses, their desks, their cigarettes, with the seated and centered woman against the cabinet and books, between the matching elements. 'Good composition': an official portrait or cliché of the two partners at work. An element perturbing this symmetry is Brigid's look, which opens a third textual-figurational function about to operate. Her look, her seduction, her dissimulation enjoy a fatal power at this moment: the victim will be Archer, recognized by the spectator here in this composition and elsewhere as the 'similar other' (semblable)[12] of Spade, or more properly a figurative stand-in for Spade who suddenly enters the scene to take over the role. Thus the figuration and its economy, by this 'natural' interruption, gain an object to be held in reserve in order to expend it 'violently' at the next diegetic turn.

Character and the Imaginary

With Archer's entry another overabundance of politenesses is heard and seen: Archer removes his hat, apologizes, Spade invites him in and introduces him. These politnesses, by referring back to Brigid's entry in lexia I, smooth over the disruption of Archer's entry. Then, slowly, a certain 'excess' or vulgarity begins to be established concerning Archer. In contrast to Spade, a sort of vestimentary degree zero, Archer is excessively marked by his display handkerchief, boutonniere, vest and unbuttoned coat (cf. the simple contrast between Effie and Brigid in terms of dress). This imaginary excess is quickly reinforced by Archer's actions: he pauses by his desk, and behind his back

he lets fall a matchstick which had been in his mouth. Again the cigarette code carries the work of the imaginary, its fabrication and relating of imaginary referents: Spade's activity with cigarette and lighter is 'acceptable' and balances him against Brigid, Archer's matchstick is 'unacceptable' and obliquely signals his terminal function in the text as a victim. At this point in the diegesis Brigid is still characterized as a 'proper young woman' and hence she is not offered a cigarette; this signifying element is held in economic reserve, deferred until at her apartment, she will take and light her first cigarette at the end of a string of gestures masking without success her panic at a crisis of events (this diegetic use contrasts strongly with the characterizational use of the cigarette by Spade). For her part Effie does not smoke, but the cigarette code joins with the proxemic and kinesic codes to mark her friendly intimacy with Spade as she later sits on his desk by him, makes him a cigarette and places it in his mouth.

Archer's gesture with the matchstick, hidden from Brigid and Spade, does have a privileged line of destination to one receiver: the spectator, following Archer's body moving in frame. This structure of scopic privileging is underlined again a moment later in 16b when Archer, behind Brigid's back, makes a facial signal to Spade; a gesture (of appreciation of Brigid's body, of rivalry for her attention, of denigration for her problem as recited by Spade...) constituting for the spectator a second mark of Archer's (soon fatal) gullibility and weakness, it is not seen by the (female) master of the lure for these

imaginary qualities. The filmic figuration and text are careful too of their own (multiple) channels, lines of destination, and modulation of spectatorial attention, since as these informations about Archer are being staged on the image-track, on the sound-track Spade is giving a resume of Brigid's story for Archer's benefit, essentially redundant and without interest for most spectators (but helpful, perhaps, for any left confused by Brigid's telling).

LEXIA IV: SEDUCTION, WARNINGS SHOTS 16c-28

Violence, Choreography, Contagion

16c: the reprise of the story being finished by Brigid's agreement to it, Archer crosses over right to take a place by Spade on his desk to listen to Brigid's warnings about the danger Thursby represents. "You must be careful. I'm deathly afraid of him. Of what he might do. . . I want you to know he's a dangerous man. . . I don't think he'd hesitate to kill. . . he gives the impression of being a violent person." It would not suffice to simply say, for example, that Brigid's new line of discourse 'creates an atmosphere of tension.' When she asks "mightn't he, mightn't he do something to her?", this symptomatic repetition--what Freud called 'preservation'[13]--manifests the pressure on the discourse, and it is well worth it to take this 'pressure' literally, pushing it further to 'force' the filmic text. The future reversal of terms of actional agent/patient (aggressor/protected one), or shift of positions in the exchange of violence, are 'already' inscribed in Brigid's fiction, barely dissimulated there by a

discursive-pronomial substitution: she might do anything to him. To whom, 'him'?

The contagion, its movement, the bodily transmission of violence is figured both in the discourse and in the image. In 16b-c Spade is announcing to Brigid the simple action which the detectives will take concerning the manifest actants of Brigid's story: "Now it's, ah, simply a matter of having a man at the hotel this evening to shadow him when he leads us to your sister." First phase: as he speaks, Archer's body is moving across the frame, 'contacts' and masks Brigid's body precisely at the words "a man"; fascinated, vulnerable, his look turned beyond at a misrecognized and masked source of violence, Archer becomes 'the man', the victim, the body Brigid has solicited and Spade is offering. Second phase: a pre-inscription of the scene of murder is produced an instant later when Spade enounces the words "this evening" as Archer's body masks Spade, leaving two bodies, the victim and murderess, on screen. The murder scene to follow this office scene will constitute the initial 'true' hermeneutic enigma by replaying après-coup this effect of maskage one further turn; Brigid's body will then be masked and held out of frame as her hand brings a pistol into the bottom of the frame to kill the shocked Archer. 16b-c prefigures, prenominates this later mortal scene: this evening, Brigid, Archer, violence. Archer is 'in Spade's place' multiply: figuratively, masking his body in frame; diegetically, unexpectedly arriving to assume the job of surveillance. Further, the code of maskage (of the blocked and barred look) thus has staged the 'necessary' blindness--in

the register of discourse--basic to the hermeneutic code for the spectator and for Spade: in the first phase, the identity of the female killer is masked for the spectator, and by extension, for Spade and Archer; in the second, the female killer and her victim are seen, but not the partner who will not see but will survive the fatal evening by having a stand-in in that place, and who will be the actant to whom the equally blinded spectator will look to reveal that killer's identity.

Middle/Active

As Brigid and Spade talk, Archer arrives, is seduced by Brigid, and is taken as her future victim. The fatality of this outcome is first naturalized by virtue of the taxis (verbal category) of his action of entry, and now in lexia IV it is shown as being further linked to Archer's 'character'--which is in turn set up by contrast to Spade. Another verbal category, that of voice, is an effective frame in which to approach and name this bundle of imaginary characterizations and contrasts in the figuration of action: specifically, the opposition between the middle and active voice. Diegetic roles and interests are of course the leading element of the contrast. Archer is 'active' in that he forcefully engages himself with Brigid for both 'official' business purposes and with more 'personal' interests, whereas Spade places himself in more of a 'middle' position vis-à-vis his and others' actions: he listens and is about to take measures on his client's behalf, but in a detached, very polite, practical, and serious--'businesslike'--way. While Brigid's statements in this lexia

constitute--after the factuality of the reprise Spade gives in lexia III--her second, stronger emotional manifestation (her terror, threatening danger from Thursby), Spade contents himself with saying, politely but with a kind of generality: "Now, just leave that to us. We'll know how to handle him" (17). Kinesic signifiers emphasize the contrast in attitude between the two men: Spade remains seated behind his desk, Archer seats himself on its edge. When in 16c Spade assures Brigid that the detectives can "manage" Thursby, Archer smiles broadly and speaks directly to Brigid for the first time: "Yeah." Finally, in 23a after Spade leans back in his chair and reaffirms in a somewhat vague and distanced way that "We'll have a man there", Archer bends forward and places himself in that place with a hand gesture, a smile, and strong vocal intonation: "I'll look after it myself" (23b). To die of fatal fascination: one could say that a certain default of the politeness code and its shielding function is what slowly but fatally puts Archer in the place of the victim once he acts to ensure his direct involvement in Brigid's affairs.

Resumption of the Chain, The Lured Look

The figurational codes constitute a second way to further the analysis of Brigid's seduction at a distance. While the privileging of Brigid begun in lexia II continues, here the figuration is worked differently to show the different effects of Brigid's presence and speech on Spade and Archer. Archer's "Yeah" in shot 16c unclenches a new line of discourse about the dangers involved, and shot 17 precisely resumes

the alternating rhythm of lexia II with the male side as Spade responds to Brigid's first warnings (the shot is slightly widened to include both men). Brigid's series of shots (18, 20, 22, 24, and 26) are all close shots, without any sharing of the image, and in which she speaks alone (and she in fact dominates the soundtrack by speaking in every shot of the lexia--except 26, which is silent), although her shots are not significantly longer in duration. It is important to note that in this lexia her look is insistent, and focussed off along a new axis towards Archer (compare shots 7 or 9 with 18). On the men's side, neither occupies the image alone, and in all their shots the soundtrack is shared with Brigid. The first two shots in their series (17, 19) are shared with her in the image, then in 21 Spade is isolated with her as he writes down a description of Thursby. Since the latter will never be seen in the film, aside from general vraisemblance, the economic utility of this action (and, presumably, the motive for its isolation with Archer off) is a signalling of Spade's 'practicality'. In turn, shot 21 serves as an anchoring point for further contrast between the two men. In 23, Brigid, the object which provokes desire, is left out of frame so that attention can be focussed on her effects, staged in a silent exchange of glances. Archer first glances at his partner as the latter speaks and, luring himself that his semblable has blundered and missed a fine opportunity, then leans forward to claim for himself the actional role as the helper of Brigid. The filmic figuration here crystallizes logical and actional interrelation and temporality; "This decision is concluded in the moment of the look"

(Lacan).[14] After Archer has leaned forward, from behind him, Spade looks at him with a brief 'knowing look' and a smile: a partial recognition of the partner's misrecognition. In 25, a larger shot with mobile camera, these structures of the look and misrecognition are repeated but replayed with variation: in 25a Brigid begins to get up but then realizes, under Spade's look, that she must pay. As she looks down and opens her purse a slight pan to the right begins which produces an effect of unveiling--Brigid is left off frame left and Archer is seen by the spectator and Spade (with a brief glance and another smile), his mouth open, immobile, fascinated by the money and the woman as scopic objects (Lacan's fascinum[15] (shot 25b-1). As the shot ends (25b-2) Archer glances après-coup at Spade--to share or receive confirmation of his fascination?--but finds, lures himself to find, that his fascinated look has not been seen by Spade. Both these shots (23, 25) quite evidently refer back to and re-utilize Archer's look and gesture of 16b to establish the opposition: Spade--pragmatism, knowledge/ Archer--fascination, misrecognition.

Fascinum: Primary, Secondary

As the textual analyst works (against) the scopics of the film's figuration by repeated viewings and systematizations, the overdetermined work of the fascinum splits. Shot 25 serves well to demonstrate the difference between the fascinum which could be called secondarized, 'in' the figured representation, with an obviously figured look and desire ascribed into the diegesis (Archer and the money), and the primary fascinum, well exemplified by instances of maskage of visibility

for the spectator's and the diegetic looks (the figurative play of image and sound in shot 16). Overdetermination of figuration springs in the overlap, folding, and doubling of these instances.

Politenesses and Silence Around a Faked Contract

After Archer unknowingly names himself for death, as the exchange object (shot 23), the falsified contract is paid for in a silence which, seemingly imposed on the men, broken only by a few empty politenesses from Brigid, discreetly marks the duplicitous and overdetermined status of the exchange. Brigid thanks Archer in 24; she 'realizes' she must pay, "...ah, yes..." (23); shot 26 is silent as she looks at Spade and decides to add a second bill, then asks "Will that be enough?" (27). Spade nods silently as Archer continues to stare; this overpayment is of course partly motivated and naturalized in figuration by the fur and by Brigid's diegetic situation.

The alternation which homogenizes lexias II and IV is broken off by shot 28 as it effects a preliminary closure to the lexia and to the overall scene both on: (1) the diegetic level ('to leave' presents itself as a final and saturating term for the proairetic armature 'to make an office call', an actional subchain whose closure is marked with respect to the verbal category of aspect), and (2) the figurational level (shot 28 repeats the framing and angle of earlier establishing shtos 6 and 16, but reverses the camera movement of these previous shots). There are many of the kind of formal spoken and gestural politenesses which will be quite markedly absent in lexia V, and several

meshed codes (camera movement, presence/absence of characters, maskage) act with the discursive/kinesic matter to reiterate and render obvious the differences between the detectives at two moments. At the desk, as Brigid is thanking Spade, Archer once again imposes himself (eager tone of voice, gesturing and leaning towards her, mentioning their meeting that evening) in an active mode in order to obtain a handshake with her, thus touching her: "You don't have to look for me! I'll see you all right!" (28a). As Archer and Brigid shake hands, Spade is masked behind Brigid's body: for an instant the filmic text ironizes the (excessive) spectacle of this couple alone in frame, the paid victim's handshake and falsified contract. Then, as the camera retreats, Archer is left off frame right and the Brigid-Spade couple isolated. Spade precedes Brigid towards the door wearing a disgusted expression shown to the spectator alone (a discursive channeling), but at the door he quickly resumes a calm and polite air: he smiles, bows, and bids Brigid goodbye quite formally after her (third) spoken "Thank you" of this shot (28b).

LEXIA V THE PARTNERS SHOT 29

A Detective Alone

With Brigid departed, a single shot functions as a dense textual and figurational node in order to draw the scene to a perceptible closure. Figurational codes of camera movement, angle, framing, and characters-in-image produce three rather distinct phases. 29a: a medium close shot, slightly low angle, of Archer alone. Spade enters

from the left, behind Archer, and then a track backwards and a leveling of angle begins which produce 29b: a static long shot of the two men, now seated at their desks. Then as Spade speaks the scene's final words a pan down leaves the men out of frame and produces a high angle close shot of their two names, projected onto the floor (29c).

This is a strong moment for Archer; having entered the scene 'by chance', and soon to be used by the figuration as a victim of the 'true' violence which will propel the diegesis, here he is accorded the image for a moment as he verifies the money paid for his death: the two bills are not counterfeit ("They're right enough"), but Brigid's discourse and the contract with her are. He continues, "They have brothers in her bag"--a phrase which signals his future expectations of the seductive woman, against which the representation can play off the violence of the following death scene, the abrupt cancelling of those expectations. 'Brothers' re-sounds the 'family' seme, which in 29b is reshaped as an elaborated but incomplete symmetry between two 'enemy brothers', their mockery and competition; "Maybe you saw her first, but I spoke first", says Archer from his desk. The chain of looks which sketches Archer's desire and his credulity, stages them, receives its final term: his look from behind Brigid in 16b, the various other looks in lexia IV (including a look at Brigid's derrière as she leaves in shot 28), and now his looks at the bill and off left towards Brigid in imagination (29b: "She's sweet"). One detective is obviously touched, but somewhat less obviously <u>both</u> are implicated in the contagion: with a small gesture Spade picks up his bill as he sits down at his desk.

Rhymes, Couples, ?

'A perceptible closure': the rhyming repetition and deferred readability of the sets of names is the most marked trait produced by the figuration to effect the scene's symmetry and closure (1a, the reversed lettering on the window, up angle; 29c, the legible projected shadows of the letters, on the floor, down angle, absence of characters at both moments). But the filmic discourse is careful to fill as well the gap, the textual space between the proairetic and figurational closures of shot 28 (which involves Brigid) and this obvious figurative work of 29c (the names) with elements which both 'relay' from 28 to 29c and which can rhyme with lexia I. First, Archer's look fixed on the object of interest, the bills, rhymes with Spade's look at the cigarette; second, Archer's words of rivalry rhyme (by contrast) with Effie's words of complicity in desire in lexia I. At the scene's conclusion one can survey it to note both the apparent discursive pressure on the figuration and text to constantly figure a couple, but also the ease of economic management and effective suturing of the spectator afforded by such a 'natural' and 'dramatic' chain of couples, their spacing, alternation, junction, and disjunction: two names, two accomplices in desire, two women, the two interlocutors, the two men (at first a compositional balance, then the different effects of seduction are displayed in shared framings), the two separate farewells, the two rivals at their desks, the names again. In this perspective the work of homogenization of the scene which this factor of figuration effects can be appreciated, and beyond the simple demarcation between

this scene and the murder scene to follow can be remarked what sort of figurative tension is engaged in the latter scene precisely because Archer is alone in frame for his death.

What is certain is that plural readings of this filmic text have barely been begun, or even indicated, concerning the scene considered here, but it is worth noting the problems which further readings must confront. What seems certain is that this cultural text is at work staging for us a certain figure of the woman, her truth and her 'metaphors' for truth, their effects amidst many other exchanges on the symbolic field: all this invites and in a certain way fulfills appeals to various psychoanalytic concepts and scenarios (dustuchia, a [first] circulation of signifiers on that symbolic field, triangular scenes of vision and blindness, and so on). What remains to be known is whether readings of this scene and this filmic text overall could with a certain force and style complicate such models, could unfold the fourth sides of such scenes (for example, taking into account the figure of Effie, the work of enunciation constituted by the action of many diverse codes) in such a way so as to rupture the apparent closure or blockage of the symbolic network of the film's diegesis-representation, its apparent guarantee of the signifier's return to its proper place thanks to the law of 'destiny as destination'[16]?

NOTES to Section 6

1. A set of numbered frame enlargements of all the shots of the scene is available in Crawford 1980.

2. Actually it is the Bay bridge, but the cultural stereotype of the toponymic blazon 'compels' that it be read as the Golden Gate.

3. For 'pseudo-nature', Barthes 1974: sec. XXII.

4. Other noteworthy examples of the 'cigarette code' as a typical figurational strand in film noir might include Brigid's gesture to light a cigarette as an aspectually marked action of concealment in MF, Mrs. Mulwray's second cigarette as a 'confessional symptom' in Chinatown, and the passage of time figured in the growing pile of cigarette butts in Detour. As a 'code of content' (Hjelmslev), the cigarette code deserves attention for its functional use in the discourse of noir film.

5. Jakobson 1957: 131.

6. On the figure of the tâche (blot) as scopic signifier, Lacan 1973 or 1977b: Part II.

7. Lecture series (unpublished) by Kuntzel, American University Center for Film Studies in Paris, 1977-78.

8. On this re-transcription of elements in a phantasmatic scenario, Freud 1963. Kuntzel's textual analyses feature this genre of retorsion of semantic strands of the filmic text (1978, 1980a,b).

9. On the Lacanian notion of dustuchia as the trauma of the encountered real, Lacan 1977b: Chs. 4-9.

10. On 'character' as imaginary plenitude of a figure of semes, Barthes 1974: secs. XXVIII, XLI.

11. On 'suture', in its psychoanalytic elaboration, as an imaginary webbing of the signifying chain around the split of the subject, Miller 1977; Heath 1981: Ch. 3 makes important adaptions of the concept for film analysis.

12. On the imaginary register and the semblable, Lacan 1966 and 1977a.

13. For this Freudian symptom translated in terms of filmic discourse, Kuntzel 1978: 60-61.

14. Lacan 1966: 15.

15. On the scopic register as a relation of drive, object, and desire (with the theme of the fascinum), Lacan 1977b: Part II.

16. These questions around a textual analysis aim to restage some of the criticisms Derrida poses for Lacanian psychoanalysis (Derrida 1980: 439-524).

SECTION 7: Analysis

Open City

One of the most important sequences of Open City[1] is that of the search and roundup by the German SS and Italian fascist police at the apartment block, which culminates in the killing of Pina (Anna Magnani) on the street. The sequence, its action, its violence, figure prominently in much critical literature on the film, which emphasizes the sequence's dramatic force and poignant realism. The sequence thus could be claimed to be a major one determining the overall semantics of the film's diegesis. How solidary is its actional semantics? Its figuration of action?

An opening incision into the filmic text, for an investigation of overdetermination, can be made at an elision in the figuration of Don Pietro's action. In shot 326, as the grandfather awakes and expostulates against the priest giving him the sacrament of Extreme Unction (or, more precisely, pretending to do so), and against the fascists whom Don Pietro warns are about to arrive, Don Pietro says (to Marcello): "Get me..."--at which moment a cut and shot change interrupts his speech and elides his action from explicit figuration. This barring elision can be forced open to unthread an remarkable hypothetical pattern of overdetermination in the sequence. The pattern forms a local economy, displacing violence in the figuration, occulting it, and condensing it into a conclusive figure of violent action.

It would be possible to stop with an extra-textual explanation of the deletion of Don Pietro's action: a cultural prohibition on figuring a priest committing an action of violence. But that would

neglect altogether the semantic contexts in play at this instance. On one hand lies the semantic field of 'spirituality'--around semes, values, and actions of religious non-temporality, non-violence, caring, Catholic law, and so on. On the other is the context of political struggle and violence, where the figure of Don Pietro is placed as a Resistance sympathizer, occupying a complex actantial position. The active struggle (including violence) is--'properly'--between the Italian men (Francesco, Manfredi) who are Communists, and the fascists/Nazis. In an actantial structure, Don Pietro would be aligned, between resistants and fascists, with the old men, the children (Marcello), and women (Pina), who are given as 'vulnerable' amidst the violence. Thus we have a schema:



These two contexts around the figure of Don Pietro are disruptively related through the visual barring of the violence associated with him, at a moment in the diegesis when the 'moral calculus'[2] of the fiction would seem to demand some explicit and manifest counterbalance to the terror, violence, and oppression worked against the Italian people by the fascists--but at a moment when the two Italian men foregrounded by the filmic discourse (Manfredi and Francesco) are figured as being without power (Manfredi, creeping away through a hidden passageway in flight; Francesco, after being found, is seem in the

action of being manhandled by soldiers dragging him out to the prison transport truck). (At the sequence's overture, the figuration [alternation, point-of-view] does rather squarely play off the two men [looking at the arriving police cordon outside] and the fascists as potential actional opponents. Don Pietro, for his part, is brought onto the conflictual scene of action, figuratively 'replacing' the two men as a focus of action within the sequence.)

Don Pietro is 'in action' throughout the sequence, but the violence connected to his actions and his figure--in three movements or instances, from (1) the subduing of Romoletto, (2) the successful disposition and dissimulation with the grandfather, and (3) Pina's death--overturn that calculus and its limited economy of values.

Consider some figurative aspects of the instance when Don Pietro assumes custody of the weapons and bombs from Romoletto. The obvious semantics of the action align perfectly with the 'spiritual' semantic context for Don Pietro as a priest, with his office as a 'peacemaker'. But the diegetic and figurative links of similarity between the two instances--Romoletto's threats of violence against the fascists and the Grandfather's, the discreet view of Don Pietro's physical subduing of Romoletto (in a long shot, from the rear, obscuring the action), and the elision of Don Pietro's violence against the Grandfather--join a strong figurative element (a potentially reversible look, between shots 312 and 313) to begin overdetermination of context. As shot 312 ends a woman's voice off-screen screams "Help! Help!", and Don Pietro looks up. Shot 313 gives his point-of-view: on a balcony above, a woman is

being seized and dragged away by fascist soldiers. Violence: Don Pietro prevents it, restrains its incipient agent, but his 'pacific violence' is equated figuratively by similarity to that of the fascists in the textual seam sutured by the look unifying the two shots, their two visual scenes of action. This figurational relation bears heavily on the diegetic relations between Romoletto and Don Pietro. The particular diegetic parallel itself is formed around an action of violence, its agents, and the manner in which these figure the relations among all the actants (the Italian men, women, children, etc.). That retrospectively contextual action lies in the prior sequence when Romoletto leads a group of other young boys to bomb a railway tank car. This heroic action of sabotage, undertaken and achieved by the boys when the Italian adult men are powerless (Manfredi, betrayed, on the run), is figured as a economically strong and textually-figuratively motivating antecedent to Romoletto's incipient action. Don Pietro's action, overpowering, subduing the boy, deflates the semantic charge of Romoletto's prior action, and overdetermines the action against Romoletto in the semantic terms of political 'quietism', or even 'surrender' (to the fascists) or 'punishment' (for Romoletto's violence against them, as the other boys--not Romoletto--were spectacularly punished as they returned to the apartment block and entered their parents' apartments). Against that prior (over)determining context, Don Pietro's action in subduing and 'taking charge' of the young orphan Romoletto is keyed as a subjugation to a familial or moral Law which has been lacking.

When, a few moments later, the scene of Grandfather, Don Pietro, and Marcello is under the fascists' look (shot 330, the fascists' point-of-view) the phantasy is that--just as the fascists believe, standing before the dissimulation which Don Pietro's violent action has produced--the Grandfather is dying. The look around this second violence is multiply determined--omitted or barred, and then, when restored, enounced from an intriguing figure of point-of-view, given for the spectator to share and assume. This 'point of view' (the fascist lieutenant's) must be understood in all senses: both as a spatial positioning assigned to a particular character (according to a figurational rhetoric of the look and visual space), along with the character's belief about what is seen. (The lieutenant's 'belief' has been preformed by a verbal determination concerning the Grandfather. Before Don Pietro starts up into the building, the Italian policeman says to him, in the fascist lieutenant's presence, "You finally made it, Father! That poor fellow was begging for you. He must be dead by now." [shot 308]). As a reverse of the point of view figure formed in the first instance, it now lures the fantasy of a gratuitous mortal action of violence--like that of the fascists--but by Don Pietro's own hand: to keep him quiet, and in order to hide the explosives and submachine gun, Don Pietro has murdered Grandfather.

This fantasmatic determination is fostered by overdetermining bars in the shot alternation and in the sound track. Shot 326 establishes and channels the spectator's attention and expectation towards an object ("Get me..."--what?) and action of violence. The alternation to

a shot of the fascist soldiers (327) figures a substitution and equivalence, an erratic metaphor: Don Pietro is doing violence 'like' the fascists, even (perhaps, in the play of overdetermination) 'for' them.[3] In the succeeding shot (328), maskage and the sound/image division of the filmic text reiterate these determinations. In the hallway of the apartment, two fascist soldiers go off-screen, then a crash is heard. "A falling object", "evidently broken" by the soldiers, in the way the filmscript annotation interprets this aural signifier into action? Plausibly, in terms of diegetic vraisemblance, yes, of course so. But the contiguous and conjunctive equation of a masked action (elided from view by a cut, or held off-screen) compellingly co-determines the sound as Don Pietro's blow, a violence done 'like' the soldiers, according to their calculus of telos, value, action, violence, 'ends-and-means'. The equation is suggested, stressed, motivated, and even confirmed by the figurative and scopic reversibility of the look and violences of the first instance (i.e., a reversed look from the fascist soldiers on the balcony above down to Don Pietro would have figured a similar scene of violent action).

In this reading, the actions--looking, and doing bodily violence--have been found determined through textual features/bars in a way that risks a confusion of the legible opposition in the conscious, thematic semantic context of 'political struggle'. But the filmic discourse retrieves, recuperates its dominant legibility and determination by a rebound: Don Pietro's violence is metonymized, in a double synecdoche, from action to instrument, from adult agent to the child assistant.

The 'weapon' is seen in the hands of the young acolyte (shot 333), who says, "Gosh, Don Pie', you really gave it to him." This re-determines the action, fixing its sense into a context of humorous verbal labelling, and achieving a Freudian transformation of effect/affect from shock to a joke.

Rather immediately that determination is upset, and again the determination of Don Pietro's action--protecting, punishing?--is over-determined in a third instance. In the succeeding shot, Pina is seen under the eyes of a Nazi soldier, who says to her "Has the priest made eyes at you?". Looking, family: from Grandfather to Pina, from the object of physical to scopic violence, Don Pietro is the term/position which equates across the bar of the shot change and alternation. Consider the counter-discourse of the three instances. The priest, equated in action to the Nazis by his look in the first instance; in the second, the to-and-fro exchange of looks between the fascists and Don Pietro around Don Pietro's dissimulation; now, in the third instance, the woman as object for the look, 'objected' from a position cohabited putatively by the Nazi soldier and Don Pietro.

But the point of overdetermination is not solely that of a lured sexual relation between Don Pietro and Pina; it can be formulated by way of sexual difference: e.g., as a question 'Can Pina dissimulate herself under the Nazi's look, "properly", with proper restraint, successfully--that is, passively?' While Don Pietro is 'active', his action of violence to stage a dissimulation for and trickery of fascists is elided from figuration--which, in terms of the problem

of overdetermination developed here, forms a significant textual privileging. The scene's discourse puts women and their bodies into a 'proper' sacrificial role.[4] When Manfredi escapes (shots 293-294), he and other resistants are seen moving along the passageway in the background, while a fascist soldier in the foreground leans through a window into the passage, and looks--not towards the men in flight, but toward the camera, then up. A cut shifts to the look's object, the legs of the women herded into the courtyard, seen from below. Passive, unknowing, even, in the play of looks, bodies, and dissimulation, the women ensure the distraction allowing the provisional and limited 'success' of the resistant men's action of escape.

Pina counter-acts, 'choosing' action and violence, not holding to the place of an object of a look. She slaps down on the Nazi's caressing hand (335). But the filmic discourse, in its politics of figuration, figures this action as an <u>immediately</u> negative one which is not economized either as momentary melodramatic humor, or as an 'endorsable' action of violence in terms of the 'moral calculus'. The immediate alternation to another shot (336) delivers the figurative 'punishment' to her, for her violence: the spectacle of Francesco, manhandled, being carried out. Discourse of the sequence elides his discovery elsewhere, in order to maximize economically the effect of shock and lured 'causality' when he is simultaneously shown to Pina and the spectator in a point-of-view figure ascribed to her (the shot change to her 'view' is immediate; the sound track gives no advance indication of what is about to be seen). This punishment, delivered to

her look with a point-of-view figure, is formed out of a fantasy transformation of elements already determined:

--the combined, condensed figure of the male (Nazi soldier, Don Pietro),

--shot 313, the women who is attacked (as seen by Don Pietro in a point-of-view figure in the chain's first instance),

--loss of the loved object (the woman whose son is taken away, whom Pina has comforted in shots 302-303).

The actional figuration of what ensues--as Pina struggles against the Nazi, other soldiers, and finally Don Pietro, all of whom are trying to restrain her--simultaneously puts Don Pietro spatially, scopically among the fascists observing Pina's struggle, and places Pina as the object of a lethal violence, culminating from all the sequence's preceding 'minor' violences.

Hence the overdetermination of Don Pietro's actions, across the barred ellipses and conjunctions of this chain of instances, comes down to conflicting determinations of of his participation and teleological stance in this third, final instance--a silent sympathetic witness, or implicit agent of a maintenance of sexual order, complicit in a violent and terrorist repression. Consider the overdetermination of signifiers of sexuality in the sequence's ending, in terms of the sacramental office of Don Pietro, and his priestly charge over the young (as he assumes charge of the 'orphan' Marcello).

The wedding day--the sacrament to be celebrated by Don Pietro (who is in his priestly vestments (white chasuble) along with Marcello in an

acolyte's garb--is supplanted by a death, an occasion figuratively displacing the sacrament of Extreme Unction which Don Pietro dissimulated over the other family member.

Marcello has witnessed, on the bed upstairs, the priest's action of violence which the filmic discourse deleted from visual/visible figuration. Now the spectacle of the woman/mother's frantic desire--running, arms outstretched, calling her lover's name--makes a repetition of a primal scene, an impassioned union of the woman's and man's bodies, con-fused with sexuality and violence, which the priest will make a gesture to censor for the boy: with his hand, Don Pietro covers Marcello's eyes.[5] Visual rhetoric continues to form the circulation of violence from men towards a woman in this final, third instance; here, however, the victim is not solely a woman, since another child is subtly figured in that position, suffering an action of violence--Pina's unborn child by Francesco.[6] The contexts for the violence against Pina are overdetermined towards sexual prohibition, and punishment for transgression as values associated with Don Pietro (condensed into his figure). In the first instance he manages to restrain violence; in the second, he acts the violence himself, but discourse shields his action from view, figuratively 'saving' the violence for later expenditure into figuration; in the third instance that violence is delivered by Don Pietro's stand-ins to the active woman, fantasmatically, in the name of the moral law which Don Pietro figures, making her at once exemplary tragic victim in the film's discourse of neo-realism, and expendable token (= proper victim) in its sexual politics.

Don Pietro is the pivot of this antinomic, contradictory overdetermination of contexts for readings of the ideological constructions locking, blocking the filmic text here.

The violence is barred by a point-of-view structure which overdetermines Don Pietro's place. His is the master look which remains on/in the scene, and from the moment that he momentarily occults it for Marcello (shot 348), he assumes metaphorically the 'discursive' authority as enunciating instance. The gunshots are heard in 349, which is a view of Francesco on the police truck. In 350 is Francesco's point-of-view of Pina running, then felled by the shooting. The alternation does not return to Francesco; nor is there a shot figuring the Nazi(s) who shoot(s) Pina down. The latter figurative determination by deletion[7] serves well a 'realism' of anonymity, figuring the Nazis as an anonymous mass and hence avoiding the effect and coding of melodrama (individualized villainy). But that discursive gesture by the film does not resolve the problematic overdetermination of the violence in action. In the context of the logic of the prior chain of looks--and the non-confirmation of Francesco's look, the non-ascription of a look to the Nazi[8]--the discourse here is ascribed to Don Pietro, as if 'punishing' Francesco for his sexual transgression by inscribing Pina's death into his look, then eclipsing his scopic subjectivity[9] in favor of Don Pietro and an effect of tragedy. The 'tragedy-effect' plays the focalization onto Marcello and his screams over his mother's sprawled corpse--whose rucked-up skirt is a figurative solecism joining determinations of sexuality (bodily exposure) and

violence (the body as shattered object)--against the comedy-effect earlier when Marcello verbally understates Don Pietro's violence ("Gosh, Don Pie', you really gave it to him.").[10]

In the succeeding shot, Don Pietro takes the child away, then kneels down to cradle Pina's body in a figurative replication of the Pietà. The economic constraint on figuration is obvious: the figure of the child and woman's body is so extremely effective, that it may not be manageable; a re-determination by a familiar, even rather well worn-out metaphoric trope drawn from the code of Art offers a more sure, more manageable determination. The child's lack of actional power for clear future narrative use would block, bind, fixate the spectatorial investment in the scene and tragic effect, choking off narrative (economy, development) in a knot of immobile, unpleasurable, even painful excess. The priest, still more 'neutral' an investment, also offers the filmic discourse and figuration the possible calming and unbinding return to narrative action as flow, change, exchange, and balance where the range of effects and meanings produced in the apartment raid sequence can be further worked over, and worked through.

The magnitude of effect and investment/charge produced by this figuration depends on the economic condensation and multiplication of its threads throughout the chain of instances within a single large textual unit (sequence).[11] Analysis of this filmic fragment displays the function of actional overdetermination as an economic condenser/intensifier of effect in relation to meaning. Furthermore, the notion of 'economy' has now been developed as a complex whose four

variables are meaning, effect, and textual space and time (of the structural unreeling of the film.

NOTES for Section 7

1. See Rossellini 1973. Shot numbers are given in the text.

2. The 'moral calculus' would be on the thematic level of the semantic register. Especially in conjunction with psychoanalytic investigations of figuration/discourse, such a notion of a 'moral calculus' would call to be compared to the social formation of the ego-ideal (superego). By this term I wish to designate an interpretative attitude of liberal and romantic moralism concerning character, struggle, and evil.

3. Or even: doing an irrational violence outside available diegetic patterns of teleology.

4. But the women's position is not thematized as 'victimization'; it is glossed over as an accessory, 'natural' aside (what is called in cinematic argot, 'a bit' or 'a touch' of style or of humor). As such, in such a position, it remains a unproblematic tactical move of the economics of diegesis. Instead of being thematized, it does operate as a small but not negligible context which links those women to Don Pietro's successful dissimulation, so that more stress is laid on the third instance with Pina, and the question of her success or failure in dissimulation.

5. The disjunction, and Pina's pursuit of Francesco form, in the symbolics of actional figuration, a parodic reversal of a wedding ceremony, a burlesque of excessive desire in the place of marital and ceremonial love.

6. On the fantasy of the murdered child, see Leclaire 1975.

7. Many of the soldiers are visible, armed, in other shots, but the specific agent of this dominant and climactic action of violence is not figurationally focalized by discourse.

8. That is, there is no return to a 'reaction shot' of Francesco according to the conventional form of the point-of-view figure. And a major action is not 'ascribed' by the filmic discourse by the look of its agent(s).

9. Francesco's subjectivity is limited to figuration by shot 350.

10. In a way, this demonstrates that the figure of Marcello is a floating signifier/determinant. But the filmic discourse doesn't operate overdetermination through him as massively or significantly as it does through the figure of the priest.

11. Contrast this deployment of textual analysis against that done on a scene from The Maltese Falcon in Section 6, where the working out of overdetermined figures was deferred beyond the bounds of a single scene and its economy. Here in Open City we have traced overdetermination by

a bar which is then sent through a condensing/displacing chain, in a manner reminiscent of Freud's map of the signifying network around the proper name of 'Signorelli', forgotten due to overdetermination and censorship (Freud 1965b: 2-7). What is 'fantastic' in this scene's neo-realism is that the figuration 'actualizes' the fantasies it has overdetermined as the scene's own conclusive figure. These questions will be taken up for discussion as issue in Section 8.

SECTION 8: Issues

1. From the Overdetermining Figurational Bar to A Textual Unconscious?

An issue which somewhat logically stems from this chapter's starting point in a theory of figurational overdetermination, is whether these analyses of overdetermination make manifest a textual unconscious in any strong sense of the term.

The analyses do go rather far towards elaborating a duplex theory of a split semantic field and split subject. The bar which marks, produces, and forms that split has been most pertinently analyzed as a "lacunary phenomenon"[1], as a stroke or trait which simultaneously determines meaning by linking signifier and signified, and by overdetermining 'lateral' signifier-signifier relations in figuration.[2]

Therefore, what has been done here does sketch the provisional outline, from one perspective, of 'a' textual unconscious. But this theoretical remains provisional, since:

--the bar 'between' conscious and unconscious is being dominantly understood as a dynamic textual operator, as an instrument of inscription, rather than as a more static repressive barrier, or demarcating line between two regions.[3] Hence this theory of the figurational bar and overdetermination does not 'map' the entire complexity of the Freudian theories of the unconscious, since the latter depends crucially upon an instance of repression.

--These sketches of textual and figurational operations of overdetermination by way of a bar--springing from a concern with the methodology of textual analysis as a practice of reading film--cannot, by themselves, account for the relations between 'a' text and 'a' textual

unconscious. To do so necessarily would entail taking a larger theoretical scope than that of the textual analysis of film.

These two provisos or reservations can be expanded.

For the first point, we could refer to Lyotard's work on the 'libidinal' and what he calls the 'figural', together with his distinction of figure-image, figure-forme, and figure-matrice.[4] Lyotard's investigations of the play of image and form in paintings and rebuses are incisive and instructive;[5] the relations between the image-figure and the form-figure run parallel to that of the overdetermining bar as theorized and analyzed here. What Lyotard's notion of matrix-figure risks is precisely its 'abstraction', virtuality, or 'evanesence'.[6] This factor threatens the analytic 'torque' of Lyotard's trichotomy, making the unconscious matrix a vacuous blank (not an other scene or other text inscribed by a bar), and construing the figural realm an untrammelled, hyperbolic utopia of a happy "radical connivance of the figure and desire"[7]--not a conflictual scene. In Lyotard's readings of pictorial and verbal texts, the dynamic power of the figural is hyperbolized so that it completely overruns the constraints of Darstellbarkeit, without leaving in account any of the conflict which renders the text the intersection of forces bearing on figuration and discourse.[8] The textual analyses of film carried out here make such a conflictuality a pertinent focus; they open the issue of the discourses and forces which establish and maintain bars which simultaneously repress and inscribe.

For the second point, the difficulty lies in taking the bar as the representative of a textual unconscious, since this risks covertly

carrying over, into textual analysis, the thematics of unity (a supposedly unified subject of symptoms, desire, repressions, and so on) associated with the concepts of 'person' and 'author', by attributing this thematic and ideological complex to the notions of 'text' and 'system' involved in the practice of textual analysis.[9] The textual analyses presented here trace the heterogeneity of the filmic text, but because of what seems like the 'material-practical' necessity of work on a fragment, they risk--in what they say about latent and unconscious signification and effects--implying a unity of 'an' unconscious due to the relative proximity and typical orchestration of those multiple effects and signification. The issue posed, therefore, is to lay stress persistently upon the heterogeneity of the text,
even to the point of adopting an informal protocol, according
to which the term 'unconscious' is kept as an adjective (to be applied in describing textual features and formations), instead of using the term as a substantive, 'reifying' it into a manipulating entity or autonomous zone of signification.

Textual analysis, as a mode of analysis, and as a genre of writing, seems well disposed to avoid that trap.

2. Scope of Analysis: Macro/Micro

Textual analysis usually tends towards 'micro-analysis'. But the construction of the analyses conducted here aims to upset that typical current, insofar as it would immanently formalize a textual fragment of film. The work on An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge complicates the issue of scope in the way that it 'covers' the general, global economy

of narrative action and object in an entire (short-length) film, playing the economies of the large syntagmatic units against the macro-economy. The strategic choice of an 'opening' fragment from The Maltese Falcon allowed for some macro-scopic tactics, such as the tracing of the interlocking of particular textual strands across the larger filmic text, according to economic schemes of expansion. It is easy, also, to suggest an opening onto a macro-scopic view for the work on Open City.

The scene following the apartment raid sequence figures the resistants' ambush (guided by Manfredi, briefly seen) of the prison convoy, and the liberation of Francesco and other prisoners. The speed or haste, and the multiple reductions or elisions in the figuration of action[10] mark out a different phase of discourse and pattern of economy, as a rate of figuration of action. A comparative macro-analysis of two large segments of the film would likely delineate the thematic and ideological imperative dictating a diegetic 'balancing of accounts', as a strategic move of filmic discourse concerned with maintaining a certain relationship of the spectator to the diegesis. The figuration assists this by the magical speed with which the successful action of rescue is unfolded, assuaging the currents of unpleasure provoked by the apartment raid sequence and its culmination, in the way it figures the potency and collective action of the Italians in the person of the resistants. In such a macro-analysis, issues of thematic/diegetic relations of 'balance' would be productively correlated with analysis of textual-figurational tempo, under the conceptual framework of economy as varying regimes of discourse and figuration.

3. The Filmic Text: Volume, Depth

An issue which emerges in the writing of textual analyses is the drive to model the filmic text as a depth, or as 'volume'.[11] The specific contribution to the formation and precision of this metaphor or model, offered by the textual analyses achieved here, lies in the relation between 'character', 'object', and 'action' as textual constituents and constructions. The 'empty' status of character for formalist-structuralist literary theory is quite familiar.[12] However, the textual analyses of Sections 6 and 7 suggest a relative order of density-in-depth of these constituents, in the volume formed by the sets of transformational scenarios read by these analyses. 'Character' is the 'least' dense constituent in order; characters permutate most radically and freely in the layers of variant scenarios. 'Objects' have a heavier semantic consistency, and therefore are 'less' variant and more strongly semantically bound through the layers. Finally in order, 'actions' are the most dense and least variant semantic constituent: the fantasmatic rewriting of scenarios largely consists in redistributing agents (characters) and objects into slots around actions, which function as invariant semantic kernels.

This turns the issue to (1) the general economy of narrative action studied by narratology, and also (2) the role of enunciation in furthering this textual rewriting-in-depth.

4. Generality and Levels: Narratology and Textual Analysis of Film

These textual analyses have persistently encountered the multiple placement of actions and objects (as narrative constituents) into

multiple levels of semantic generality and transformation. (The multiple actional scenarios in the scene from The Maltese Falcon offer the most striking example, in which actions/objects were components on several interlocking levels of different generality and variations of scenarios.) This incitement to model the text as a volume of superimpositions compels the question of whether there is theoretical gain in deliberately stressing some 'highest level' of generality. Narratological models of action and object seems a likely source of such general models. Could the generality of available narratological models inform textual analysis as it moves through the various and heterogeneous meshes of elements and figures in specific filmic texts?

Textual analyses, in their individual readings, point ineluctably towards general analytic frames. For instance, the facility of interpolating gaps in the actional chain--suggested by the ways that the actional chain retains its general legibility despite particular gaps--indicates how strongly actional sequences are determined and preconstructed. Narratology is the 'discipline' formulated to study narrative action as canonic patterns of nodes, links, and relations. Can these semantic and syntactic dimensions, elaborated in various narratological models, pertinently aim textual analysis at figuration, discourse, and economy? That is the point of departure for the following, third chapter.

5. Énoncé ==> Enunciation

The dimension of enunciation will be developed below in Chapter Four in a theory of actional nomination. But already in the reading of

the sequence from Open City, enunciational factors such as spectatorial position and passage have come to the fore,[13] since the multiple narrative scenarios around action and object, opened and inscribed by the overdetermining bar, resist treatment exclusively as variant énoncés. Within the enunciational perspective, action (Lyotard: "doubtless the sole invariant" [14] among textual constituents) takes on a different function in a fantasmatic matrix (not structure[15]) of transformations, each of which depends immediately but differently upon spectatorial position.[16]

In his last textual analysis on The Most Dangerous Game, Kuntzel refers to Freud's essay on a supposedly common actional fantasy[17], and sketches a somewhat mechanistic version of the matrix as a "mold" of figurative variation, but largely neglects questions of discourse and enunciation.[18] In an essay in an archaeology of psychoanalytic theory, Forrester develops Freud's model in a very rigorous way, drawing out a large set of constituent elements (thirteen "propositions" in all) which underly the three basic énoncés presented by Freud.[19] But Forrester is only concerned with 'literal' verbal formulae, and not with figuration. In "Fiscours Digure, L'utopie du fantasme"(sic),[20] Lyotard goes through Freud's original arguments, and helpfully, albeit abstractly, links enunciational issues to problems of figuration.

We can draw on all these theoretical essays in order to work on some important aspects of filmic enunciation through another reading of the fragment from Open City. Here even more stress will fall on enun-

ciation and effects of pleasure/unpleasure linked to meaning; by comparison, the reading of Section 7 remains closer to the figuration in its textual side, as énoncé).

The initial temptation would be to try to univocally align Freud's three phases of the fantasy action with the three actional instances or nodes in the filmic fragment. But the filmic figuration is not 'laconic' (uni-determined),[21] and as will be seen, each of the actional nodes involves several 'propositions'. On the other hand, several factors--the figurational similarities of children and adults (a 'father', a 'mother') around a kernel-action of bodily violence; the direct implication of the spectator in the filmic figuration as discourse/enunciation; the pleasure/unpleasure linked to semantically diverse constructions of scenarios--promote and specify this speculative analysis of the enunciation in the filmic fragment, patterned on Freud's work. The bar which split figurational integrity also produces multiple positions for the spectatorial subject to invest with interest, and from which to construct signification and effect.

Consider the first instance of the apartment raid sequence. It suggests a number of propositions, which begin from the impotence and an aggressivity which 'equate', in enunciation, the spectator and the child Romoletto. We could say that this equation is a 'turning around' of reference and affect from diegesis to spectator; Laplanche claims that the process of 'turning round' lies in the "very movement of fantasmatization."[22] The first proposition is thereby sadistic in orientation to action, effect, and meaning:

(1) "The other (one like me, a child) is (going to) hurt those Germans whom (we) hate."

The anticipatory thrust of this 'proleptic' spectatorial construction is blocked and refused by diegetic development, since, with a physical struggle, Don Pietro subdues and disarms Romoletto. Constructions which denegate and displace (supplant) ensue, to cover and account for that diegetic turn:

(2) "The father is not hurting the child (me), or preventing the Germans from being hurt (i.e., protecting, loving them), but..."

(3) "...it is the Germans who are hurting a woman (a mother)."

The discursive-figurational shift operated by Don Pietro's vision enables proposition (3) to be produced, and to serve as a momentary resolution-in-repetition.

The second instance of the film begins with a proposition formed from the grandfather's action:

(1) "Grandfather is going to hurt the Germans/fascists."

But this runs counter to the resolution of the first instance: the action of violence, threatened by the grandfather, threatens in its turn Don Pietro's action and his achievement of control over Romoletto (the 'bad' child)[23] and over the weapons of violence. This difficulty or bind can be represented by two propositions expressing (a) the relation to the father (to the 'imaginary' father as object) and (b) the constraint of value (or figurability) of that position.

(2a) "I love the father(s) (Grandfather and Don Pietro); he

cannot be beaten by the Germans/fascists."

(2b) "He must not (be seen to) do violence."

The figurational movements elaborated and read above in Section 7 have amply demonstrated the way that the father's (Don Pietro's) violence to (an)other father (Grandfather) is occulted, displaced by a projective substitution onto Marcello (seen holding the instrument of violence), and that, through this ascription to the child, the violence is split away from its 'true' agent (and the troubling, uncertain, but certainly unfigurable action elided) so that it can be 'pranked', transformed into (a) an effect of humor linked to the figure of the child, and (b) into a successful, ruseful action of dissimulation mastered by the adult father, which conforms to and presumably satisfies the 'moral calculus':

(3a) "I (the child, the spectator who 'knows') beat (the father who was like the 'bad' child Romoletto)."

(3b) "We beat ('tricked') the fascists."

This second instance, analyzed into propositions to trace the spectatorial relations in enunciation to meaning and effect, demonstrates two important discursive moves concerning exchange and resolution:

--first, an economic balance through exchange, which the secondarization ('moralization') of the drives' aggressivity into an acceptable trade achieves. The scopic drive, pressing to take pleasure in a figuration of violence, is 'traded' for the 'proper' affect and 'acceptable' figurative/diegetic turn of action, since the aggression against the fascists is achieved by the dissimulation and their deception.

--second, this turn (diegetic, figurative, discursive, economic) allows--unlike the resolution-in-repetition of the first instance--for a more elaborated, more satisfying resolution-in-transformation.[24]

The third, final actional instance from the apartment raid sequence suggests a quite large set of constituent propositions. These sketch the passage of a rebounding vicissitude of the enunciational elements (meaning, effects, drives), in which the inertia and figurative-metaphoric 'causality' of action 'turns round' and produces a masochistic positioning vis-à-vis a filmic representation.[25] The chain begins with the mother as an object of action:

(1a) "The mother is (to be) attacked by the German."

This proposition offers pleasure from a split, heterogeneous position. First, if Pina is positioned as 'any woman', the figuration can be made more easily the object of an anticipatory sadistic pleasure against a prospective victimizing action of violence. Or, second, if the spectator is enunciationally positioned (with attention, interpretation, and investment) to 'accept' this woman 'as' a loved mother (the text's prior thematics and figuration have made this a strong bid), then moment of figuration is very conflictual, invested with the strongest unpleasure of all the scene's instances of violent action.[26] The most likely positioning, and most likely productive hypothesis for a textual-analytic reading, is that the spectatorial subject <u>oscillates</u> between the two positionings for meaning and effect, as the micro-textual unreeling proceeds.

(1b) "The mother beats the German."

The enunciational relation fissures here. The 'moral calculus' endor-

ses this actional turn of the figuration and diegesis, but sexual difference undoes the solidarity of these enunciational relations,[27] because the violence (a slap on the German's arm) is simultaneously too little and too much. 'Too little', in its pathetic feebleness, juxtaposed against the generously figured fascist violence, even against the anticipated but not executed action of violence by Romoletto (who was about to throw a bomb down into the fascists' ranks in the courtyard below)[28]--and, most critically, against the spectatorial demand[29] to the figuration for a sufficient counterbalancing violence. 'Too much', in that it breaks Pina's solidarity with Don Pietro's values, authority, moral guidance, and his 'power' over the figuration (he stops violence, his violence is hidden). It breaks, too, with her maternal-feminine place in this sexually determined actantial grid. (In the yard, before the soldier accosts her, when she is seen to comfort another woman whose son has been seized from his hiding place, this seme of 'comforting' directly aligns Pina's actional gesture with the figure of Don Pietro and his priestly offices.) These chiasmic, paradoxical constraints and pressures on the figuration (from the zones of thematics and diegesis) rupture along a double fault line--sexual difference (male/female) and the imaginary figure of the parental pair (mother/father).

These factors lure a 'metonymic causality'[30] which paradoxically punishes Pina and manifests her desire.

(2a) "The father is found and beaten by the fascists."

(2b) "The mother beats the fascists."

(2c) "Mother desires father (in his impotence?)."

The figuration outraces the enunciational construction of meaning and effect, overdetermining (2a) as being 'caused' by (1b), perverting the effects of any supposed 'moral calculus' tutoring the spectator's passage, reading, and co-production of meaning and effect. The bar marking the cultural conception of 'male/female' is taken up by the figurational work of the filmic text and 'abused' by an overdetermination of the woman as an excess and ('hence', by a trope of pseudo-causality) as victim her excess (of action, violence, desire). The spectacle of the father's impotence--manhandled, found out (unable to dissimulate with the power which Don Pietro masters and puts into effect in the second actional instance), 'beaten' at the game of 'hide-and-seek', and now publicly trundled away 'like a child' in the grip of adults--lures the sense that, for the violent mother (violent like a 'male'), it is precisely that figuration of the man-as-child being beaten which incites, causes Pina's desire.[31] The figuration around proposition (2b)--Pina slapping the German's face, breaking free of his grip, shouting Francesco's name (first, and more often than he calls to her), the (albeit weakly established) point-of-view shots by her of him--repeats and intensifies the problematic opened by (1b). With (2c) the logic of the discourse troubles the figuration and its economy, making it falter, and unsure. The symbolic places assigned by sexual difference are stressed and wrenched, but the sort of figurational 'treatment routines' availed by discourse/figuration elsewhere are insufficient here. Pina's desire cannot be <u>dissimulated</u> as Don

Pietro's violence was, or transformed into an effect of humor (as with Marcello), or mastered by Don Pietro. The figuration has been worked into a corner, a pseudo-'fatality'[32] which can only be worked through, worked off, by staging an effect of tragedy which--in the measure already established by Pina's desire--is excessive, almost unmanageably unpleasurable within the scope and context of the scene.

The enunciational passage escapes, slips out of the regime of tight economic management of figuration traced in the first two instances. The propositions set out from the end of the second instance onward to this point--and the bound meaning, effects, drives which they represent as kernels--are not strikingly oneiric or 'illogical', but they precipitate an outcome (actional, diegetic, figurative) in which the dictate of the 'moral calculus' (for a legitimate retribution) and a cultural dictate for maintenance of sexual difference are overturned. The blockage of these two positions is a symptom of a blockage of cultural politics of representation; the contradiction is not stated but supplanted by a figurative/enunciational 'politics of masochism': the action of violence, lured by the figuration from the sequence's outset, made the object of demand by discursive-enunciational relation of spectator to the figuration, can only be formed with Pina as object,[33] and the Nazis as (implicit, but definite) agents of violence.

The third instance thus closes with:

(3a) "(We see) mother is beaten/killed (by ?)."

(3a') "(Father is lost)."

The figuration works to inscribe the violence and loss onto Marcello,

Don Pietro, and Francesco, as it builds up the scene and play of looks in the street. (3a') is implied, but downplayed by a sleight of hand in the discourse, since Francesco's reaction is not displayed (in violation of the point-of-view figure's ordinary form).[34]

(3b) "(We?) are beaten (by ?)."

Since Francesco's reaction is unseen, figuration of loss is worked through Marcello and Don Pietro. Marcello as the clichéd but secondary 'good object' (the 'good child') is put on top of the mother's corpse, but such a spectacle risks further explosion of excess--so he is removed, and an easing and figurative resolution produced by recourse to iconography of the Pieta, with Don Pietro over Pina's body the scene's ultimate image, in all senses. Even as this action of violence, the most violent thus far in the film, is being 'treated' by iconic figuration, it abstractly lures the proleptic proposition "The fascists are (to have been) killed just as this mother has been killed". However, that imaginary circulation of violence, in the future anterior mode, is itself an action pressing a question and problem of a 'proper' agent. Who can, who will be the agent of such action? Is there a 'father' proper, as agent, to the action? A 'properly' violent father? Francesco, lost? Manfredi, in flight? Don Pietro, now seen in a ritual and spiritualized pose 'like' an iconic woman, over the martyred woman? Marcello? The forces and contexts which take up the action of Pina's death, to form narrative expectation of action from it, can be read as enmeshed in symbolic and imaginary contradictions between what the sequence's figuration would dictate,

and what the film's neo-realist discourse can afford or 'conceive' in action. The twists and turns of figuration manifest the cultural contradictions--around action and violence, sexual difference of female/male and child/adult--which inflect the text's discourse and figuration, its economic contract for narrative action with its spectator, and the perverse vicissitude of that contract, opened out for criticism by this analytic reading.

The most cohesive issue to be formulated, as stemming from this line of work, bears again on an 'action'--threatened, elided, and then manifested in a perverse transformation across the three actional instances--as the "sole indubitable invariant."[35] How can a 'finer-grained' model of enunciational passage be constructed, one closer to the semantics of action/object woven in the filmic text? Sections 13 and 14 take up the issue by way of close analyses of discursive/enunciational passage by figuration of vision, and by ways of models of discursive processes concerned with the construction of actional semantics as nameable/named units.

NOTES for Section 8

1. On the signifier as a lacunary phenomenon, see Lacan's work, and commentaries such as Nancy/Lacoue-Labarthe 1973. The particular citation is from Laplanche/Leclaire 1972: 131.

2. Laplanche/Leclaire 1972: 168. I say 'lateral' for the sake of the psychoanalytic concept of a signifying chain; figuration as conceived here is depth, the filmic text a volume--but these 'visions' accommodate themselves to psychoanalytic theory as chains woven in depth/volume.

3. Metz 1977a: 279ff., 313ff.

4. Lyotard 1974: "L'autre espace", esp. 271ff.

5. A challenging work in theory would be to elaborate the relations between Freud's and Lyotard's studies of the rebus as a mixed, dynamically visual/verbal text, and the materially mixed, divided filmic text.

6. Lyotard 1974: 278-79.

7. Lyotard 1974: 271.

8. A symptom of the Lyotardian utopia: the term 'repression' (refoulement) does not figure in the book's quite extensive index of technical terms.

9. The concept of 'textual system', in its original formulation in Metz (1974b), defends itself poorly against this misappropriation. Metz's writings since that time have substantially altered his view of the filmic text. Bellemin-Noël provides an insightful commentary on the parallel problem between literary text-analysis and psychoanalysis (1979: 121-24).

10. For instance, no 'prior' diegetic-actional articulations such as 'planning' or 'assembly' dilate the text: it rushes to the gratification of seeing Francesco freed, as a token avenging of Pina's loss.

11. As Bellour says often; cf. 1979: 260: "la pression volumineuse (volumétrique, volumique: on aimerait dire volumeuse) du système textuel."

12. The reference most often cited is Barthes 1974: sec. XXVIII. Barthes decomposes character into a proper name plus a field of characterizing semes.

13. These two terms come from Heath (e.g., 1981: Ch. 7), but he does not elaborate them as a framework to analyze filmic enunciation.

14. Lyotard 1974: 333.

15. Lyotard 1974: 338-39.

16. Freud 1963a: 114; Lyotard 1974: 329.

17. Freud 1963a.

18. Kuntzel 1980a: sec. I.3.2. In another article (1980b), a single scene from the film gets rather extensive permutational analysis in terms of enunciation via vision.

19. Forrester 1980: Ch. 4.

20. Lyotard 1974: 327-54.

21. As laconic and unidetermined as they seem, Freud's fantasmatic "phases" are multiply determined, as Forrester's study shows quite well.

22. Laplanche 1976: 102.

23. The 'bad' child who is eliminated from the sequence, at this point, as a superfluous element.

24. For instance, consider commutational variants of the figuration, which would end the sequence either at the first or second instance: it is clear that an ending at the second instance would be mostly acceptable and legible, whereas if ended at the first, not so at all.

25. On the topological trope of the drive/instinct 'turning round', see Freud 1963b: 83-103, Forrester 1980: 154-63, and Laplanche 1976: Chs. 5-6.

26. It would be premature to call this positional inclusion around actional semantics an identification in the full psychoanalytic sense. See Section 12 below.

Recall that, first, Romoletto's violence was figured at a distance, with his victims unseen in the play of alternation, and second, Don Pietro's violence is hidden. Against these contexts of actional figuration, the figuration here (in medium close shot, direct bodily contact, and so on) is much more intense, and intense in its unpleasure.

27. See Freud on sexual difference 'in/from' the fantasmatic matrix, 1963a: 114-32, Nassif 1967, and Rodowick 1982. Forrester and Lyotard do very little to develop this cultural issue either in terms of Freud's original model, or in developing/explicating it.

28. Reconsider that the violence is by a male child, who is restrained by an adult male.

29. 'Demand' here in the Lacanian sense as a relation to an object and/in a signifying chain, with effects such as anticipation and an anticipated signifier of satisfaction.

30. 'Metonymic', that is, to stress the factor or figure of continuity in the pseudo-causality of post hoc, ergo prompter hoc; but it would be somewhat more precise to say 'syntagmatic' causality in this particular instance, since we are dealing with a suture achieved by an imaginary object (a look) which binds two syntagmatic/textual units (shots) as metonymies of space and contiguity.

31. On the object which causes desire without satisfying it, Lacan 1977a: Chs. 8-9. Here this psychoanalytic construct is also characterizing the enunciational link or contract between spectator and the object-film.

32. Analysis must play hard here against the pull of the film's diegesis to make this 'fatality' one of a fictional 'character' (as substance), or one of documentary, neo-realist factuality (the incident of the film is modelled after a historic SS atrocity).

33. But also, latently, the child, as discussed in Section 7. Leclaire (1975: 11, and passim) discusses the fantasy of the murdered child as a 'parental' fantasy, as a scenario meaningful from the 'parental' position (in terms of the "parents' dreams and desires"). The analogy hypothesized here between the spectatorial enunciational positions for a fragment of Open City and Freud's fantasy of the beaten child only increases the relevance of this figure of the dead infant.

34. The expectation, according to the conventional form of the point-of-view figure, is to a return to Francesco for a 'reaction shot'. See Branigan 1975.

35. Lyotard 1974: 333. Nassif (1967: 78) writes: "the verb 'beat' . . . is the most solid (dur) kernel of the fantasy and supports all the staging of the fantasy."

CHAPTER THREE
Section 9
Section 10
Section 11

SECTION 9: Theory

Narratological Theory, Narrative Film, Textual Analysis

What force can narratological analysis offer the textual analysis of film? As a context against which to operate, could narratological analysis of film empower textual analysis? The point here, therefore, is not conducting an exercise in narratological theory per se (i.e., elaborating it, arguing its validity within its own general scope), but its heuristic deployment as a contextual horizon for textual analysis of film. This entails that the narratological analyses--in their avowed generality, for which the particular signifying material and figurational dimension of the particular analyzed narrative are not pertinent[1]--referred to here have been carried out 'beforehand', 'elsewhere', aside from textual analysis. Their efficacy and pertinence for the kind of work with the filmic text pursued here, thus, are only established 'on the scene' of textual analysis, where issues of discourse, figuration, and textual heterogeneity are in the foreground of pertinence and interest. Can the problematic of figuration (in terms of figurative tropes, deletion, substitution, and so on) be broached by reference to the homogeneous and heavily determined constructs of narratology?

This section on theory limits itself to sketching major points in the methodologies (object of analysis, operation, results) of the three models of narratology chosen and applied to the entire text of The Maltese Falcon (abbreviated as MF) in a previous, separate study.[2] They are:

--Bremond's logical matrices of narrative possibilities;[3]

--Pavel's trees structures of narrative syntax;[4] and

--Greimas's theories of actantial analysis, sequential analysis from canonic narrative statements to canonic narrative syntagms, and analysis of narrative modalities and the narrative path.[5]

A basic criterion for their choice was their de facto applicability to the materially mixed (verbal, non-verbal) signifiers composing the filmic text.[6] No substantive criticism of the theoretical foundations of these three modes of narratology is offered here.

BREMOND

Object: Bremond's narratology proposes a logical model aimed at the restricted hermeneutics of actional outcome. The basic logical cycle of action is formed: (1) possibility, (2) passage (or 'non-passage') to action, and (3) achievement of goal (or failure). Bremond correlates this cycle to a restricted catalog of agents and patients, and their respective interests in the phases of the actional cycle (amelioration, degradation).

Operation of analysis: In operation, a close correlation was made between the hermeneutics of enigmas (in the large sense[7]) and degradations. Next, a workable method of building the logical matrices was found, by way of five spheres of interest, labelled according to major narrative actants (Spade, as the dominant actant, figures in all five).[8] Each matrix annotates the cycles and outcomes, woven across the filmic text, into legible non-chronological patterns. At major

points the functional correlations of elements between different matrices was indicated on the diagrams of matrices.

Results: While the inventories of hermeneutic enigmas and degradations for actional cycles were quite similar, the mapping and dynamics of these two facets of narrative are rather different. The dimension of enigmas is operated and resolved by an overlapping, related set of stages; the Bremondian model of actional cycles traces out the logical course of the resolution of degradations as a pattern of individual or independent sectors of narrative movement concerning agents, patients, processes, and degradations. It explicitly forces into the light:

--the ends-means relations of actions (or the lack of such relation);

--the jumping of 'logical' steps, as in the instances of ameliorations not produced by way of actional processes (cycles);

--repetitions and compoundings of states of amelioration/degradation motivating narrative action;

--the defining criteria and boundaries of separate spheres of narrative interest;

--a clear and defined distinction of primary and secondary narrative spheres in terms of their functionality (i.e., does a narrative sphere's ameliorating resolution also resolve another sphere?); and

--the conclusive and inclusive terminations of matrices/spheres of interest.

PAVEL

Object: Pavel's theory aims at the axiomatic, rule-governed transcription of narrative elements (actions, situations) into syntactic order and form. These elements are abstract and semantically minimal components or 'categories' (Pavel).[9] The transcription is rigorously governed by a set of rules, deduced from a corpus,[10] and are formed on the pattern of transformational-generative theory of natural-language syntax.[11] The basic rules for the minimal narrative unit, a 'narrative structure' (NS), are:[12]

NS ==> Troubled Universe + Reestablished Universe

Troubled Universe ==> Initial Situation + {Transgression / Lack}

Reestablished Universe ==> Mediation + Denouement

Written in the graphic format of a branching tree structure, these rules form this tree:



The leftmost three terminal elements of the tree (Initial Situation, Lack/Transgression, and Mediation) can either be formed by a multiple set of simple elements, or may themselves be composed of embedded, complex NS's. Each NS has associated with it the names of the actants/characters who can be defined either as suffering from the lack

or transgression of the Troubled Universe branch, or for whom mediation is performed on the Reestablished Universe branch.

Operation of analysis: Because of the manner in which Pavel's theory 'ascribes' the NS to particular actants/characters, his model more or less already resolves the operational problem of spheres of interest. For MF, a tighter dissection of spheres was allowed: 26 NS form seven spheres (of vertically embedded NS). However, the facility of embedding NS helps in turn to create another difficulty. At first, gulled by the persistent illusion of narrative flow and its pseudo-nature, one tends to embed NS repetitively, 'wildly', until it is realized that the successive NS deserve to be placed on different syntactic-logical hierarchies and levels. (A major instance: much of the film's narrative should be located as multiple mediations of the NS concerned with Archer's killing, so that these mediations form spheres of interest.) Numbering the NS in order of the first appearance of any element makes the formation of a large diagram both workable and pertinent for a 'return' of analysis back towards the textual disposition of the narrative constituents.

Results:

--While some of the hermeneutic information highlighted by Bremond's matrices of alternatives is lost by Pavel's method, the substantial graphic legibility afforded by the tree structure (as a 'spatialization' of narrative relations) provides very intelligible and informative results. It holds narrative actions and states in clear interrelation.

--It allows for easy and pertinent representation of the 'multiple use' of narrative elements in the NS as an economic principle on the macro-level.[13]

--The overall architecture of the narrative is made manifest, and in a way which informatively runs counter to naive intuition of the narrative.

--The tree structure shows contrasts between actional versus thematic 'centers of gravity' (e.g., the problem of the falcon as a thematic and intuitive center of attention, versus its functional status as only an instrument in actional/narrative resolution).

GREIMAS

Object: Three areas of Greimas's evolving proposals in narratological theory were selected.[14]

His first proposal, dating from the mid-1960's, is an analysis of actants. Derived by a distillation of some of Propp's functions, the thrust of actantial theory is to show the functional work of a basic, dynamic pattern of actants--agents/entities moving narrative action. Greimas proposed three meshed actantial pairs: a subject and object on an axis of volition, a sender and receiver on an axis of communication, and a helper and opponent on an axis of power.

In a second phase of theory, beginning at about 1970, Greimas turned to a different facet of narrative discourse, and laid stress on the canonic nature of sequential narrative actions--their reducibility, or better, transcribability into a restricted set of simple formulas of

functions, subjects, and objects. The most elaborate analysis of this type conducted by one of Greimas's group (Rastier, on Molière's Don Juan[15]) rewrites a narrative into canonic 'narrative statements' (énoncés narratifs), in the form of algebraic propositions, working with defined and limited sets of subjects, objects, and functions (such as displacement, communication, contract, and performance[16]). Here the stress on transcribing the canonicity of narrative aims at bringing a breaking pressure on our customary intuitive acceptance of narrative actions as irreducible, singularly unique givens for experience.

And third, the pilot idea for Greimas's theory of modalities (developed during the last decade) in narrative analysis is that a narrative subject proceeds through a "syntactic path (parcours)", a series of states of the modal characterization or status of the subject. Greimas suggested that the fundamental path or sequence is wishing, knowing, being able, and doing (vouloir, savoir, pouvoir, and faire).[17] Analysis of modalities therefore aims at tracing the interrelated passages of narrative subjects through this modal sequence, 'acquiring', manifesting, exercising these modal values. Modal analysis is supposedly a more powerful model of the dynamics of narrative, which advances on the earlier Greimasian proposals. The pattern of modalities does seem clearly to subsume the three axes of the actantial structure in a general way. Relations along the axis of volition concern modes of wishing, the axis of communication that of knowing (recognizing an object), and the axis of power the modalities of being able and doing.

Operation of analysis: Actantial analysis operates most helpfully by a two-way search, moving from diegetic elements to the actantial structure, and from a given abstract actantial slot to search among elements of the narrative fiction. E.g., one actantial set, among others (this is not a univocal determination) could be begun with what the film does present, obviously and insistently, as the object par excellence: the falcon statuette itself. Its sender? 'History' itself (a non-human actant); it is more clear why the film is inaugurated by a very long crawl-up title giving the pseudo-historical itinerary of the falcon across the Mediterranean, Europe, and Asia--so that the 'sender' function can have textual/figurational primacy (in ordinal and valuative senses).

The sequential analysis of canonic narrative statements is operated by finding an effective level of detail,[18] and transcribing narrative actions 'at' that level into canonic form. Sets of subjects and objects are progressively defined as one works through the text and narrative. For example, the first scene of the film establishes a narrative statement involving Spade, Brigid, and Archer as subjects of a contract whose object is the communication of Brigid's 'sister' (her return to the bosom of her family). Therefore the first scene also forms Brigid's performance in breaking the obligations of a contract: the situation she has described is a deliberately false one. Her sequence of successful performance continues when she kills Archer in the film's second scene. These are the first three transcriptions of canonic narrative statements. The narrative statements form syntagms according to their subjects.

Operationally, how does a modal analysis proceed? The most extensive modal analysis effected by one of Greimas's collaborators is Courtés's study of the Cinderella tale.[19] But it is distributional, not sequential in organization. Since Greimas's idea of a 'path' (parcours) calls precisely for a sequential format, I tried to organize modal analysis of MF by a sequential notation in order to hold to the chief claim of narrative-modal analysis to interest and force. A table of modal emphases was laid out for each of the narrative agents (the human actants), giving superscripts to the key moves to new phases in the four-stage modal path. For example, by the fourth large textual syntagm (Spade's visit to the site of Archer's murder), both the police and Spade are characterized by a shared modal value of wanting-to-know, which forms the first stage of their modal parcours.

Results: In general, moving from actantial to modal analysis, successively more substantive results were obtained. The theoretical and practical break with the fiction of the representational 'character' is a significant one (which, in particular, prepared the way for the perspective of textual analysis), and some of the actantial alignments and oppositions marked out in MF are important ones. However, as discussed above in Section 8, the entity 'character' is the least robust constituent of the problematic addressed by this present work on film. Furthermore, tracing various actantial sets provides little insight onto the syntactic or sequential aspects of narrative structure. Thus this area appears to offer the least as a fulcrum for a textual analysis aiming at figuration and discourse.

Since sequential-canonic analysis of narrative statements is more rich semantically, it thereby moves closer to the concerns of textual analysis as a project of a formal reading of a film's semantic register.[20] Furthermore, sequential-canonic analysis is still strongly formal, and it would seem to offer a fulcrum for strong and revealing comparative analyses of textual instances which share similar canonic form, but different figurations of action and object. Its operational weakness lies in the difficulty of achieving a good 'tuning' or level of detail for transcription. If the analyst begins working at too 'low' a level (too fine grained), the coherence and legibility of the analytic schema is lost, 'drowned' in a mass of canonic narrative statements which are unmanageably, unreadably numerous.[21] Too 'high' a level of detail, and so much narrative information is ignored that analysis loses its efficacy.

And it precisely here that modal analysis provides its first substantial results--by strengthening and guiding the operation of the sequential-canonic transcription. Keeping closely concerned with the substantive movement of the modal <u>parcours</u> helps adjust the level of canonic narrative statements to a workable level of detail versus abstraction--by holding attention focussed on the pertinence of each canonic statement or sequence to the <u>movement</u> of modal values. The pertinence of modalities tunes the canonic transcription at an effective level.

The modal sequence (<u>parcours</u>) which Greimas proposes immediately appeals to one's intuition, but good results can only be obtained with

a sequential notation. Further refinement of the mapping or notation of modalization is imperative.

The notation of modalization carried out for MF does succeed in mapping legibly the different actants' 'individual progress' (forward, backward) through the four-mode sequence. It succeeds in demonstrating the interplay of modalizations; e.g., the detectives' 'wanting-to-know' functions to interfere with Spade's 'doing' in the scene where Brigid and Cairo have been brought together by Spade for initial negotiations. The modal notation succeeds in marking the functional relations between 'human' and 'non-anthropomorphized'[22] actants. For instance, the structure of the narrative text is such that, while putting forward the falcon as the principal spur to interest in the narrative for its characters and the spectators, it is knowing the identity of Archer's killer which forms the key of modal movement and narrative resolution. And last, the modal analysis 'reads' and inflects, in a very informative way, the schema of canonic narrative statements; e.g., the non-power of Archer is not equivalent to the non-power of Wilmer when these are considered in the context of modalities, by reference to the chart notating modalization, although the canonic formulae for these items would seem almost identical. With the concept of modalization the film analyst has a strong theory of a principal motor of narrative change.

NOTES for Section 9

1. On the general scope of narratology, Bremond 1973: 12, Greimas 1970: 158. On the 'normalization' of a text as a rewriting to eliminate features of enunciation, discourse, and figuration, Greimas 1966: 141-71. These techniques of normalization are, tellingly, the first place where the claim of general applicability of narratological theory breaks down, since it becomes too often apparent that various narratological models can only be applied to rewritten verbal texts: a major, persistent fault of narratological models brought forward in the last decades.

2. A research paper, 42 pp. with seven large diagrams, written for Professor R. Akehurst in 1979-80.

3. Bremond 1966 and 1973.

4. Pavel 1976.

5. Greimas 1966, 1970, and 1973; Greimas/Courtés 1979; and Courtés 1976. No use was made of Greimas's work on the distinctions of actant/actor/role.

6. Narratological models by Propp and Todorov, Barthes's theory of kernels and catalysts, and the narrative theory by text-grammarians such as van Dijk were all discarded on grounds of this--among other--criteria.

7. Barthes 1974 on the hermeneutic code.

8. This choice of disposition of the matrices follows Adam's work (1976: 213-22), using Bremond's model for a Nivernaise tale.

9. Pavel 1976: Ch. 2.

10. Pavel works with a corpus consisting of Corneille's tragedies.

11. Pavel models these on Chomskyan 'rewrite rules' for constituents.

12. Pavel 1976: 26, 30. Other rules pertaining to the corpus concern peripeteias, familial lineage as a grid for transmission of transgresssion, and so on.

13. For the textual-economic principle of 'multiple use' on the micro-level, see the analysis of Section 6.

14. Most important to note is that no passage was made from what Greimas calls 'surface narrative syntax' to the level of 'fundamental semantics'. I remain unconvinced that narrative progression (its basic sequentiality) is to be, in any pertinent way, elaborated by the static semantic oppositions of the semiotic square.

15. Rastier 1973: 91-161.

16. Notice that these canonic functions are more semantically loaded than the categories of Bremond or Pavel.

17. Greimas 1970: 178-80, and the relevant entries in Greimas/Courtés 1979.

18. That is, neither too detailed and specific, nor too general and abstract.

19. Courtés 1976: 109-38.

20. In this way, the canonic sequences present a partial analogy to the quasi-canonic form of Freud's work on a matrix of phantasy, as this was developed in Section 8. Lyotard's tabular presentation of Freud's model brings this out (Lyotard 1974: 328-33).

21. This fault mars some of the work done in the U.S. to apply Greimas's models to the study of Biblical narratives.

22. See this entry in Greimas/Courtés 1979.

SECTION 10: Analyses

This section comprises five programmatic sketches of textual analyses, incited and oriented by the narratological contexts described in Section 9, so as to demonstrate those contexts' 'use-value' and force for the analytic reading of film.

A) Amelioration, Discovery, Truth

In the Bremondian analysis of The Maltese Falcon, a persistent 'degradation' is notated concerning Brigid's absence, disappearances, loss. Close to the film's end, narrative action takes a turn which has to be notated in a striking, even somewhat awkward fashion as an 'amelioration' not produced by any actional 'process'. Spade has been induced, by very emphatic persuasion from Effie, to go out searching for Brigid at a distant, unfamiliar address, an action which turns out to be useless. As Spade returns to his apartment, Brigid appears from an adjacent doorway on the street, collapses, and is helped up the stairs into his apartment, where, it turns out, Gutman and others are waiting, and where the narrative's denouement transpires.

This 'simple' and apparently isolated defect of narratological determination--which suddenly, effortlessly 'returns' Brigid as a lost object into Spade's purview--clues to important, large-scale workings of the symbolic order. The film's discourse seems constrained here to form the relations between symbolic 'truth' and the actional process of 'searching' by a tandem figure of sustenation and concession,[1] by holding the spectator in the suspense of a search which turns up nothing, and then suddenly, surprising, making the search fully useless

in that the searched-for object finds the searcher after the search is abandoned.

A textual analysis reading the figuration of 'discovery' (action, object) in MF necessarily encounters some of the same issues which Derrida unthreads concerning the narrative/psychoanalytic search for an object and investigation of truth in Poe.[2] (The terms of argument and analysis marked there would guide this sketched textual-analytic reading of MF.[3]) The missing narratological determination cue a textual analysis tracing the way in which the figuration of MF must paradoxically upset the law of genre (an axiom of narrative action: a detective searches and finds an object, the truth). That generic law is overturned in order to maintain a dramatic and conclusive economy of truth. The economy of effect (which overrides generic forms of staging and action), to which the film's discourse is committed, dictates that there be no investment of effect in a work and labor of discovery of the woman: an unfolding actional sequence, culminating in the scopic pleasure in revelation, 'sighting' what was missing and sought, with triumph of mastery. That would implicate, too heavily, too directly, without sufficient figurational (secondary) elaboration or shielding, fatally, an analyst/detective (Spade, Dupin) in the play and violence around the complex of truth/unveiling/feminine sexuality. Repeatedly, insistently, the film's discourse figures the action of 'searching' as effectively that of being 'duped' in lured fascination, false discovery, imaginary jubilation, into violent and 'true' symbolic dispossession. On one hand, the dramatic and conclusive force econo-

mized by the figuration must be conserved for a later instance, and expended at that time so as to stage Spade as the 'non-dupe' of the falcon, and so as to invest with conclusive force his denial of desire for the woman's sexuality and lacking truth. So, on the other hand, a textual analysis would strive to read the figurational rationale for the woman's circular course, her return back to Spade (literally, 'right back into his arms'), and back into the locale figuring a 'domestic' oikos under his propriety and authority.[4]

Analysis thereby passes from a contextual clue in a narratological matrix, to textual analysis of filmic figuration, to a deconstruction of a cultural ideology of truth and/as sexual difference.

B) Mediation and Figurative Space

In the tree structures built up by Pavel's syntactic narratology, the category of 'mediation' possesses a pivotally determining function. Pavel's categories are more semantically weighted than those of Bremond's model; consequently, the Pavelian modelling of a narrative takes of necessity more of the semantics of its object into account. In so doing a particular figurative pattern in the actional deployment of space in MF moves into focus in ways pertinent and productive for textual analysis and reading.

In two of the 'narrative structures' annotated from the film (numbers 11 and 15), Spade's mediating power figures as an ability to place his narrative opponents before a deceiving or concealing doorway, spatially (objectally) blocking their action, vision, inquiry.

In the first instance (which presents a complete 'narrative structure' within one delimited syntagmatic sequence), Wilmer appears and follows Spade on the street as he is on his way to Brigid's apartment. Spade incites Wilmer to pursue him by taxi to a different apartment house, where Spade rings several doorbells at once, gains entry through the security door, moves through the building and out back onto the street. In the last shot of the sequence he looks at Wilmer (in background, bent over the rows of mailboxes and names), smiles, and turns away. This mediating power, which resolves this particular instance of narrative 'lack' (of privacy, of freedom of secret movement in the streets), is figured as an action drawing an opponent into a 'blind', before a wrongly labelled door, where the names are excessive and 'untrue'. (Another textual strand: recall that Brigid uses and discards two alias-names, that Gutman is first alluded to as the "fat man", a description beyond which Spade deciphers his 'true', 'proper' name, and so on).

In the second instance, Spade enjoys the power--for a time--to protect the secrecy of Brigid's and Cairo's negotiations in his apartment by refusing entry to the two detectives, who have come on their second late-night visit/inquiry. The spatial relations, as a pivot of narrative action and relations of power, are markedly stressed by verbal demands, gesture, and off-screen sound:

Dundy: "We want to talk to you."
Spade: "Well, go ahead and talk."
Polhaus: "We don't have to do it out here in the hall, do we, Sam?"
Spade: "You can't come in."
Polhaus: "Oh, come off it now, Sam." (He reaches into foreground to lay a hand on Spade's shoulder.)
(Cut to Spade's face for reaction shot.)

Spade: "You aren't trying to strong-arm me, are you, Tom?"
[After more discussion, and another demand from Dundy, "Let us in!", which Spade meets with silence, the detectives turn to go. At that moment Cairo's cry "Help!" is heard from off-screen. All three men look off-screen right, then:]
Dundy: "I guess we're going in."
Spade: "I guess you are."

These instances demonstrate the possibility of significant correlation between a figurative pattern with a specific narratological-syntactic category/function as a discursive strategy in a given text. This avenue allows the narratological map to take on more theoretical importance and pragmatic potency for textual analysis, as a consistent abstract representation of the text (of a specific level of the text's semantics: narrative organization) which is open to correlation with other textual levels. It provides for a more discriminating perspective onto analysis of figuration, in which a figurative pattern (e.g., an imaginary repertoire of spaces, or spatial structures concerned with doors, actions of entry, etc.[5]) can be specified according to which instances in the pattern have narratologically pertinent function--and which not. In this way, the syntactic starting point of Pavel's narratology becomes an incisive frame for textual analysis of semantics and figuration.

C) Actants As Figures of History and Territorialization

Actantial analysis in the case of MF determines a number of actantial networks, as could be expected for any elaborated narrative. In two networks where the falcon forms the 'object' actantial position, 'History' and Jacoby (the ship's captain) are positioned as the

falcon's actantial 'sender'. These narratological determinations provide a contextual focus for a textual analysis which reads the film's cultural politics of territoriality.[6] Such a reading would dwell on the topology figured by narrative elements (objects, relevance, truth, and actions), such that Spade and his territory form a 'socius'. The film territorializes every time it figures the crossing of one of these listed narrative elements, into what narratological analyses construct as Spade's 'sphere of interest', as a disruptive, violent, deceptive or valueless intrusion, which demands to be resolved by a reterritorialization in the form of narrative resolution by the Law.[7] This forms a major economic motor of the narrative's working.

For instance, 'History' sends the falcon along its narrative course, and the film's textual and figurative order is heavily determined by the roll-up title which figures that history as a written pre-text. Spade is not socialized by this history, he is ignorant of it. It is im-pertinent for his narrative determination; this history and its territory[8] determine most other narrative agents. But most significant is the violence which figuratively attends the transfer or crossing of this topological boundary. When Spade is tutored, at length in elaborated dialogue with Gutman, on the (falcon's) history, this action of transfer of knowledge and/of value (in)to Spade is coupled with Gutman's deception and dissimulated action of violence, drugging the whiskey he simultaneously gives Spade to drink. In a parallel figurative disposition of territories and boundaries, the intrusion by the ship captain into Spade's space--unexpectedly, when

the front office door is unlocked and Effie not 'at her post', the captain bursts into Spade's interior private office--forms the second violent, mortal irruption of that history. This narrative turn is entirely constructed to figure an overwhelmingly excessive violence textually bound to a movement from the 'outside' into Spade's sphere (of interest, of power, of space). 'Overwhelmingly', since in a filmic narrative notoriously long on talk and short on the sort of aggressive and spectacular violence associated with the law of its genre, this intrusion of a dying man figuratively provokes some of the most marked effects of the film: Effie is sickened to fainting by the captain's corpse, and Spade crushes and hurts her arm as he sees what the captain has delivered to him. Ultimately narrative problems are resolved by Spade's manipulation of the deceptive, valueless object from 'outside' (the statuette) as an instrument to produce a truth which re-marks the Law of the socius, the home territory, and its community as a male brotherhood.

A reading of MF's xenophobic politics of territoriality could thus put narratology of actants and their figuration to work as components of a cultural analysis, probing the film's social-ideological functioning as a 'registering machine' (Deleuze) of territoriality.

D) The Scopic Register in the Seam of Canonic Sequences

Transcribed according to the practice and custom of narrative semiotics, narratology models its object as a flat, relational and hierarchical map, whose space is idealized, disjunctive, and purely

logical. But a narrative text is traversed by its subject as a multi-dimensional space, in which narrative logic is recognized, but the sequences constituted by and conforming to that logic are encountered as spreading, (in)folding, and closing threads and areas.[9] This is one way to view the relation of énoncé and enunciation.

How does the film's discursive enunciation inflect the canonic 'narrative statements'? Consider the closure of the sixth syntagmatic sequence, covering the performance of Spade versus Cairo. For the narratological analyst, this means drawing an imaginary terminative line across a column of entries of canonic narrative formulae defined by Cairo as subject. From this point onward, Cairo (as the logically defined opponent to Spade's function of 'performance') merges with the syntagmatic sequence previously established and defined by Gutman/Wilmer. But how are this narrative development, and narratological closure, staged as action? What is the economy of that actional figuration?

This particular narratological shift is encompassed within figurational moves of reversal, blindness, and irony. Spade's entry and exit along the hotel hallway to Gutman's room (in his first interview with Gutman) are figured with identical camera setups of the elevator doors, and along the corridor from the elevator. Spade's action of movement (arriving/departing), in its banal symmetry, is a token of the reality-effect through economically minimal actional elaboration in figuration as a discursive regime.[10] As Spade leaves, after manipulatively giving Gutman an artificial angry ultimatum inside, he smiles, wipes his hands

with a handkerchief, and before entering the elevator, grins at his trembling right hand. The action of 'departure' through the hall's evidently private space--visible only to the spectator, as opposed to the 'scene' within Gutman's room--is being troped metaphorically, away from a mundane reversal of the action of 'arrival', as 'the nervous, excited actor leaving the stage after his tour de force performance'. As Spade enters the right-hand elevator, the left-hand elevator doors open and Cairo emerges, intent on a newspaper in his right hand. Thus the figuration plays on vision, upsets and and reverses the 'private/unseen' figuration of the hallway space (by opposition to the 'visible scene' of Gutman's apartment), and in so doing executes a rare movement of irony against Spade, at his expense. The equation of 'one eye in excess' produces Spade's non-seeing, a scopic/narrative castration. The irony is carried by figuration of space, vision, and power, since although Cairo himself does not see Spade (narrative power does not accrue to Cairo in this instance[11]), the newspaper he searches motivates and 'enables' Gutman's reversal of the power relations in the 'theatrics' of his second performance/interview with Spade.[12] Because Cairo--newly aligned with Gutman--finds, in the paper, a plausible location of the object (falcon) in a shipping schedule of arrivals, Gutman is empowered so as to overthrow with dissimulated violence Spade's narrative advantage and position in that second interview.

Any textual analysis of scopics could be well informed and aimed by narratological contexts: in this way, analysis of figurative patterns of sight can be fused to analysis of power.

E) Narrative Modality, Film-Work, Dream-Work

Narratology, in Greimas's hands, has expanded its scope beyond the narrative énoncé as statement (i.e., as 'asserted proposition') with the inclusion of a theory of narrative modalization. Thus textual analysis of discourse and figuration can exploit narratology as a context not only for issues of action and power as 'realized' narrative elements for figuration, but also for questions of desired and 'irreal' objects, actions, and states of affairs.

A rich but precise instance might be found towards the end of MF, in the brief and fast-moving sequences connected with Spade's obtaining the falcon (the modalized, 'wanted' object grounding his 'knowing', 'power', and 'doing'), and his disposition of it. The figurational thread I want to follow is formed by a dispersed series of four shots of objects in close-up, without human figures in frame:[13]

--the "Shipping News" column of the San Francisco paper, where the arrival listing for the freighter "La Paloma" is circled;

--the ship's painted name on its bridge, wreathed in flames and smoke;

--the parcel, wrapped in tattered newspapers, which the dying captain of "La Paloma" has dropped to the floor in Spade's office;

--the envelope, into which Spade tucks the bus terminal parcel check ticket that he has received for the parcel.

Kuntzel's textual analyses of films by Lang and Cooper/Schoedsack broke open the interweaving[14] of film-work and dream-work. This four-

element chain is apt for a textual analysis which reads MF's film-work as an idealist ventriloquization of sight, knowledge, desire, and 'possession' of the object. The film's discourse, in one movement, disenfranchises Spade's knowledge and praxis: what he 'knows' by way of the first shot is wasted and lost in the second shot. Purposeful, conscious, 'waking' action yields nothing. The film-work 'is' a dream-work. It lures an oneiric, desiring, non-pragmatic causality of action, object, and effect. It is when Spade is reclining in his chair, tended by Effie, 'telling' the object, 'representing' it in speech (as Wortvorstellung) to someone, that it can appear under its veil,[15] abruptly, a-causally (in terms of Spade's action and causality as a narrative dominant), 'like a dream' in its unreal, quasi-hallucinatory resolution, pleasure, and satisfaction. But the fourth instance--instead of immediately figuring this object of desire unveiled for the (spectator's) eye--prolongates the rule of Freudian 'figurability' (Darstellbarkheit), leaving something to be (yet) desired, hence dilating the filmic pleasure produced and produceable by the dream-work's play of unveiling, withholding the falcon from direct scopic pleasure in the spectator's look for a while longer, so that the film-work can profit with increased interest, with dividends credited to Spade's account (as being untouched by the object's falsity).

This sketched reading indicates that the economy of the object--its value, its truth--can be traced out in a powerful way, when a textual analytic reading shuttles from the narratological context of modalized 'wanting' to follow the intermeshed paths of desire and figuration in a text's film-work and dream-work.

NOTES for Section 10

1. For these figures, consult the entries in Fontanier 1977.

2. Derrida 1980: 439-524.

3. This line of questioning was hinted at in the conclusion of Section 6. The terms of argument are: truth, circular passage, unveiling, truth in (the) place of feminine sexuality, the discovery of truth as the acquittal of a debt. Their pertinence to a reading of MF is pervasively multiple.

4. There are a chain of mise-en-scène instances (and 'absences') which figure 'domesticity' or 'privacy' of Spade's room. Recall that Iva is unable to gain entry into Spade's room, whereas the detectives enter during the night and sit across from Spade, on his bed; the denouement sequence is interspersed with 'domestic' actions (preparing coffee, and so on).

5. Cf. the discussion of the figure of 'the woman at the door' sketched above in Section 6.

6. See Deleuze/Guattari (1977: Ch. 3) for concepts of 'socius' and 'territoriality'.

7. On value and narrative object of transfer/communication, Greimas 1973. 'Reterritorialized' here in the sense of an operation which reaffirms, with legal force, preconstructed boundaries, territories, and identities.

8. See the discussion of the intertwined figures of History and toponymy in Section 6.

9. Barthes 1974: sec. XXXVI, on the text as fan and systematic folding.

10. That is, a filmic discourse which is maintaining the effect of vraisemblance must provide a minimum threshold amount of narrative-actional determination, or otherwise it would signify its action as fantastic. Cf. Heath 1975b: 99. Narrative movement (arrival, departure) is a fundamental term/material which is worked to provide a minimal reality-effect.

11. Cairo's individual 'stake' in the narrative is now exhauted; he figures as only a minor adjunct to Gutman.

12. Cf. the notes, on the over-coded 'staginess' and 'politeness' involved, in Section 6.

13. These characterizations of the four shots are not entirely precise. It would be more precise to state that these are sometimes

'phases' within shots, and that (in the fourth shot/phase) Spade's hands are in view. But their relative unity, through codes of writing, shot scale, and CHR code, is quite definitely established, in juxtaposition against their contiguous context in the filmic text.

14. Kuntzel 1977, 1978, and 1980a.

15. See Lacan (1977b: 181-83) on the voyeuristic situation in which the desiring look will "phantasize any magic of presence" beyond the veil (curtain, wrappings), "the most graceful of girls, for example, even if on the other side there is only a hairy athlete."

SECTION 11: Issues

1. The overriding issue stemming from this chapter's work with narratology as a context is the fashion in which the dimension of enunciation is re-situated for investigation. The theoretical work in semiotics and psychoanalysis of the last decades repetitively unsettled the restricted focus of any narratology (or 'structuralism') with the énoncé proper.

The issue which most specifically emerges concerns the spectatorial passage through the signifiers defining the zone of signification which narratology makes its object of analysis. In other words, what specific, local model can account for the determination of the minimum narrative signifieds of 'action' by the spectatorial subject?

2. Such a local model would not be constructed by induction or extrapolation from the textual level, but would have the form of a cognitive theory--albeit a limited one--of narrative reception, as a cognitive process producing semantic determination. The issue: to construct an appropriate theory which conforms to the 'results' of textual analyses of film (i.e., the general hypotheses which textual analyses of individual films generate by implication), and to the givens from semiotic and psychoanalytic theory of textuality and its subject. The theory and analyses of this chapter move toward overturning the conventional conceptual opposition of logic versus rhetoric, and--by working through the framework and focus of narratology--have replaced and transformed that 'opposition' with vision of the interlocking operation of cognition/figuration in the enunciation of the filmic text.

3. The above points entail a further issue: would the theoretical model, in its turn, be heuristically productive for other problems? That is, could it link local determination of actional semantics to other spectatorial/enunciational processes which bind the spectatorial subject to the filmic text and its dispositions? Identification processes? Effects of suspense, shock, and pleasure? Scopics?

4. Finally, what are the direct and pragmatic consequences of such a model for the practice of textual analysis? In particular, could such a theory orient and support textual micro-analyses in which enunciational and spectatorial passage are stressed as a focus? By themselves, the global, macro-economies modelled by narratological theories necessarily leave discourse and figuration irrelevant. But if we could refer to a model of local determination of actional semantics, could not textual analyses construct the local economies of narrative action, and provide strong hypotheses about spectatorial passage across the 'fine grain' of the filmic text?[1]

NOTE for Section 11

1. This is, so to speak, the 'investigator's imaginary' (see Metz 1977a: 27-60): the notion of voluntarily, methodically chooosing and according an 'equal balance' to the dimensions of the text's énoncé and enunciation in an analysis.

CHAPTER FOUR

Section 12

Section 13

Section 14

Section 15

SECTION 12: Theory

Actional Nameability and Filmic Narrativity

In the wake of important work done in the last decades, in the field of narratology, on the large patterns and processes of narrative, attention has also turned to the issues of narrativity. 'Narrativity' is not simply a narrative pattern or unit in a text (in its énoncé), but a status or effect produced in the enunciational relation of a text to spectators/readers and their activity.

A Hypothesis of Actional Nomination: Units, Levels, Process

Narrativity must be investigated as an effect of feature of enunciation, more than or rather than a full or positive trait which could supposedly be isolated solely in the énoncé--in the filmic or literary text 'as such'. Barthes, speculating on a written verbal narrative by Balzac, claims that an action sequence "exists when and because it can be given a name."[1] With such a literary narrative, nameability seems to be a question of the reader's passages from one name to another or of new nominations, both accomplished within a verbal sphere. When the analyst of a literary text provides such a name for a recognizable unity of narrative action, either a new one or one generalized from out of the manifest text (as an appendix, Barthes lists over 100 named sequences for the Balzac tale), the analyst is in some way making explicit an aspect of the reader's work with the text. While this description of an activity of nomination, and/or an intelligibility produced by it, does not seem to--or claim to--offer any necessary or sufficient conditions for narrativity, it does nevertheless have

interest as an effective starting point in thinking about an enunciational process of production of minimal units ('names' or 'verbs') for the narrative actions in a verbal text. Barthes's idea of a proairetic code, and his handling of the proairetic skeleton of Balzac's Sarrasine, seem an incontestable advance in the theory of narrative structure and its cognition.

Could this line of approach to narrativity and narrative units be elaborated for filmic narrative? Three problems stand out: the nature of the units, their level of detail, and the process of formation.

In film, where narrative action--some, not all of it--is represented in image, any model must take into account a change of regime, or rather, a relation of the regimes of image and language, of perceiving and naming.[2] In "Le perçu and le nommé" Metz elaborates a semiotic structure of intercodic relations (signifiers and signifieds of different codes, e.g. linguistic and visual), of pertinent traits, and of different realms of perception.[3] Metz works principally with examples of objects which are perceived and named, but he does provide a very brief discussion of nomination of actions, and of the traits which ground the process of actional nomination. The basic model of traits, codes, and intercodic relations which Metz lays out seems a coherent and convincing account of the relations of the sort of perceptual and linguistic 'units' at stake in filmic narrativity (an area which Metz himself does not develop.)

Assuming his ideas as a basis, the next problem is the way in which this model of codes and signifiers might function at an

appropriate level to establish narrativity in film. The problem of the level of narrative-actional nomination, particularly of the choice of particular versus general names, has been developed since the Russian Formalists in the study of verbal texts (the novel), and in the study of literary codes (what French semioticians call codes of vraisemblance, coded naturalness). Such codes, to borrow an example from Culler, mark the expression, 'he walked to the store' as a more 'natural' nomination of action (in terms of its level of nomination and detail, for most fictional discourse) than 'he swung his left foot forward, balanced himself, moved his weight ahead, lifted his right foot, etc.'[4] In literature, such a code of naturality in describing action can be adhered to or violated in order to produce effects, but this will always be a question of choices manifested in a printed verbal text. What of filmic narrative? Do similar codes of vraisemblance guide or channel our reception and apprehension of filmic narrative actions in image? Is there then a code, a set of paradigms of names which is at work and which may be a part of a general narrative code, which can enter into the formation of narrative texts--written, oral, filmic?[5]

Thus, the issue turns back again to process. Concerning the process (as opposed to the codic structure), Metz says only that "at the limit [language] effects vision, whether aloud or by a simple mnemonic evocation of a phonetic signifier."[6] A different, more complete hypothetical account of a process of nomination for filmic narrativity might be Ejxenbaum's 1927 description of inner speech, a "continual

process," a flowing internal current of speech, related in some way to external (uttered) speech, which "makes connections between separate shots," "forms a chain of film phrases" and--most importantly for our problem--"translates the shot" and "forms semantic units."[7] These ideas, together with the elements of theory from Barthes and Metz, now form a very strong hypothesis about a process of nomination of narrative actions in a spectator's inner speech. Ejxenbaum has no theory of traits and codes like that of Metz; he writes instead of an elusive and less coherent "divination" of meaning. This lack leads his theory to overemphasize the role of context in the formulation of meaning(s) for any single shot.[8] On the other hand, Ejxenbaum's account of inner speech offers a much more apt description of the processes of a film spectator's activity than the two alternative processes Metz gives in passing (external speech aloud or memory of phonetic signifiers), which seem commonplace, but not pertinent to the problem here. Ejxenbaum stresses that inner speech is a "new type of mental work which does not develop in everyday activities."[9] Ejxenbaum's idea of inner speech received much attention in the early 1970's,[10] especially concerning issues of visual and verbal metaphor, but here it can be effectively developed and deepened by narrowing its application to the theoretical issues of reception and intelligibility of narrative film, and by making it the key element in this hybrid configuration--along with the idea of narrativity as nomination (Barthes) and an understanding of nomination by way of coded and perceived traits (Metz).

Recountability and Inner Speech Nomination

Recountability, the speed and ease with which a cinema spectator can acceptably recount a filmic narrative in outer, uttered speech[11] (an activity called up often enough in the ordinary situations of cinema spectatorship: giving a summary of a filmic narrative in part or whole, when someone has missed a portion of a film, or when discussing films), is strong evidence indicating that some sort of verbal processing, similar to this hypothetical nomination of action in inner speech, forms a component of the cognitive processing of filmic narrative. Recent research in cognition and psycholinguistics offers substantial confirmation, and suggests further insights;[12] some older empirical research on segmentation of the 'behavior stream', employing the actions of a filmic narrative as an experimental object/stimulus, also is pertinent, and suggests the uniformity with which a filmic actional chain is broken down into units.[13] It is immmediately apparent that empirical research could be designed and tailored to the problems and pertinences of film theory, in such a way so as to be of benefit to both film theory and psycholinguistic inquiry.[14]

Actional Nomination in Spectatorial Passage

We could specify the model further by focussing attention on the dimension of filmic enunciation: specifically, on the spectatorial passage in the unreeling of the filmic text. A number of aspects stand out, which could be conceived as procedures and operations of nomination, which together could form an algorithm of the spectator's inner speech work and passage.

First, there is the procedure by which a spectatorial subject locates an appropriate or useful level for the activity of nomination. Chafe, discussing empirical psycholinguistic research on film reception as cognitive processing, labels this working procedure a 'conceptual analysis.' He claims, however, that the procedure moves from wholes to parts, from a large 'name' (or 'holistic concept'), to 'sub-concepts'.[15] This view is in effect created, it would seem, by the particular experimental method Chafe and his co-workers were using (having experimental subjects retell a filmic narrative after viewing it). The illusion is that sub-concepts are 'posterior' to the film, necessarily produced so as to articulate the non-verbal 'into' the fine-grained verbal form of the subjects' oral retellings.[16] But this view and research do tend to confirm notions of spectatorial passage as a dynamic search among levels of smaller and larger 'grain'.

Lindekens suggests another aspect of the problem, that the procedure is a deduction, moving conceptually 'up' from represented action-as-movement to narrative action-as-function.[17] But, as suggested above in Section 4, this transit between levels ('movement' ==> 'function') neglects the range of intermediate levels. In part, this is because Lindekens is taking narrative function largely in terms of Propp's very heavily semantically loaded functions.[18] The latter are fairly 'detailed' (not abstract), and hence are conceptually much closer to the level of action-as-movement. It does seem worthwhile to hold to Lindekens' directional notion, incorporating it into the model of inner speech nomination as a deductive work of naming. However, I am con-

vinced that narrative functions are most productively understood as far more abstract entities (as in Pavel's, or Greimas's methodologies, discussed in Sections 9 and 10). Therefore, the movement of deductive nomination should be conceived as covering 'more' conceptual distance, which includes more levels of detail/abstraction for nomination, than just a level of movement 'or' a level of function.[19]

Todorov has provided a cogent example of these levels in graphic form,[20] in which an fairly abstract semantic unit ('to hurt') can be specified through three further, more fine-grained levels of determination. Todorov's branching diagram of alternatives shows the difference in 'grain' among levels quite clearly. A slightly more direct example, pertinent to our preceding argument, could be made out of a 'single' behavior string nameable as several embedded (not alternative) action sequences,[21] such as:


'get up from chair, walk towards the door, extend hand,...'
<== specific deduction of action from motion
'close door'
<== general notation of action by attributed 'causal intention'
'successful mediation'
<== (Pavelian) narrative function

This view of the multiple contexts for the interpretation and integration of represented action seems a much more convincing and fruitful model for a theory of actional nomination in inner speech.[22]

Second, the development here thus far is still too 'atomic', in the sense that too much emphasis is put onto the single action and its

--single or 'vertical'--levels of possible nomination. It is important as well to taken into account determinants[23] which channel the passage towards a lateral co-determination. Barthes' idea of the 'already-read', i.e., cliched, pre-constructed sequences of actions, is again important here.[24] Their redundance eases, 'lubricates', and sets the expectations for spectatorial passage along the actional chain, as against the difficulty of nomination of 'random' activity (empirical investigation presents some good confirmation[25]).

Furthermore, these sequences of named action are probably multiply determined in the filmic text, such that different levels of action and nominations do not conform hierarchically among themselves, as was suggested above, in the diagram, and with the 'atomic' perspective. It happens that Rumelhart, before turning to the deliberately simplified material suitable for psycholinguistic experimentation, quotes a fragment of dialogue from The Little Foxes, and suggests that different 'schemas'[26] govern its 'understanding' on different levels: as 'conversation', as 'conflict', or as 'extortion'. He argues:

> As we discover increasingly more specific schemata to account for the passage, we have an increasing amount of structure in the schema and we find that the more specific schemata yield better fits to more of the detail of the passage. Depending on our knowledge and purpose in reading we may settle for a more or less specific schema corresponding to a more or less deep understanding of the passage.[27]

But Rumelhart goes no further with the correlation of this process with that of narrativity as an enunciational regime for the text and spectatorship.

It is the factor of narrativity, and the semantic register, which marks the break-point between the 'scientific' perspective of psycho-

linguistic researches (with their concern for a 'natural ecology' of perception),[28] and textual analysis as an active reading of mediated text and discourse, with an ideological ambit.

Accordingly, another determinant of interest for the model, as an ultimate context or instrument for textual analysis, is 'power'. This is to be investigated in two ways. As diegetic power on the register of the énoncé, it should be asked how far, and in what ways spectatorship is modulated or manipulated, in its construction of actional semantics, by the diegetic dominance of particular actants, and the presumably legible and nameable actional sequences and schemas ascribed to them as fictive/imaginary agents.

Next, in the register of enunciation, how do the discourse and figuration of a filmic text work as determinants of actional nameability, 'empowering' certain figures with it, depriving others? Focus, privileging, foregrounding might be terms which textual analysis could take up in order to question actional nameability as a means of ideological inscription. (In particular, the next movement of this theoretical essay will be to suggest some pertinences of actional nomination for the study of the enunciational effect of spectatorial 'psychic' identification.)

We could sum up the basic elements of this theoretical model in a hypothetical algorithm of spectatorial passage:

(1) Actional nomination will begin at a very 'atomic' level as a spectator confronts minimally determined text (i.e., not just at the

'beginning' of the text, but also, for instance, after major figurational shifts such as scene changes).

(2) Then, nomination moves to as general and high a level as possible until--

(3) various schemas are suggested, tested, and found to be successfully 'fitting' successive action, and hence the potentially unnameable novelty of represented action is reduced (a effect of entropization), so that--

(4) actional nameability will make narrative functions legible, and thus a regime of narrativity is established as a dominant enunciational relation for spectatorship; and--

(5) when a major figurational shift (as conventionally found between large syntagmatic units in the discourse of classic narrative film) is encountered, retrospectively the highest (most encompassing) actional schema and its narrative function(s) are marked for memory and subsequent use in the semantic/cognitive processing of the further filmic text.

As a tentative example of the algorithm, reconsider the opening scene of The Maltese Falcon. The schema of an 'office visit' is established first. Archer's intrusion 'interrupts' the schema's unfolding, but the filmic discourse accords greater diegetic power to the schema and its agents, and Archer is subsequently fitted into that schema by original agents. But now a sub-schema, which we labelled 'rivalry' (in Section 6), complicates the work of actional nomination. The figuration (shot changes, framing, play of looks to on- and off-

screen objects) changes the material terms of the spectator's work of nomination. On one hand, the play of glances between the two men, Archer's kinesics, and, on the other, Brigid's actions, have to named and integrated into overlapping schemas of 'rivalry' and 'seduction'. These latter nameable actional schemas are a more fine-grained play of actions and diegetic turns within the original and continuing schema of an 'office call'; hence, spectatorship as actional nomination is retuned in passage across the text as discourse and figuration are elaborated.

Actional Nameability / Cinema Grammar?

Actional nameability may be an implicit facet in the 'cinema grammar' in transformational-generative form recently sketched by Carroll. Several of his criteria and rules for such a grammar involve relations between represented action (particularly the phases of action), and the register of filmic textuality (distribution and conjunction of action(s) into shots).[29] But even if it is immediately agreed, as Carroll repeatedly insists, that there is no direct equation of grammatical 'acceptability' with esthetic 'value',[30] it does not seem likely that such a grammar can be exploited as a productive contextual frame for textual analysis. The main goal which Carroll sets for the grammar is to account descriptively for a dichotomy of 'filmic' versus 'unfilmic' instances of figuration.[31] But in its generality, and artificiality (i.e., a 'sorting' of sequences into the two categories), the theory corresponds to no clear and important phe-

nomenon of film as work or as text, or spectatorship. It seems therefore im-pertinent to the practice of textual analysis of film.[32]

A Hypothesis of Identification Via Narrativity and Nomination

Now this model might be explained and exploited by turning to another problem in the range of spectatorial activity: identification. If as a narrative film progresses, a spectator is producing in inner speech a chain of nominations of the narrative actions, cutting the chain of actions into a series of names at a coded or conventional level of generality and naturality,[33] using a stock of signifiers related in some way to verbal language, then this cognitive processing of filmic narrative is a likely site from which to investigate the 'psychic' process of identification in spectatorship, along the lines of the psychoanalytic theory of identification.

How could this model of actional nomination relate to the process of identification in narrative film? Seven points--questions, rather--of possible pertinence between this model, psychoanalytic theory, and film suggest themselves. First, might it not sometimes be the case that this transitive process of nomination--or 'identification' in its ordinary sense--acts as a pivot in the sort of reflexive identification ('identification of oneself with'), which is the spectatorial process supposedly at work in the experience and reception of film? For instance, Laplanche and Pontalis take care to distinguish and separate these two senses of 'identification' at the head of their definitional essay on it.[34] However, might it be possible that spectatorial iden-

tification in narrative film combines actional identification (nomination of a unit of action) with the other, reflexive process?[35]

Second, since Freud claimed that an identification can be achieved on the basis of only a single trait[36] (Lacan develops this as the 'unary trait' [trait unaire]), might not a named action be such an identifying trait grounding an identification? And since in narrative film, actions--their type, order, outcome--are a chief element building the characterization of 'human figures' or of situations, scenarios, or 'worlds' (even the time-space of the representation: cuts on actions extend space or delimit time), might not these actional names be a leading--if not single--trait involved in spectatorial identifications? Do these nominations as a part of filmic enunciation provide the spectatorial subject with an identificational access and positioning with regard to the film's énoncé or representation? Usually, discussions of identification in film turn on identifications with a star, with 'sympathetic' (or not) 'qualities' which their image embodies, and other effects of the 'star system' (a cinematic code), but I would suggest that sometimes the 'star code' and its major effect--the identifiability of a star's visage--work to focalize attention, perception, and expectation onto less the star per se, but onto the actions performed by a star and the names produced in the spectator's inner speech which construct these actions' intelligibility. Obviously, there is a hierarchy of traits which can support identifications, but the identification of narrative action by inner speech may be a leading, opening trait in the hierarchy, and one which works to support identification even without or against the momentum of the 'star code'.[37]

Third, what sort of identification would an identification based on actional nomination be? Following the psychoanalytic model, this is evidently a secondary cinematic-filmic identification, aside from and logically posterior to primary cinematic identification with the camera.[38] Furthermore, in terms of Lacanian psychanalytic theory, which distinguishes imaginary and symbolic identifications, this identification, when a spectator identifies (nominates) narrative action by inner speech and then 'identifies with' something/'someone' on its basis, lies far to the side of imaginary identification (in line with Lacan's mirror stage). The spectatorial subject is constructing an identification, a misrecognition of himself in a semblable--a similarly acting human bodily figure, acting in a teleological and nameable fashion. Here we must lay great stress--more than is typical of discussions of the mirror stage as a part of film theory--on the feature that the image at stake is of a body acting with mastery over itself.[39] Such an acquisition and possession of mastery over bodily action is a major function of the imaginary, and perhaps the process of identification in film by way of actional nomination aims at a phantasy of the ideal ego, fully assured of omnipotence, particularly over the body and its actions.[40] The image of the controlled body, whole, balanced, active, achieving, perhaps forms a baseline phantasy lured out by institutional cinema of narrative, along with all the other conventional romances and fantasies.[41] Actional nomination by inner speech would be precisely the very basic spectatorial activity which specifically engages that fundamental phantasy in the enunciation of narrative

film and its imaginary.[42] Nonetheless, actional nomination as a part of the enunciational film-work is not entirely swallowed up in the imaginary. The chain of names which a spectator attributes in inner speech is unquestionably related to a general narrative code, and since, in Lacanian terms, the code comes from the place of the Other, this process of naming then also falls under the domain of the symbolic. Here the Lacanian theory of the unary trait is particularly valuable, since Lacan develops it as precisely a junction or line of intersection between the imaginary (perception) and the symbolic (code), and proposes a topography of this critical but difficult dual relationship of these heterogeneous orders.[43] Still, if we imagine some sort of 'polar continuum' of identifications from imaginary to symbolic, actional nomination/identification is still on the side of the imaginary.

Fourth, since these nominations form a chain of elements, a chain of signifiers, this chain would split and suture its subject (the subject produced in relation to, in subject to a signifier) in the way Lacan and Miller describe the relations of subject, signifier, and unary trait in the process of suture. Since nominations produced in inner speech are not within the horizon of consciousness for a spectator ordinarily focussed on the signifieds of a scene (not a shot), it would seem most evident that the process of actional nomination is predominantly preconscious, not unconscious (descriptively unconscious, not dynamically unconscious, in Freud's sense). More radically, any element of such a chain, despite apparent sufficiency and independence,

functions at a dependent and 'future-oriented' position in a chain whose syntactic unfolding makes individual elements and their subject submit to a lack in time, a scansive delay which opens any element to disruption, overdetermination, and reversal. Thus the subject of such a chain of nominations is left in the "future perfect tense" in relation to its meanings, as it is pulsated in the chain's extension and movement.[44] Any identification, then, built on actional nomination is a pause of/in the signifying chain, since on one hand narrative is by nature extendable and depends on movement through action sequences, or on the other hand, since for psychoanalysis "the definition of the subject comes down to the possibility of one signifier more."[45] Therefore, the particular sort of model of nomination and identification postulated here, constituting the spectatorial subject in film as caught in the mobile pulse of the signifying chain of a filmic narrative, corresponds quite closely to the psychoanalytic theory of the subject, and it also makes a positive break with the everyday notion of identification as a steady positioning or continuous stable line of connection and affect tied from a spectator's psyche into the film's diegesis.

Fifth, in a valuable way this hypothesis specifies the manner in which a 'narrative subject' is set up on the basis of nomination of action and is constituted by the inner speech signifiers as an inmixed subject within the multiple and split filmic-spectatorial subject. Among all the streams of signifiers put forth in a film's projection and reception, as long as a minimal level of intelligibility of natura-

lized plausible, identifiable action is maintained, this particular 'narrative subject' can be produced and then entertained, 'stitched' into other layers of a film's diegesis and figuration through devices of identification, shock, and fascination. This theory of nomination and identification through it focuses exclusively on local, not global intelligibility of narrative. An example of this distinction might be constructed out of The Big Sleep, for which a spectator can probably nearly always identify individual actional units, can 'identify him/herself' with agents in the diegesis on that basis, and even give a sequential account of the entire diegesis, while being unable (as is notoriously claimed) to give an acceptable explanation of the coherence and vraisemblance of the global diegesis. Thus this model points us towards ways of helpfully making investigation into filmic signification more complex, by marking off narrativity as established by actional nomination and identification, and thereby delimiting other domains of signification at stake in a filmic text.

Sixth, if identification can proceed directly on the basis of actional nomination, this process may correspond in economic terms with Baudry's and Metz's separate metapsychological descriptions of the subject-effect of the cinematic apparatus and its signifiers,[46] in that a filmic-spectatorial subject in such a state has reinvested energy and attention from bodily, motor activity into (among other areas) the inner-speech work of nomination. The immobility of the spectator's body and the attendant disinvestment in mastery and control over the body stand in inverse relation to the strength of investment in scopic

and epistemic drives to see and identify human bodily action (as an image of mastery) on the screen in imaginary signifiers.

Finally, seventh, the pleasures afforded in the activity of nomination can be marked out in psychoanalytic terms. This pleasure is edged in the tension between the realm of perception (an open flux) and the realm of semantics (discrete names), between the scopic drive with the jubilation of recognition in the imaginary and the epistemic drive with the mastery of naming in the symbolic.[47]

All these nodes of questions contribute to any critical perspective on the psychoanalytic theory of identification and its prospective employment to map a part of filmic enunciation: to pose the questions of whose identifications are being produced, what identity is being educed, and the positionings called up, in any given films and their analysis. These notes only indicate in brief how this model of actional nomination might further investigation in this area.

Nameability and the Textual Analysis of Film

To conclude, a different question, aside from recountability and identification: how might this theory of actional nomination enter into the reading of films in their textual analysis? Up to now, inner speech and nomination have been discussed nearly exclusively as a working of the two registers of perception and semantics. To work with a film as text is necessarily to take into account another dimension: the register of textuality, of textual units such as the shot, of textual codes such as shot duration and shot framing, and the logic of

relations between shots. The brief triple comparison of fragments sketched out here, or other textual analysis like it, must be recognized as effective when the hypothesis of actional nameability is in the foreground of the reading; otherwise the theoretical construct has no rationale. The starting problem to be addressed is that of constructing the local economy of relations among these three registers.

Consider three fragments: the cross-cut rescue sequence at the end of Griffith's The Lonely Villa (1909), the shower murder scene from Hitchcock's Psycho (1960), and the long-duration shots of Delphine Seyrig on the floor of the embassy in Duras's India Song (1975).

We might take the first of these to be a sort of 'first' realized exploitation of a potential one-to-one synchronization between minimal actional articulations (a single nameable action/event) and a minimal textual unit in a film (a single shot). Each nameable unit in the successive shots serves as a holding point in an alternation which works to reduce the textual register of shot duration down to an apparent minimum threshold needed to assure the nameability of a single represented action. There is enough perceptual duration and matter, and other factors concerning the image are suitable to deliver the necessary perceived traits to allow a single nomination of action: 'breaking a door', 'turning the corner' with a carriage. Against this pressure (pace, minimum thresholds) is set the preconstructed[49] binary 'opposition' of the semantics ('bad thieves', 'good family') which goes along with nameability to assure the readability of the diegesis

against the discontinuity (textual and representational) of the alternation between the strands of action and characters.[50] Thus this fragment from the Griffith film can be read as a particular and notable modulation of the registers of textuality (a textual unit: the shot), semantics (a nameable semantic unity in a narrative chain: an action), and perception (a delimited duration of representational perceptual image-flux, experienced with a pre-established cognitive set: a few seconds of moving image).

With the Hitchcock fragment[51] a different hypothesis suggests itself: this scene deploys cinematic conventions such as the mode of alternation Griffith developed and presses against the limits of the logic of that classical cinematic system. Specifically, it strains the ordinary logic of action and figuration by passing below a threshold of nameability as it modulates upward the amount of perceptual flux in relation to semantics, by increasing the rate of shot changes (about thirty-two shots in about twenty-three seconds, in part, several of which are 'unnameable' in terms of action, on an individual basis, because of framing and/or duration). Whatever actional nomination may be proposed to cover the scene of sexual violence, the nomination is being called upon to hold these shots together, to bind the perceptual flux to a diegetic armature, to maintain a rapport between actional intelligibility and the drives to see/hear at a moment when these drives and their organs of operation are receiving a degree of perceptual shock whose limit or potential (that of the cinematic apparatus and its interlocking with human perceptual systems) had not often been

pushed so far in classical narrative cinema. This fragment is to be read as a temporary and strategic unbinding of the spectatorial subject's imaginary 'hold' over the signification in the film (its diegesis), an unbinding which is effected by accelerating perceptual discontinuity to leave that subject confronting a stream of actional fragments, logically excessive in relation to the actional name which they might apparently support (if their perceptual traits were coherent). In terms of conventional cinematic logic and economy, this moment of narrative action 'doesn't justify' being articulated into so many separate--and unnameable--shots and setups. This is, then, a different 'ratio' of the three registers of perception, textuality, and semantics: a maneuver to make the most violent textual staging and effect at this narrative turn with its unconventionally early diegetic loss of the good-object star. Whereas in the Griffith fragment there is a quick pace which approaches a one-to-one shot/name relation, the Hitchcock fragment upsets the spectatorial subject's hold on the film by accelerating textual/perceptual flux faster than the subject can name, and this acceleration breaks the relation or binding between nomination and film.

The example from Duras's film (shots 19 and 21[52]) points to a different modulation of these three registers, and to a collapse of narrative-actional nomination as a textual and enunciational dominant. This effect would be quite analogous to a collapse of the suture system when shot duration is 'over'-extended, and "hesitates beyond the time of its narrative specifications."[53] It is possible that these shots

work as just one in a series of salient breaking points in the film's enunciation with its spectators. Some other shots and narrational details on the voice-over seem to point expectation towards some sort of key action/event, some crisis or encounter to be seen: the mentions of the unseen mendicant, her song, looks off, the apparent shot/reverse shot with the Vice Consul. That expectation would point towards a conventional repertoire and logic of action and nomination, of the sort valid for the Griffith and Hitchcock fragments. But these shots produce a critical amount of uncertainty for any nomination by way of their 'excessive' duration; they mark an important moment of dissolution in this film of the taut, engaged functioning of inner speech nomination, as a usually central spectatorial activity for narrativity.[54] Given the uncertainty of nomination in terms of naturality and level of generality when the duration of the shots far passes the 'logical' appointment of naming ('sleeping on the floor', as indicated by the voice-over?), there is a slide towards focalizations elsewhere in the filmic text than any narrative armature--towards the body as something other than a narrative agent, the voices, the music, the colors--an other hierarchy and weighting or centering of attentions. By drawing out the registers of perception and textuality (in the duration of shots), the register of semantics is blocked and also unbound and diffused.[55]

This sketch of various practices of the diposition of action in image suggests with some concreteness that the theoretical construct of actional nomination has power as a heuristic fiction to read an indivi-

dual filmic text by way of its enunciational contract and interplay with spectatorial subjects,[56] even in a case where the process of inner speech nomination could be said to be faltering, and in default of its classical functioning inside the cinematic institution.

NOTES to Section 12

1. Barthes 1974: 19. Also see Barthes 1971a.

2. This may be the point to best broach the questions of the sorts of films to which this model applies: Silent? Sound? Classical representational-narrative cinema? Independent and non-representational cinema? Most obviously, this line of theory is taking off from classical narrative film, and in particular restricts itself in scope to action represented in image, not signified on the sound track. This restriction leads to another point: while a component of this theoretical model was constructed for silent cinema, there may well be strong differences between silent and sound cinema even in terms of this model which concerns only the image track.

The restriction of focus to action in image is quite evidently an artificial, theoretical fiction, itself complicit with a certain ideological hierarchy placing image 'over' sound.

3. Metz 1977b: 129-61.

4. Culler 1975: 143. Also see the comparisons offered by Heath 1975b: 99-100.

5. Once again, this idea of a general narrative code entails that the scope of this model of inner-speech nomination be restricted to narrative film in the classical sense and usual historical limits. Under the concept of a general narrative code would fall the repertoires of action sequences, grids of intelligible linkages and resolutions, and the range of matters in which narrative can be manifested.

6. Metz 1977b: 149.

7. Ejxenbaum 1974: 14, 23.

8. Ejxenbaum claims that film tries to "cultivate precisely those elements of semantics which are not commonly utilized"(1974: 28). The semantics of narrative would probably represent an exception to his claim. Amidst the polysemy of a shot of frame, narrative semantics would be more "common" than much else.

9. Ejxenbaum 1974: 13.

10. Willemen 1974, Garroni 1973, Levaco 1974. Willemen presented further work on inner speech to the 1979 Milwaukee film conference (now published, Willemen 1981). It covers the concept of inner speech in Ejxenbam and Vygotskij, but does not develop any extensive connection to filmic narrativity.

11. Writing on inner speech, both Willemen (1974: 63) and Garroni (1973: 116-17) dwell on the difficulty and blocking of its translation to external, uttered speech, but it would seem that narra-

tive nomination in inner speech is an exception to these difficulties. This hypothesis depends only on a rather gross 'lexical' dimension of inner speech; metaphor and thematics seem, on the other hand, much more complex issues.

12. Rumelhart 1975 and 1977, Chafe and others in Advances in Discourse Processes 1980a. Rumelhart works only with verbal material; the latter is a collection of essays concerning experiments around a single narrative film.

13. Barker 1963, Dickman 1963, Newtson 1976.

14. Most of the cognitive and psycholinguistic experimenters simply assume filmic representation of action as an inert, unproblematic given.

15. Parret 1974: 7.

16. Willemen (1981) is especially cogent--and emphatic--about the false dichotomy of verbal versus visual.

17. Lindekens 1976: Ch. 4. Ejxenbaum hints at this notion of deduction when he describes inner speech as a 'translation/transformation' (1974: 14). The opposition of 'action-as-movement' versus 'action-as-function' could be compared to the distinction drawn by the philosophy of action between 'behavior' and 'action', in which the latter is defined by will and intention.

18. Lindekens 1976: Ch. 4, sec. 16, and Propp 1968.

19. Lindekens is too binary in his treatment: either the deduction to a function is made, or not (the action then remaining on the level of movement). Newtson has shown how extremes of specificity/generality can be manipulated in an empirical-experimental setting (1976: 231).

20. Todorov 1968: 139-40.

21. The examples notated on the first two levels are drawn from Newtson 1976: 224-25. His work shows that empirically, too, the levels of fine-grained articulations can be hierarchically embedded into the network of the large-grained levels (1976: 225). Van Dijk (1980: Ch. 4) offers a good discussion of 'levels of interpretation'.

22. As an example from a filmic text analysed here, consider the instance in The Maltese Falcon, discussed in Section 10 above, in which Spade's functional mediation of a narrative lack was figured as a struggle to control entry by a doorway, and the ways in which actional nameability was in play with narrative function there, as embedded names or contexts of intelligible nameability.

23. 'Determinant' is reluctantly chosen as the most apt and precise word, but it is not intended to mean that these elements possess a

final causality over the process of nomination. Here especially a probabilistic model is most appropriate when treating questions of textuality and spectatorship (cf. de Beaugrande/Dressler 1981: xiv-xv).

24. Barthes 1974: sec. XI.

25. Newtson has tested this contrast within an 'artificial' experimental construction (1976: 231-35). Also cf. Ejxenbaum on the differences among spectators: "It is not surprising that there are people for whom such mental work [of cinematic inner speech] is difficult, exhausting, unusual, and unpleasant" (1974: 14).

26. The grammar he proposes for schemas needs to be put into comparative conjunction with Continental theoretical research in narratology. Most American psycholinguists working on perception and recall of 'stories' cite only Propp.

27. Rumelhart 1977: 268.

28. Despite their concern with a 'natural ecology' of perception, the research carried out by Dickman (1963) and Newtson (1976) is in fact deliberately asemantic in format, undoubtedly for procedural needs in experimental testing.

29. Carroll 1980: Chs. 5, 7.

30. Carroll 1980: 68-69.

31. The theoretical perspective of 'figuration' is not raised as a methodological issue by Carroll. In his perspective, 'sequences' are treated as 'examples'. The 'filmic/unfilmic' dichotomy is developed in Carroll 1980: Ch. 4.

32. Among the examples of 'unfilmic' sequences given in Carroll (1980: Ch. 6), left without further discussion of their figuration or semantics, are several instances of deletion which call for analysis as figurative ellipsis. Here, especially, it is evident that textual analysis starts where Carroll's grammar would end. Actional economy, not cinematic grammar, is pertinent for textual analysis.

33. It would be more precise to speak of a 'stream' of nominations rather than a 'chain' or 'series' of them, inasmuch as these may well be multiple and simultaneous. Notice that this formulation does not raise the dead issue of an equation between a shot and a word, which Metz dissected in his earliest essays in film semiotics (1974a: Chs. 2-4).

34. Laplanche/Pontalis 1973: 205.

35. Identification is thus being approached directly through textuality, discourse, spectatorship as activity, and not as an isolated 'irrational' or 'emotional' event of a different order.

36. Freud 1959: 39.

37. The same movement of concern away from the whole entities of 'person/personality' and 'character' towards a view of identification based upon a single and perhaps quite heterogeneous trait can be noted in Freud's discussion of identification (1959: Ch. 7).

38. Metz 1977a: 7-109, Baudry 1976.

39. See Lacan's text on the mirror stage and his discussions in the first year of the seminar (1977a: 1-29, 1975: 105-23). A particularly lapidary formulation comes from the 1957-58 seminar: "certain elements play a crystallizing role [in the imaginary]: the image of the body and the domination of its members by the subject" (1958: 187). Schilder (1950) offers numerous suggestions and a review of the literature around the body-image, but his Gestaltist-style psychoanalysis does not bear down on the dynamics which Lacan schematizes in the mirror-stage theory.

40. It is this sort of rationale for spectatorial investment which is lacking, for instance, in Michotte's theory of the spectator's 'emotional participation' (Michotte 1953). He can establish a parallel participation in imaginary movement between the spectator's and actor's bodies (i.e., what he calls 'motor empathy'), but the only conceptual rationale he offers for the spectator's pulsional investment in the imaginary is the sharing of 'experiences' or 'sentiments' between the diegetic character and the particular spectator. While this might have explanatory power in some instances, it can hardly be a general theoretical framework pertinent for close textual analysis.

41. Notice that here the problem of <u>action</u> (as nameable unit) has pivoted, turning into a problem of a fundamental <u>object</u> (a body-image) dominating the discursive/enunciational relations with narrative film. The problem of the narrative object, its relations to the body, and its insertion into figuration will emerge as a substantial issue for the textual analyses of Sections 13 and 14, and will form one of the most important issues posed at the end of this chapter.

The historical body of films is not monolithic, and one easy and immediate exception to this 'rule' would be the cinematic genre of slapstick comedy, in which the body is abundantly represented as lacking such mastery and self-control. This may be a point on which to problematize the relations of comedy and narrative as textual regimes. Also, see Lacan's apt comment on slapstick (1958: 184). Schefer offers a phenomenology of cinematic experience (within the themes of memory, life, and mystery) which occasionally addresses the body-in-action, without a strong context of narrativity. His examples seem to stress bodies which are in unnameably burlesqued action (Laurel and Hardy), or bodies which are mutant and unnameable (<u>Freaks</u>) (Schefer 1980: 13-14, 41, 55, 106).

42. This claim about narrative film might be a particular complement to Metz's general discussion of the imaginary signifier of cinema.

43. In Lacan's published writings the unary trait is usually discussed principally in terms of the symbolic, but see Conte 1970, especially p. 134; the papers on identification in Lettres de l'Ecole: Bulletin intérieure de l'Ecole Freudienne de Paris 1978 (e.g., Robert Viry's description of the trait as simultaneously distinctive [in the symbolic order] and a trait of resemblance [in the imaginary], p. 255); and Petitot 1977. Lacan's topology of the line of intersection between the imaginary (demand) and symbolic (desire) is given in 1977b: 271. The links between actional nomination, demand, and desire in a topology of the cinematic spectatorial subject will be developed in future work.

44. Lacan on the overdetermination of the signifying chain, 1977a: 153; on the subject in the future perfect, 1977a: 306.

45. Miller 1977: 33. Note that narrative resolution of closure is achieved at a higher semantic plane than that of actional nomination: there is nothing in the semantics of a single action per se which marks it as a perceptible or satisfactory closure of a narrative. Hence this model and this description of the signifying chain can stand without need to accommodate the real fact of perceived narrative finality.

46. See note 38.

47. Barthes 1975: 6-10. Barthes explores the specifically textual deployment of pleasure in the edged relation between a closed form and an excessive force/flux.

48. This problem of a textual economy is, I believe, a more cogent, concrete and pragmatic aim for analysis of actional disposition, which goes beyond the terms by which Heath addresses the question ('specification', 'signalling', 'marking', 'notation'), speaking of the filmic narrative's "need for a work of specification (modes of then signalling actions, of marking them for functional integration), in order as it were to raise the recording of actions to the level of notation from which, in language, the novel begins" (1975b: 99).

49. I.e., preconstructed outside the film, and within the film as a prior context.

50. Here is a historical opening from the theoretical model: the way in which cinema historically drew upon the preconstructed practices of narrative in theatre and vaudeville, where the scene (not shot) is a basic minimal unit in which action is represented. Griffith's film takes over the preconstructed melodramatic matter from these other systems in culture, but significantly changes the textual deployment of action in representation.

51. See Hitchcock 1974. Cf. Bellour (1979: 292-310) on the narrative turn here which reverses relations of patient/agent in the dominant actional chain.

52. See Duras 1979.

53. Heath 1981: 109.

54. To suggest that a certain conventional regime of narrativity in images (the text's structuration through the spectator's active expectation and construction) is foundering around this point in India Song is not to claim that the film does not propose a fiction through its images, sounds, speech. See the reading by Lyon 1980.

55. Duras' text cam thus be rather effectively situated as an avant-garde practice in Kristeva's terms, since this economic default of nameability shifts the relations between what Kristeva calls the 'semiotic' order (of heterogeneous flux) and the 'symbolic' (where thetic units are formed as homogeneous stases of the semiotic flux of signifiance). See Kristeva 1974: Sections I, III.

56. Ejxenbaum: "Inner speech must be taken into consideration in the very construction of a film" (1974: 14)--i.e., Ejxenbaum is implicitly relating spectatorship to the film as an economy of text and discourse (a 'construction').

SECTION 13: Analysis

Psycho

Choice

Take as an object of textual analysis and reading the Bakersfield car lot scene in Psycho.[1]

What would the rationale for the choice be?

The fragment from Psycho was chosen since it both seems intuitively to have a certain 'relative poverty'[2] and at the same time nonetheless forms a dense nexus of important problems for film theory--segmentation, alternation, closure, exchange, ideological interpellation, and scopic relations between the look, object, and desire. The argumentative claim implicit in this choice, for analysis, of a filmic fragment which seems figurationally impoverished has not always been understood. By contrast against a fragment of film which is strongly and obviously 'elaborated' passage (considering the film as a 'work' or spectacle), the arguing point turns on the analytic demonstration that complex figurational and discursive patterns form the text of even such a 'relatively' impoverished fragment, where the level of 'naturality' and reproductive representation might seem to be highest and most absolute.

The fragment of film in question can be clearly recognized as a scene, with punctuational optical dissolves and musical 'brackets' of the same musical motive, with full unity of diegetic place and time among its 47 shots, and with general unity of character. These factors establish a conventional unity and homogeneity for the scene as a large textual unit.

The fragment will be broached in terms of a series of six problems:

--subsegmentation;

--alternation;

--a large-scale figurative/diegetic trope;

--actional nomination as a micro-economy, with subsegmentation and alternation as determinants;[3]

--the film-work as ideological interpellation; and

--the disposition of the scopic register.

These problems, as an itinerary for analysis of the filmic text, form a sort of chiasmus, which in its turn tropes the course of analysis and reading. The two textual processes of subsegmentation and alternation are functioning in a thoroughly interlocked way throughout the scene. These can be traced as two formal networks of the text and figuration. They intersect at, and focus the next two problems: on the side of the <u>énoncé</u>, a large-scale trope in the <u>écriture</u> of the filmic text formed by the units of the two networks; and next, on the side of enunciation, the process of the actional nomination channelled by the two networks' unreeling and relation to narrative action. Then analysis moves in divergent directions, in order to <u>read</u> actively two instances/processes carrying heavier semantic weight: ideological interpellation and the play of the object and desire in the scopics of the scene. The 'ratio' of this crossing and divergent movement changes from a dominant of figuration over semantics (in the first three problems), to a parity of semantics with figuration (in the final three problems). Schematically the course of analysis and reading thus assumes this figure:



Codes and Analytic Table

An analytic table was prepared as a first stage of work. It functions not as an inert description of the filmic work on its own terms of communication, entertainment, and diegesis, but as an intervention, an active and analytic representation of the filmic text's network of relations and articulations. As such a specific representation of the filmic text, it can in its turn be manipulated as an instrument for divergent aims of analysis.

With the above-mentioned nexus of theoretical problems in aim, by trial I found these nine codes to be pertinent in an initial effort at subsegmentation, by virtue of their action in tracing the filmic texture of the scene. The abbreviations used for the codes are:

--CHR: a code of presence or absence of characters in image. Abbreviations used for characters are: M (Marion), P (patrolman), C (Charlie), and H (Charlie's mechanic-helper). When a single shot goes through phases of different dispositions pertinent to this code, these phases are indicated in left-to-right order, divided by slash marks.

--MVIEW: a code whose pertinence, for shots in which Marion is in the image track, is whether or not Marion is being viewed by the patrolman:

+ indicates she is, - not. (This code does not indicate point-of-view shots for the patrolman.)

--MVISION: a code of 'Marion's vision': this code delineates whether or not a shot figures Marion's point-of-view vision (+) or not (-).

--ST: a code of presence or absence of a character's speech in the dialogues on the sound track (for character abbreviations, see CHR code; 'silence', marked 0 on the table, will therefore indicate absence of speech, not of noise or music).

--MUS: a code of the presence or absence of music on the sound track.

--FRM: a code of camera framing, provisional specified as: long shot (LS), medium shot (MS), close shot (CS). Phases are marked, as with the CHR code.

--TOS: a comparative code of the duration of shots (by comparison to the duration of the preceding shot): + substantially longer, 0 roughly equal, or - shorter.

--S/M: a code of camera movement: static camera (S), mobile camera during the shot (M).

--ANG: a code of camera angle: 0, flat angle; HA, high angle; LA, low angle.

The analytic table formed by this grid of codes is given on the following pages.

Analytic table

SHOTS	CODES								
	CHR	MVIEW	MVISION	ST	MUS	FRM	TOS	S/M	ANG
1	O	-	+	O	+	LS	-	(M)	O
2	M	-	-	O	+	CS	O	S	O
3	O	-	+	O	+	LS	-	(M)	O
4	M	-	-	O	+	CS	O	S	O
5	(M)	-	-	O	+	LS	+	S	O
6	M/CM/M	-	-	C	+	LS	+	S	O
7	M	-	-	O	+	LS	-	S	O
8	O	-	+	O	+	CS	-	S	HA
9	M	-	-	O	+	LS	O	S	O
10	O	-	+	O	+	CS	O	S	HA
11	M	-	-	O	+	LS	+	M	O
12	O	-	+	O	+	CS	-	M	HA
13	M	-	-	O	+	LS	+	M	O
14	M	-	-	O	+	LS/MS/CS	+	M	O
15	P	-	-	O	+	LS	-	S	O
16	M	+	-	O	+	LS	-	S	O
17	P	-	-	O	+	LS	+	S	O
18	M	+	-	O	+	LS	O	S	O
19	P	-	-	O	+	LS	O	S	O
20	M/CM	+	-	CM	+	MS	+	M	O
21	P	-	+	C	O	LS	-	S	O
22	CM/M	+	-	C	O	MS	+	M	O
23	M	+	-	O	O	MS	-	S	O
24	P	-	+	O	O	LS	O	S	O
25	M/CM	+	-	CM	O	MS	+	M	O
26	M(C)	+	-	M	O	CS	-	S	O
27	C(M)	+	-	C	O	CS	O	S	O
28	M(C)	+	-	CM	O	CS	+	S	O
29	C(M)	+	-	C	O	CS	-	S	O
30	M(C)	+	-	CM	O	CS	+	S	O
31	C(M)	+	-	O	O	CS	-	S	O
32	M(C)	+	-	O	O	CS	O	S	O
33	C(M)	+	-	C	O	CS	O	S	O
34	M(C)	+	-	CM	O	CS	O	S	O

SHOTS	CODES CHR	MVIEW	MVISION	ST	MUS	FRM	TOS	S/M	ANG
35	C(M)	+	-	C	0	CS	0	M	0
36	P	-	+	0	0	LS	-	M	0
37	CM/0	+	-	0	0	CS	+	M	0
38	MC	+	-	C	0	LS	0	M	0
39	M	-	-	0	+	MS	+	S	HA
40	0	-	+	0	+	CS	-	S	HA
41	M	-	-	0	+	MS	+	S	HA
42	C/CM	+	-	CM	+	MS	+	S	0
43	P	-	+	C	0	LS	-	S	0
44	CM/0	+	-	C	0	MS	+	M	0
45	P	-	-	0	0	LS	+	S	0
46	0/P/PM/ PMC/PMCH/ M	+	-	H	0	LS/CS	+	M	HA
47	PMC(H)/ PMCH/PCH	+	-	M	+	LS	0	S	LA

ONE: Subsegmentation as a Variable Operation

Bellour has noted that subsegmentation "theoretically has no true end."[4] Therefore, the key point of an effort at subsegmentation lies in the choice of level of subsegmentation--the 'grain,' so to speak, of the articulation. This choice is made against the pull of the scene's figuration of itself as a unified homogeneity in narrative terms (because of its 'natural flow') on the level of the work, and against the drive of analysis to break out, in counter-intuitive fashion, the most effective textual relations for use in other critical contexts. And therefore the interest which this essay in subsegmentation holds, for film analysts trying to put into action the various means of film theory and criticism pioneered in France, lies in the relatively large ensemble of codes deployed, and in the effort to go to a new limit in the use of the analytic table formed by their array. A 'limit' in the sense that, in confronting the table, and in shuttling from the table as a representation to the filmic scene in its unreeling, one is pushing much closer to a limit of ability to intuitively discover the patterns of coded articulations in the tabular representation of the text. In doing this, a division of the scene into nine subsegments was achieved. All the codes enter into the découpage, and each division is formed by at least several codes. Each of the nine units still has a relative autonomy vis-à-vis the others both on the formal level and the diegetic level.[5]

The Nine Subsegments

The nine subsegments are:

I shots 1-5
II shots 6-13
III shots 14-20
IV shots 20-25
V shots 25-35
VI shots 35-38
VII shots 39-41
VIII shots 42-45
IX shots 46-47

Notice that some of the subsegments overlap; the status of these overlapping shots (or phases of shots) will be elaborated in the 'itinerary' of the subsegmentation.

Subsegment I (1-5): This subsegment is defined by the presence of the distinctive musical theme until the end of shot 5 (MUS code); there is no speech (ST code); it has a unifying alternational pattern (MVISION, FRM, CHR codes) which, although continued from the preceding moment in the film, is distinctive in that there is no one to be seen (CHR) in alternation with Marion's looks.

Subsegment II (6-13): Shot 6 breaks off from subsegment I due to the new CHR presence (Charlie), the first speech (ST code: Charlie's greeting to Marion); its (very) long duration (TOS code), it is a long shot instead of a close shot like the ones preceding it in the alternational rhythm beforehand (shots 2 and 4) (FRM code), and at the end of shot 6 a different musical theme comes up on the sound track after Charlie speaks (MUS code). In shots 6 and 7 of this subsegment, the alternational pattern from subsegment I stops, then picks up again--but

in reversing the patterns on the FRM/MVISION codes: here, what Marion's look finds is seen in close shots, whereas in subsegment I her object of vision was in long shot. The new pattern of the alternation (which begins to add, in turn, new patterns such as the high-angle shots, on the ANG code, to other rhythms of codes such as CHR) makes subsegment II cohere as a recognizable unit. The musical theme and absence of speech (MUS, ST codes) provide a supplementary thread of cohesion; against this cohesion, the factor of camera movement from shot 11 on does not seem heavy enough to justify separate status.

Subsegment III (14-20): Shot 14 breaks away from subsegment II by the halt of alternation marked on the MVISION, ANG, and CHR codes. The camera movement (S/M code) characterizing the end of subsegment II is carried on partially in shot 14, but the shot is static at its end. Then, this subsegment gains its cohesion from the FRM code (all long shots until shot 20), from the MUS code (a new theme plays on until the end of shot 20, the end of the subsegment), and principally, by the new alternation which is instituted after 'skipping a beat' in shot 14: the alternation with the patrolman's look (MVIEW, CHR and TOS codes--the shots of the patrolman are shorter in duration--constituting this alternational pattern). Given this alternational emphasis on looking, the absence of speech on the ST code also underlines, in an important way, the binding of the subsegment until shot 20, which overlaps into the next subsegment.

Shot 20: Diegetically, this shot begins by fitting into the flow of subsegment III: Marion walks left with the papers she has purchased

and has been examining throughout subsegment III. At the start of shot 20, she is alone in frame (CHR code), this too placing the shot on the side of subsegment III in terms of the CHR code throughout that subsegment. But just as a camera motion to the right in shot 14 sets up the spatial relations for the static-shot alternation of subsegment II, the camera track to the left here (S/M code) in shot 20 breaks away from that unit and initiates a new, fourth subsegment: by reintroducing Charlie (CHR, ST codes) and by ending the musical theme (MUS code) before he speaks, an ordered transition is elaborated into a new subsegment, in which the alternation pivoting around vision will diegetically move among three actants. The precise movement of the transition could be found in the middle of shot 20 when Marion looks off and sees the patrolman--so that in shot 21 the MVISION code can 'reciprocate' the MVIEW code.

Subsegment IV (20-25): The A/B/A/B alternation with the figure of the patrolman continues from subsegment III, anchored by the CHR and FRM codes (and partly by the action of the S/M code: shots of the patrolman are always static). But it takes a little formal construction for the alternation to take over its three terms. After Marion's look to the patrolman in shot 20, shot 22 separates the Marion-Charlie pair, leaving her alone in frame; her looking (and by implication, Charlie's not seeing the patrolman) is emphasized by a separate shot, 23, which puts the rhythm back one shot/beat. The loss of consistency in rhythm is matched by the figurational gain: shots 23 and 24 are a

'perfectly' matched set of looking shots--from Marion to the patrolman, and vice versa. Shot 25 begins to break up this crystalized formation of the scopics: Marion is alone at the start, in a camera setup nearly matching shot 23, but camera movement (S/M code) goes left to draw Charlie back into frame (as he returns from the task of giving her car over to the helper for a test drive). It is these new patterns on the MVISION, CHR, and FRM (medium shots, instead of the long shots of subsegment III) which give subsegment IV its identity.

Shot 25: The ending of shot 25 overlaps into subsegment V, since at the end when it becomes a two-shot with Charlie and Marion, it serves as an establishing shot for the formally conventional setups of subsegment V (S/M code: the pan and track left; CHR code: Charlie's reentry into the shot).

Subsegment V (25-35): A glance at the analytic table suffices to demonstrate that, in the block uniformity of the codes, this is the most homogenous subsegment of the scene, formed by 'straight dialogue' setups and editing. The alternation between the setups of Charlie and Marion (on the CHR code)--the alternation to the patrolman ceasing through this unit--is the leading thread of cohesion. Changes between shots are 'motivated' on the diegetic plane by stresses in the dialogue about the sale of the car.

Shot 35: A camera movement is the dividing force inside the duration of this shot, making a bridge between subsegments V and VI as it shifts

the scenic space, cutting off the homogeneity of subsegment V by breaking the series of static close shots with character and camera movement (S/M code).

Subsegment VI (35-38): The movement which marks the end of subsegment V also brings a coherence and continuity to the sixth subsegment. Shots 35, 36, and 37 have a track-right camera movement to hold Marion and Charlie in frame as they walk to the office (S/M code). The alternation to the patrolman is reestablished in shot 36 (CHR code), but with the difference that this mobile subjective shot for Marion 'matches' the diegetic character's movement and vision of the patrolman--a unique conjunction of the MVISION, CHR, and S/M codes throughout the scene, which in large part constitutes the separate identity of this short subsegment. The ending of the subsegment works in phases. In shot 37, Marion and Charlie walk off frame right (CHR code); in shot 38, a static shot now (S/M code), Marion and Charlie move into frame, and separate. On the ST code the play of question-and-response brackets the subsegment: in the first shot of the subsegment, Marion asks for a rest room; the middle two shots, silent (modulating the 'sensorium' to focus fully on the visual track and the represented play of looks); the final shot, Charlie points and speaks to give Marion a direction.

Subsegment VII (39-41): This subsegment, perhaps just as much as subsegment V, is marked off quite distinctively by the codes' articulations: Marion is not under the view of the patrolman (MVIEW

code); there is a new alternation, in a minimum point of view cell of three shots, with an object, the cash (CHR, MVISION, FRM codes); the ANG code is uniformly marked; and a different musical motif (the "Temptation" theme) plays to give unity to these shots (MUS code).

Subsegment VIII (42-45): This subsegment, against the contrast of its preceding unit, marks itself off by the final return of the alternation to the patrolman (CHR, FRM codes), and by the action of his look (MVIEW code).

Subsegment IX (46-47): This concluding subsegment introduces a wholly new formal configuration into the scene, and this assures its status as a separable unit and as a conclusion. First, there is an unusually complex series of phases in the CHR code: into shot 46, at first absent of characters in image, arrive the patrolman, Marion, then Charlie, then the helper. Next, the camera movement and character movement (Marion begins to drive out) leave Marion alone in the frame. In shot 47, Marion moves out of frame to leave the image to the line of men watching her depart (CHR code is joined by the FRM and S/M codes to produce this figuration). The high/low angle setups of the two shots are a distinctive conjunction of articulations on the ANG code, for a second factor. Third, the end of shot 47 is a kind of condensed culmination of the work of the MVIEW code through the scene, since in no other shot have the men been together (CHR code), united in the action of looking at Marion, the "wrong one" (as Charlie's voice will later say), as she leaves. This unique formation of the codes' traits in the

representation of action--which was initiated by a hailing voice from off screen (the helper, in shot 46), an effect playing the ST code off against the CHR code--gives itself to be a distinctive knotting together of some of the most 'loaded' strands of the scene's figuration, providing these shots subsegmental autonomy and the scene a perceptible effect of closure.

TWO: Alternation and the Object

Discussing the subsegmentation of the scene, we have crossed again and again the work of alternation as an active force in the scene's figuration. The most effective pertinence for a découpage of alternational phases and patterns is the status of the object, with the full sense that this term assumes in the psychoanalytic theory. The formal 'motivation' for shifts in the alternational process concern the object, relations to the object, and the chain of images/shots as a a signifying chain which is placing subjects (diegetic characters, 'empty' discursive subject-positions, and the looking spectator) in relation to objects. Thus this analysis ineluctably begins moving along the lines of analysis to be fully developed in the sixth topic of the series, by turning attention to the scene's figurational disposition as a scopic field (the relations of object, look, and desire).

The alternational network is formed by these phases:

Prior phase: From early in the film's narrative, up to the beginning of the car lot scene, the major alternational texture of the film has

been constituted and governed by an object feared: the look of an employer or a patrolman, the possible knowledge in that look of Marion's action of theft, of her guilt. Immediately preceding the car lot scene is a very sustained alternation between Marion's look, and an image in her rear-view mirror of the patrolman's car following her--which finally, seemingly, turns away onto another diverging road.

First phase: When the car lot scene opens, the rhythm of that alternation with the patrolman (his look) is continued in shots 1-5. Hence, to a large degree, these shots still form, on that pertinence, a supersegment with the preceding sequence. But here the terms of alternation have changed: in shots 1 and 3 (figured as Marion's point of view), there is no danger to be seen (the threatening look is absent). This absence is functioning zero value[6] rather than an irrelevant blank; this is an orchestrated toning down of the pressure and grip on the spectator achieved in the long prior sequence, on the road, with alternation between Marion's look and the patrolman. First the patrolman 'drops out' as a term in the alternation, and then, as the car lot scene begins, the drivingly tense musical theme associated with the 'chase' by him is attenuated, then falls silent. No alternation is begun when Charlie puts in his first, brief appearance in the image; as a diegetic element, he has no privilege yet relative to figuration.

Second phase: Instead, the alternation picks up in subsegment II with the car license plates (shots 8, 10, 12)--the two California plates (8, 12) are metonymies for a figuring a desired escape, from a dangerous

identity and public visibility, figured as metonymy by Marion's own license plate (10)--the visible partial trace of herself in her identity as a 'suspicious character', as determined in the roadside scene during which the patrolman looks at the license plate (figured in close-up) and writes it down.

Third phase: The figuration shifts into a new phase by the irruption of the other's look, the feared object, sliding along a further and more abstract metonymy, in the form of a pseudo-causality. A certain patrolman has looked at Marion's license plate in the diegetic past; Marion subsequently looks at license plates; 'hence', in a artificial syllogism, the same patrolman now reappears. The patrolman's look returns and inserts itself again into the alternational chain (shots 15, 17, 19, 21, 24, and so on), but whereas the terms are the same, now the relations of the alternation differ. This repetition varies the diegetic terms of the alternation as a figurative pattern/process, since now Marion does not know she is being looked at. Her participation in the the scopic alternation is privative, and she is figured as blinded by her object of vision; her status is marked as a non-knowing until the end of subsegment IV. Her look at the newspaper (the plausibly named action: searching for news of herself, her crime) metaphorizes this un-knowing status in the face of the object. For his part, the patrolman does not plausibly know fully of Marion's guilt, but in no way does this aspect form a symmetry or balance with Marion's non-knowing of his look at her--his non-reciprocal scopic privilege suffices to carry the force and weight of his threat.

Fourth phase: Now the alternation takes on a triangular schema of terms (Marion--patrolman--Charlie: their looks, their knowledge) through a redoubling of alternation: between the patrolman and the two others, and between Marion and Charlie. In subsegment V, the alternation is worked not by single shots of each term (as with Marion and the patrolman), but instead by two symmetrically balanced camera setups (angled toward Marion or Charlie), as the purchase is negotiated. A reciprocity of looks links Marion and Charlie, but not a reciprocity of knowledge: a major tension forms around Marion's glances into off-screen space right, out towards the patrolman. Thus Charlie has taken over Marion's position of un-knowing, until subsegment VI when Charlie finally looks off and sees the patrolman. His epistemological position there is doubled, too, precisely by the scopic structure of the scene's figuration and alternation: he does not see, does not know of the patrolman's look, nor of the illicit status of Marion as a buyer (with stolen cash) even though he sees her (his look at her receives especial figurational emphasis, for example, in the dialogue silence of shot 31).

Fifth phase: Even when, in subsegment VI, Charlie does look to the patrolman, and a subjective point-of-view shot of the patrolman is figured for Charlie (shot 36)--thus completing the triangle of looks as an alienating mutural relation--, the alternation between Marion and Charlie is not figured by isolating them into individual shots. That 'strong' format of alternation (enunciation of the text) is reserved

for the patrolman and his look vis-à-vis his objects of vision; Marion and Charlie continue to 'share' the figurational space/frame of the shot. The filmic discourse thus reveals obliquely its standard and strategy for assigning figurational dominance and privilege.

Sixth phase: Subsegment VII stands out in the way it arrests the sort of scopic alternation (between different 'human characters') which has been elaborated in preceding subsegments; it breaks the tension built up around those looks. In achieving this effect against the context of the preceding alternational chain, the subsegment itself as a phase is formed as a minimum cell of alternation, a classically formed point-of-view triad of shots, around the object at which the patrolman's questioning look has been--logically, abstractly, but quite palpably--aimed: the stolen cash (shot 40).

Seventh phase: Finally, in shot 46, all the terms of alternation are restated and elaborated into a single shot, into a slow unfolding of entries and exits from the visual frame: multiple phases within shots. The high angle shot looks down into the office area. In the shot's first phase, the frame is empty of characters. Then the patrolman's car enters, and he emerges to look. Marion comes out from the office, and exchanges looks with him. As she starts the new car to leave, Charlie comes out and exchanges looks with the patrolman. In the background, the helper arrives in Marion's old car, and gets out. The camera follows Marion's car as she drives out of the lot, isolating her in frame, and leaving the three men off screen. Just before the shot

ends, a male voice is heard to shout "Hey!", and Marion suddenly stops. The process of alternation has now been displaced from an inter-shot level of operation; it has taken over the CHR code to produce alternational phases within the duration of the shot: Marion is left alone in frame at the end of shot 46 under the men's looks, and she is moved out of frame by the shot/setup change for shot 47 so that this final shot of the scene 'alternates' the frame back to the three looking men, standing in a row, in low angle. The structure of the alternational enunciation of the text (a configuration of successive shots, the CHR code, looks, eyelines, space, timing) undergoes profound modification, while Marion is preserved and 'culminated' in the position of object for the men's looks, the enunciational work, and spectatorship. Across the textual and diegetic space of the scene, this conclusive effect works as a massive reversal of the opening of the scene, where Marion's vision, 'alone', was staged as the spectator's 'shared' scopic access to the figuration.

THREE: Trope

Next, consider a trope across the scene, formed as large-scale textual/diegetic pattern by the filmic writing (écriture filmique).[8] This tropic configuration is produced by the articulation of units (the subsegments) on the 'formal' level,[9] and by the inter-unit rhymes[10] on the diegetic level between those subsegmental units. The relation of 'rhyming' depends upon semantic complexes, but the specific relation is of transformation, reversal, multiplication, repetition.

--The first subsegment rhymes with the ninth in terms of a man's look (the patrolman's) at Marion, a look distinctively absent in the scene's opening (by contrast to the highway sequence preceding the scene), or multiply present--multiplied, shared, and staged with the line of the three men at the end.

--The second rhymes with the eighth in terms of fake or substitutive objects and identities, stolen and exchanged, objects seen alone in close-up framing: the license plates, the substitute identity and anonymity they promise to her look, and, in the final agreement to buy the car when the salesman wonders if Marion's car is stolen, an improper or false object-of-exchange, it is her cash which is of false value.

--The third and seventh subsegments rhyme around looks and the unseen crime: Marion looks intently through the newspaper she's purchased, but cannot see anything about her crime nor can she see the patrolman's look at her, and in the seventh subsegment the spectator is privileged to see what the patrolman's and salesman's looks cannot see, the object of guilt and crime, the cash.

--In the fourth and sixth subsegments, the rhyme is formed by the discovery of the patrolman's look: Marion looks off and sees his look, the salesman does so in turn later as they walk back to the office.

Subsegment five, the dialogue about the car purchase, is the most homogenous subsegment of all, a conventionally constructed exchange of balanced setups; as such, it serves well as an island around which these rhymes are laid.

Now this textual figure of folding rhymes and repetitions has a name--it is a palindrome, palindromic construction[11]--and what is most striking here is that a textual analysis can demonstrate that a filmic scene--a unit which Hollywood cinema strove to present as a natural dramatic unity experienced as such--is being constructed to possess that naturality by way of a trope, an 'artful' figure, usually known as a verbal trope. Textual study of a filmic fragment thus offers the possibility of enriching a general rhetoric or tropology across 'languages', media, or signifying systems in culture.

Sketching these rhymes, indicating by arrows their action by retroaction, produces this schema:



The function of the trope in the enunciational unreeling of the scene lies, without a doubt, in what Bellour identifies as "a particular arrangement. . . profoundly characteristic of the American cinema. The progressive relationship [between symmetry and closure, and dissymmetry and opening] . . . seems to resolve itself within each unit of narration . . . by means of a suspension and folding effect, as if to allow the segment to close back upon itself more effectively and to leave to the new fold the problem of unrolling new elements."[12] The unconscious relational interplay of the palindromic formation

assures the dynamics of this effect of circulation, circular folding back and knotting as resolution. It is even aided, by a feature which one could further describe as as an 'embedded', or 'bracketing' trope within the palindrome. The rhyme between the first and the ninth subsegments can be precisely characterized as a palinode--as negating, revoking reversal (of Marion's scopic privilege, her mastery of the look). In this effect, filmic textuality makes itself one time moreover be conceived as a volumetric depth of weaves and operations.

FOUR: Nomination

The car lot scene presents a number of aspects of interest relative to the theoretical model sketched out in Section 12. In particular, the scene figures a good deal of its action in (verbal) silence, so that actional nomination proceeds by way of action in image without anterior or simultaneous verbal determination in dialogue. Thus the scene also resembles, in a good share, the three filmic fragments discussed at the end of Section 12.

However, the figuration of the scene, its textuality, demand a particular change of focus from the one in which those three exemplary fragments were treated. Here, instead of the textual unit of the shot, the larger textual networks formed by subsegmentation and alternation need to be taken into account as a force proposing, confirming, or upsetting the nameable intelligibility of action and actional schemas in the enunciation of the filmic text.

In a general and superficial view, the scene does not immediately call nameability into question, by, for instance, the sort of direct strategies of temporal pacing of actional figuration, as were examined in the trio of examples at the end of Section 12. Overall the car lot scene's discourse and figuration produce a quite legible actional schema.

Nonetheless, a number of particular operations around actional nomination, related to the movement of subsegmentation and alternation, hold interest for close analysis.

(1) Transition and establishment of a new actional program: The dominant programs established at the end of the highway sequence preceding the car lot scene could be labelled 'escaping' (from the patrolman's surveillance) and 'arriving' (to join Marion's lover, Sam). The diegetic disappearance of the patrolman (who appears to drive away on a different road), and the figurationally obvious change to a new large discursive unit (signalled by a dissolve, the pictured roadside sign naming a new location) generate, for the spectator, a certain number of cognitive 'tasks' at this enunciational switchpoint. How is the change to a new unit of the film, and the elaboration of a new nameable actional schema to be effectuated? The action in image which concludes subsegment I (in shot 5: the car turns off the boulevard) offers a rather fine-grained determination of action: 'stopping the car (as an initial phrase in what schema of action?)'. Subsegment II determines that action by proposing the functional identity of the

place, and by introducing another actional agent--but any spoken verbal labelling, by its use of alternation, point of view, and metonymy (without, for example, a plausible and possible verbal specification from Marion to Charlie identifying herself as someone about to buy a car). Subsegment I determines a new location for action (one from which the patrolman's look is absent); subsegment II takes up the small action at the end of the first subsegment and determines it as the overture of a socially well determined, large-scale actional schema of 'car purchasing'. The spectator can thus take part in the progressive integration of actions into a legible schema, as a semblance of 'private' activity on the spectator's part 'without' redundant verbal labelling in diegetic dialogue). The spectatorial 'intimacy' with Marion (as a foundation of identification through actional nomination) is furthered by the spectator's work ('on his/her own') of supplying, through referential stereotypes, of the motive and rationale of her 'decision' to trade cars. In this movement by the filmic discourse of unfold a new, subordinate actional schema, the discourse of the film enunciates the actions by way of Marion's look (at the license plates), so that the spectator's scopic participation in that look supplementarily confirms her diegetic 'mastery' by this particular figuration of the look and action.

In a second and further instance of this problem of establishing new schemas of action, the filmic discourse seems to produce a sort of embedded space, a figurational and diegetic 'enclave' inside which the patrolman's presence and surveillance irrupts, but <u>without</u> immediate

impact on the prior schema of 'purchasing' which has been interrupted and suspended in its unreeling. This is achieved by subsegment III. Marion obtains a paper and reads it; the spectator looks for a semantic and schematic integration of this action not in the schema of 'purchasing', but of a hierarchically higher schema of 'escaping': she is reading to find out what is known or published of her crime, as information pertinent to her choice of action. Thus this action marks in figurative terms (space, CHR code) the opening parenthesis a certain enclave, as a suspension of the 'purchasing' schema.

It is inside that schematic enclave that the patrolman's return and look and look irrupt into the figuration, with its effects--immediately, a major 'thrill' of the scene, and the effect of ('Hitchcockian') suspense for the remaining duration of the scene. The force of that irruption depends, at least in part, on the nameably similar actional programs--the law looks at the criminal looking for the reported crime.[12] (That her look evidently finds nothing seals this abyme with an irony of ignorance.) Then, as Marion and Charlie take up the 'purchasing' actional schema again, the spectator, as a relay-point in establishing actional schemas by nomination, is positioned 'divisively' against the contexts and modes of schematic unreeling.

(2) The spectator as a relay in nomination: As subsegments IV and V unfold the spectator's place, as an active relay for different actional schemas, the spectator is placed under a divisive stress. The spectator's activity is multiple, constructing and reading actional

intelligibility through nomination, from/for various diegetic positions, that of Marion, Charlie, and the patrolman (without necessarily occupying an diegetic actant's imaginary optical point-of-view position).[13] As the scene's narrative action develops, this division occurs as the spectator must register the divergence and stress between characters' 'positions' (an imaginary bundle: understanding, goals, feelings). The car lot scene holds interest, not only because of the play of scopic relations (looks and enigmas of looks seen and unseen, with their results of knowledge and power), but as a particular case in which the multiple paces of unreeling of actional schemas, the pace of appearance--or non-appearance, non-manifestation--of nameable phases of a schema, carry a good deal of the effects (suspense, satisfaction) produced by the scene a spectacle for spectators. On one hand, the patrolman's schema becomes troubling, not a little unnameable, because there is no nameable <u>progress</u> of phases of action. In shots 19, 21, 24, 36, 43, he continues to stand, leaning against his car, without changing position, fixedly looking.[14] The effect of uncanny threat produced for his figure has its basis in the figuration of action, and the norms by which spectators process narrative action as nameable phases of a schema. 'Between' the patrolman and Charlie, through subsegments IV and V, Marion's program of 'purchasing' a car continues quite nameably, but also (for the spectator's judgment) 'futilely'. Furthermore, her actional project is only momentarily masked from Charlie's discovery of the patrolman, and that discovery's diegetic consequences. Now the spectator's preconstructed knowledge of nameable

phases and 'strategic' protocol of the schema of 'car purchasing' allows for the legible meaning and effect of tension which the spectator must relay through Charlie's position: even though he offers time for consideration and a test drive of the car, Marion declines these, accepts his first price bid, asks him for haste, and so on. The effect and meaning of this narrative development is operated through the spectator, who is placed and 'torn' between the three actants and two actional schemas: the patrolman's schema (of 'surveillance'), which has no movement through recognizable phases, and on Marion's side, the 'purchasing' schema which is nameably unfolding, but from Charlie's position, which is also moving so quickly that its 'nameability' becomes uncertain and troublesome (he asks "Somebody chasin' you?" and asks if she can prove ownership of her car). The spectator is 'torn' between an enunciational difficulty tied to the patrolman, and the diegetic difficulty to be read in the activity of Marion and Charlie. The spectator's pleasure in this dramatic and narrative suspense is produced via nomination, as a pleasurable tension between these imaginary/fictive positions of and for intelligibility and naming which the spectator shares in the multiple movement of actional nomination in inner speech.

(3) Nameable determination: The scene's figuration can also be examined to extrapolate the filmic discourse's economic choices. The actional schema of 'purchasing' is so heavily determined that the choices--to include the phase of counting the cash, and to omit the transfer of cash and ownership papers inside Charlie's office--can be

interrogated as economic dispositions of narrative into figuration. A plausible economic rationale would be that the omitted action does not diminish the nameable intelligibility of action so fully built up by that (late) point in the schema, whereas on the other hand, the included action with the cash still offers a certain economic potential for figuration, as a significant and effective juxtaposition (the cash seen in close up, the privacy of the bathroom space shielded from the patrolman's look) to the preceding action of subsegments VI and VI, largely staged in a chain of 'talking head'-format close shots and close ups, all implicitly under the patrolman's off-screen look according to the imaginary space of action and vision.

Excursus: Nameability and Identification

Much stress has been laid on the way in which the film elicits and maintains identification with the figure of Marion in its first long narrative movement from Phoenix to the motel sequence. Analysis of the car lot scene within the frame of actional nomination demonstrates the channel of access, through participation in nameable action, organized to further an identificational relation of the spectator to Marion (as actant) and her action, whereas the spectatorial relation to other actants and action is barred or resisted by the difficulty, produced in figuration, of naming. Identification with Marion is not furthered by immmediate, unmediated reference to her figure as 'character' or 'person',[15] but chiefly by her implication within action and its nameable/unnameable disposition. Actional nameability therefore deser-

ves more attention, as a feature of filmic figuration and spectatorship, supporting and determining identification as a spectator-to-text relation in the enunciational flow of film.

FIVE: Film-work as Ideological Interpellation

> How are the forms in the 'imaginary' relation [of ideology] generated? . . . The forms of the 'imaginary' cannot arise spontaneously from the subject (that would convert recognition into imagination and restore the constitutive subject), equally, they cannot be given by 'reality' (that would restore a simple reflections theory). The forms of the 'imaginary' should, if these positions are to be avoided, have the status of significations, representations which are reducible neither to a represented which is beyond them, nor to an origin in a subject, but are effects of the action of means of representation. Such a conception makes the very notion of 'representation' problematic. This raises the question of the determinants of those means, of their signifying action, and of the relation of the subject to them. These questions challenge the functional necessity of the effects of the 'imaginary'.
>
> --Hirst[16]

The problem of the patrolman's actional schema as uncertainty, as a schema with uncertain and unnameable development, calls attention again to the film-work of the scene's concluding subsegment. Consider these two final shots of the scene: here what is figured is someone, an individual, moving in space (the camera pan left leaves her alone in the visible space of the frame) when a voice, an unidentifiable male voice, calls out "Hey!" from the off-screen space out of view. Marion and her car are arrested, she stops and turns her head back 180° towards the hailing voice. A new shot shows the three men and their look, and the CHR code intensifies this emphasis after Marion leaves

the visual frame, leaving them on screen looking. The conclusive shock and thrill of the scene as effects onto the spectator seem conclusively linked to these moves of filmic figuration and text.

In proposing a theoretical model of the action of ideology, quite outside of film study, Althusser was drawn to offer a 'spatial model', a sequence of events in space. Ideology transforms individuals into subjects (in the law, education, religion, military, and so on), he claims, by an operation of interpellation or hailing: a small 'theatre' of ideology as imaginary formation, structured in its action around public space, a voice, and an openly addressed call:

> I shall then suggest that ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among individuals (it recruits them all), or 'transforms' individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: "Hey, you there!" Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn around. By this mere 180° physical conversion, s/he becomes a subject. Why? Because s/he has recognized that the hail was 'really' addressed to him/her, and that 'it was really him who hailed' (and not someone else). Experience shows that the practical telecommunication of hailings is such that they hardly ever miss their (wo)man: verbal call or whistle, the one hailed always recognizes that it really him/her who is being hailed. And yet it is a strange phenomenon, and one which cannot be explained solely by guilt feelings', despite the large numbers who 'have something on their consciences'. Naturally for the convenience and clarity of my little theoretical theatre I have had to present things in the form of a sequence, with a before and after, and thus in the form of a temporal succession. There are individuals walking along. Somewhere (usually behind them) the hail rings out: "Hey, you there!" One individual (nine times out of ten it is the right one) turns around, believing/suspecting/knowing that it is for him/her, i.e., recognizing that 'it is really s/he' who is meant by the hailing. But in reality these things happen without any succession. The existence of ideology and the hailing of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing.[17]

A hailing voice and a turn in space produce a renewed recognition of an imaginary status in ideology: the guilty legal subject before the apparatus of the law (incarnated in the figure of the patrolman, who never reappears in the film, being 'used up' in this ideological function[18]). The filmic discourse of Psycho forms its text and figuration of this instance of diegetic action rather literally so as to re-produce the same Althusserian model of ideological action in aural and visual space. Notice that, in the play of the aural/visual, the hailing voice from off-screen space thereby has no identifying traits to ascribe it a particular man off-screen--but that this the vocal interpellation has an evident and quite recognizable effect and efficacy, for the female diegetic character and for the spectator. In figuring the textual bars of the shot-change and frame in this way for the visual and aural, the filmic discourse works ideology by the agency of the split.[19] Not a 'reflection' (according to the conventions of Marxist aesthetic theory), this discursive strategy and staging of the film are a re-production whose interest lies in their specific binding or hold onto the watching and listening spectator, achieved by the whole range of textual factors partly or fully specific to film (framing, cutting, characters in/out of frame, voice off, subject movement within frame, and so on). This conjunction of social, technical, and psychological features--sexual difference, narrative lures, the filmic-textual array of the divided text, voice and its authority--form the 'gears' of the apparatus, its socially useful and achieved work and effect,[20] and the possibility of its overdetermining

effect, within the filmic fiction of the énoncé, and and for the spectator within the enunciational circuit. The shouted "Hey!" is 'over-addressed' to the spectator's place,[21] to the imaginary/symbolic 'filmic body' which the spectator loans into the film.[22]

The film-work, in Kuntzel's sense, is at this instant/instance given over to the work of an ideological apparatus, and it is precise to say that this apparatus is fully at work with the spectator, through the cutting, the aural space as related to and divided from the framed visual space--all this in ways which textual analysis can delineate more powerfully than other modes of film study. The task of ideological criticism can thus be carried forward by focussing not exclusively on the fiction or statements (énoncés) which the film delivers, but on the textual and figurational patterns of signifiers, relations of vision and sound, framing and staging which dissimulate into effective communciation ideologies of sexual difference, desire, marriage, familial relations, guilt, and violence.

The hailing is the final turn of an over-turning. Consider the play of 'mythologies' (Barthes[23]) woven into the roles of the participants of the car trade-in and purchase. The cliché of the used-car salesman, even his toponym 'California Charlie'--made explicit in dialogue ("I think you'd better take it for a trial spin. Don't want any bad word of mouth about California Charlie.")--so it plays against the woman and her desire-in-demand to the man, under the species of the mythology of the woman as inept consumer in the auto marketplace, ignorant even of the basic precautions and self-defenses (Charlie urges

the trial drive of the car on her) for protecting herself, her interests, her value (money) in exchange. Thus the imaginary positions for the players in the symbolic exchange are discursively re-constructed (with a vraisemblance out of continuity of diegesis: the scene plays Marion's 'character' as previously constructed in the scenes at the Phoenix real estate office, her legal and commercial knowledge about ownership, legal titles and papers, etc.), and discursively pre-constructed (the culturally 'available' mythology of the used-car salesman, which the film 'picks up' for use) to provide for the marked and palpable sensation of overturning of cliché when Marion argues, hurries, even 'bullies' Charlie into making the sale immediately. The effective power marked on the side of the woman's figure and action remains a tactic of the discourse, a phase of discourse's strategy for figuration and diegetic unreeling, a semantic determination will be ultimately and brutally recouped from her at the motel scene and her 'fatal errors' there. The anonymity aimed at by her desire, in her demand to buy a different auto, is then figured as the token which operates her victimization.[24] Retrospectively, then, the film's discourse revokes her power and mastery as figured in the car lot scene, annuls it as only an incidental moment or effect motivated by her diegetic desire for her lover and a marriage.

The ideological interpellation recoups this play of mythologies by its superior power as an instance/agency, which--

--shifts and arranges the figuration (aural, visual sensoria, the staging of action relative to their division, and the effective

power of man's [men's] look[s] over woman's speech) in order to draw a new legal set of subject definitions, both in the diegetic énoncé (California Charlie takes the position of a 'victim', 'protected' by the patrolman, who stands across from Marion as 'guilty criminal'), and

--in the enunciation where, for the spectator, fiction becomes Law, in the sense that the spectator must read the meaning and effect of the narrative and figurative turn as a legal definition, or resolution, or the fiction's semantic terms, a flux of meanings, into a clear division and assignment of status.

The filmic subject/spectator thus "appropriates" (Macherey/Balibar[25]) a particular form of social ideology of law, crime, and property relations of ownership. The spectator's terms of access, through Marion, through her vision, speech, and actional schema (with goals), and therefore, all the spectator's prior psychic expenditure and investment in the film and fiction, is thus brought into a strategic position to be stamped by the ideological apparatus as legally culpable complicity in guilt.

The Law does not 'enter' the fiction of Psycho in the car lot scene as a diegetic element in the énoncé, among others, on any sort of equal or equivalent standing with other elements of the fiction, but instead as an overwhelmingly powerful change of--imaginary, symbolic[26]--regime which orders the fiction in the énoncé and the spectatorial position in enunciation with regard to the fiction. In this way the ideological apparatus, operating (in) the film-work, couples a 'fiction-effect' to a 'reality-effect',in Macherey/Balibar's terms.

With the shock and meaning of the fiction-effect around the final turn of the car lot scene, the 'thrill' of hearing Marion being caught by the voice (this fiction-effect supposedly being the 'proper' scope of cinema as communication and entertainment) is coupled the tutoring reality-effect--a lesson in learning the law's address, of inserting the individuality of an experienced process of film reception into the envelope, supposedly general in form, of subjection to law. "But it is true that the text does produce a reality-effect. More precisely, it produces simultaneously a reality-effect and a fiction-effect--emphasizing first one and then the other, interpreting each by each in turn but always on the basis of this coupling."[27] The thrill of the interpellating instance, in particular, couples its effect (pleasure) and meaning (guilt) in a mutual, even indistinguishable emphasis. (This 'fusion' is a first symptom to be addressed by an ideological active reading of the film.) The way in which the particular figure of the patrolman is constituted within the fiction is, furthermore, a potential instance of a 'cinematic formation'[28] of ideology analogous to the 'literary formation' which Macherey/Balibar theorize in a sketch.[29] The way in which the entire instance works forms one answer, from a popular-cultural area in which ideologies operate, to Hirst's questions, given above as this subsection's head epigraph, about the relations and effects, the terms, of the operation of the imaginary in ideology.

(The ideological process so strikingly crystallized in the scene's film-work, which textual analysis can educe for reading, continues in

operation up to the film's overall diegetic resolution: a trajectory well marked out in Bellour's global analysis of the film, especially in the thread of figurative detail moving from the patrolman's look to the psychiatrist's discourse at the film's [hallucinatory] conclusion.[30])

The dispossessive power of ideology makes itself experienced in this climactic moment of recognition/misrecognition (mé-connaissance). 'Recognition/misrecogniton' in that the spectator recognizes, as diegetic fiction, the guilt of Marion, misrecognition in that the effect addresses the spectator as sharing her status. The dispossessing power of this instance is located, for the spectator, in an instance whose specific vocal origin is materially and effectively unspecified as origin, out of sight, and which has nonetheless (all the more) evident power to order and dominate the future course of action (diegetic action in the filmic diegesis, and spectatorial action with the film). In these factors of space, time, sound, and image, ideology works a material instance. It is efficacious, while remaining opaque.[31] 'Opaque' in that as actional program, it is nameably intelligible to the spectator under the prior contract of relations to the film, and against prior contexts of actional determination. This opacity is a material defense of the ideological apparatus inhabiting the film, operating through collaboration with the film-work.

Excursus: Textual Analysis and Cultural Criticism

But against the massive and dominating ideological work effected by the apparatus, the car lot scene could be positively, affirmatively

read by insisting on factors--of body and desire--which that ideological apparatus would suppress (into unconscious repression), as the apparatus operates interpellation and the production of the legal subject. MacCabe notes, as a criticism of Althusser and Pêcheux, "the cost" of Pêcheux's easy adoption of Althusser's functionalism with a schema of subject-signifier-discourse drawn from Lacan, a cost which is:

> . . . the disappearance of the body and desire from the schema. The failure to grasp the radical heterogeneity of the Lacanian Other means that there is nothing left over in that place to function as the object of desire. A first step in the rectification of Pêcheux's position would necessitate a greater emphasis on the other practices imbricated with the interdiscourse [i.e., the imaginary 'verbal body' constituted for the reader] and, in particular, the positioning and representation of the body. It is through an emphasis on the body and the impossibility of its exhaustion in its representations that one can understand the material basis with which the unconscious of a discursive formation disrupts the smooth functioning of dominant ideologies and that this disruption is not simply a chance movement of the signifier but the specific positioning of the body in the economic, political, and ideological practices.[32]

A subversive reading of the car lot scene would take a point of departure in Marion's desire, and the terminal irrelevance of bodies[33] under the interpellating instance; the reading would maneuver to ensnare and then positively exploit investment in those matters, exploiting them for a constitution of a group against the hegemony, evident power, and <u>logic</u> of the ideological instance (as a polar logic of a social/state apparatus versus the 'individual' or individual spectator). This would deconstruct the terms of the figuration, the apparatus, and the ways according to which standard Marxist theory (Althusser is no more than exemplary here) thinks of the social/cultural in the discursive.

SIX: Object and Look in the Scopic Field

> What I look at is never what I wish to see.
>
> What one looks at is what cannot be seen.
> --Lacan[34]
>
> More immediately, it on the level of the shot that one experiences oneself as demand and, beyond that, as desire for cinema.
> --Bonitzer[35]

Is there an 'other scene' (Freud: ein andere Schauplatz) in the obvious and manifest scene at the car lot? A point of departure could be the very manifest textual feature of alternation, carrying the spectator along, spurring his/her interest in the scene. Another cue may be the tension produced by the stress on exchange: in the diegesis, on the sale as exchange; in the figuration, on the play of looks as exchange. When commentaries on the film do mention the car lot scene, it is only to underline the 'futility' or 'hopelessness' thematized in Marion's purchase of a decoying replacement car. The exchange find its motivation in Marion's diegetic 'demand' and 'desire'. Her rather anonymous demand to the salesman ('sell me a car') envelopes her desire (which could be fictively constructed as wishes to disappear from the frustrating unsatisfaction of her past life, and in particular, to disappear into a shielding anonymity protected from the patrolman's look at and knowledge of her)--desire profoundly aimed at the figure of Sam, her drive to 'see' him and 'be seen' by him. This common parlance figures her desire as the Other's desire: in imaginary interior dialogue, as Marion drives through Phoenix, she 'hears' him

speak her desire in reciprocal form as 'seeing her' ("Marion, what in the world? What are you doing up here? Of course I'm glad to see you! What's the matter, Marion?"). On the other hand, this play of exchanges, 'caused' by desire, is checked by the (male) principle of law/reality in the appearance and effects of the patrolman's look, where the diegetic 'loss of reality' on Marion's side (a hallucinatory, or better, delusional action or 'acting out' in pursuit of a desired object without realistic regard for conditions and constraints, their real law of [im]possibility) is precisely matched to, set up by, the textual 'loss of vraisemblance' on the side of the patrolman in the figuration of action (his completely unmotivated reappearance into the scene). This line of argument directs the point of issue to the scopics of the scene, addressing these factors and force of exchange and desire by educing a chain of objects in exchange: specifically, a metonymic chain of scopic objects, moving as a signifying chain-in-exchange in a structured way, from character to character in the fiction, and from character's looks to the spectator-as-look. In preceding portions of this section, a focus on the visual register decisively opened up analyses of the scene's subsegmentation and alternation. Here we take up the visual register in the specificity of look and scopic field assigned to it by psychoanalytic theory; analysis grasps its as a heterogeneously staged composition flowing in the mobile filmic figuration, as a chain of instances, with their principles of extension and repetition, and the shifting logic of terms and places by which the chain positions objects (including the look) as seen, known, and exchanged.

How does this chain of instance in the figuration (principally the manifest factors of alternation and point of view, but also subsegmentation) deploy and unfold a scopic field? Framed in this way, the question goes beyond diegetic relations of the énoncé,[36] and instead encompasses a dialectic turning on the congruences[37] and absence of the look and scopic relations, and of demand and desire between the énoncé and enunciation. Diegetic demand and spectatorial demand for the unreeling of intelligible narrativity go through the object at the level of the shot. In its figuration, the object becomes object of desire.[38] Analysis of the scopic field will thus turn our focus away from action to the object, but an object as caught and produced in figurational networks and processes.

This dominant for the analysis, the object of the scopic field, calls for a brief theoretical excursus, in the form of a rehearsal of a selective and quite limited set of lines of the psychoanalytic theory of the object. (It is selective in that it begins by way of the object and the signifying chain, rather than--as is most customary --through the topology of the subject-ego-object of Lacan's schemas L or R, or by way of the registers of symbolic-imaginary-real and the mirror phase.[39]) This rehearsal is, however, a montage--a bilateral operation which does not begin by assigning psychoanalysis a position of authority. Instead, the reading begun here is a dual movement: first, assembling a number of psychoanalytic frames, deliberately chosen and constructed by reference to their utility for reading a filmic fragment, and second, then reading a filmic fragment and its deter-

minations of a scopic field as an implicit critical reading of a particular sector of psychoanalytic theory.

Whole/Part: Klein

The theory of the object developed by the Kleinian school (good/bad, whole/part objects) offers a workable starting point, since the emphasis on splitting fosters tropological analysis of the figured object (framing, disposition, metaphor/metonymy), and the emphasis on the subject/object relation as value aligns this psychoanalytic frame with some initial questions about diegetically and spectatorially pertinent values and desire around the object.

Primary/secondary object

The distinction which Safouan draws between primary and secondary object can also further analysis of discourse and figuration.[40] Against its quasi-Platonic idealism, the relationship between a series of 'common', perceived secondary objects can be the material framework for analysis of the unstated trait of homogeneity, which makes that series significant, a signifying chain in the psychoanalytic sense. The primary, 'ideal' object is at a logical, abstract, heterogeneous, singular place with regard to the secondary objects. This frame orients a line of analysis of a chain of scopic objects, as metonymically and metaphorically related, and it pertinently opens up the issue of the network of relations between the object and desire. The heterogeneous singularity of the primary object corresponds to the singularity of desire in Lacanian theory.

Object a: product of a signifying chain, and lacking cause of desire

> ". . . the only conceivable idea of the object, that of object as cause of desire, of that which is lacking."
> -- Lacan[41]

The three defining terms of the unconscious in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory--signifying chain, object a, and subject[42]--fuse analysis of the énoncé and enunciation of the filmic text. Subjectivity is defined in the phased relations of the figured diegetic 'seeing' subject, and of the 'minimum'[43] spectatorial subject, to the chain of scopic objects. In their multiplicity, their common homogeneity (secondarity), the chained objects produce in outline the lacking object, and thereby the complicity in desire between film (its figured subjectivity) and spectatorial subjectivity. The object is produced and 'expelled' as an irrational term, from out of the obvious or (literal) 'meaning' of the signifying chain, hence the object is paradoxically lost, 'necessarily', as a (literal) matter of the chain's logic and productive movement.

> A more suggestive example. . . is that of the irrational, evidenced by the measure of the diagonal of a square by way of the measure of the square's side: there is no common measure between the diagonal and the side, and any attempt to make one appear leads to the production of an irreducible remainder. The object is partially characterized as a remainder [reste] ejected from the measure (ratio, reason) of letters. The product, or remainder of the operation of literal articulation, fallen outside the intrinsic order of the literal system [i.e., signifying chain--LC], can be considered from this point of view as 'lost'.[44]

Visual rhetoric and minimal semantic coherence can support an analysis which moves between the latent and manifest, interrogating the

splitting and joining of subjectivity around the object as meaning and effect. The object as lack turns interrogation to the body, and to the (narrative) temporality of the chain, and subjective position.

Object and body

Psychoanalytic theory, concerned with analysis-as-cure, finds the object related to "the body from which the 'little thing' can be separated."[45] Hence the conventional list of variants of the part object (Klein) or object a (Lacan) figure the breast, feces/urinary stream, look, and voice.[46] This separation implies two elements of import for analysis of scopics: the cutting (coupure) of the subject, and the relation of the object as lack to a bodily organ (eye). "The object a is something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ. This serves as a symbol of the lack, that is to say, of the phallus, not as such, but insofar as it is lacking. It must, therefore, be an object that is, firstly, separable and secondly, that has some relation to the lack."[47] The stress, in psychoanalytic theory, on line(s) of cutting around the object, brings force onto the disjunctions/conjunctions of the figuration of the scopic object. In the context developed so far, the object of the scopic field can be specified.

The look as object a

"The object a in the field of the visible is the look."[48] To develop this assertative and punctive dictum, a hypothesis: is the

'primary object' (Safouan), for an analysis and reading of the scopic field of a filmic representation, the look? This hypothesis marks the frame and terms by which to analyze (1) the objects figured as separate, individual objects-of-the-look in (2) the work of filmic figuration, and (3) the overlapping, phased subjects (diegetic, spectatorial) of the scopic field and its objects as a signifying chain.

Splitting of the subject in the cutting of the scopic object

> "In the scopic field, the subject is not essentially indeterminate. The subject is strictly speaking determined by the very separation that determines the cutting of the a, that is to say, the fascinatory element introduced by the look."[49]

> ". . . the cutting of the subject, which constitutes it as separated, as ejected, is imposed on it by an objective determination: it comes from the object a"[50]

The psychoanalytic notion of cutting can articulate the 'cinematic experience' of the filmic text so that signifier and object can be distinguished as functions of the subject. The topology of the cut draws together--for comparisons, unifications, and disjunctions--the 'cut' and 'split' articulation of filmic figuration, diegetic/spectatorial subjectivity, as subject of the énoncé/enunciation. The movement of the signifying chain depends--at least, but especially in the instance from Psycho to be analyzed--on a play between figurative elements as object and as signifier. This mobiliity is what effect the split subjects, and opens the subjective passage across the filmic text for critical reading. "There is thus some thing by which the object a is the locus of this doubled movement: movement of it toward the subject, and of the subject toward it."[51]

Temporality of the splitting

> The object. . . is completely heterogeneous to the literal order [the signifying chain--LC], and the sole fashion by which we can evoke this non-relation which separates it from the letter is by invoking the irremediably ejected, lost--thus perfectly irrecuperable--position, which the object occupies.[52]

The split of the subject in the movement of the chain, between the signifier-letter and object, produces an effect of structural/logical temporality, one which inflects the split subject. Three 'phases', or perhaps better, 'loci' could be distinguished, using the conventional tripartition of temporal success (past/present/future), the discursive couplet of énoncé/enunciation, and the aligned couplet 'subject of énoncé/subject of enunciation' as Lacan develops this.[53] First, the lost object outlined by the signifying chain points to a past which is a (fictive) context of intelligibility drawn on by the subject of enunciation: the spectator, in the function of constructing the intelligibility of a narrative filmic énoncé for and 'with' (in a 'sharing' relation) the fictional diegetic subject.[54] Second, the locus of 'here-and-now'[55] which is the moment of perceptual upsurge, of an aporia between the signifier or object--as a structural dead spot, between meaning and effect, analogous to the hypothetical 'dead point'[56] of an apparatus, where the subject of the énoncé and the subject of the enunciation are structurally equatable.[57] The third moment, that of the structural 'future', is one of the phantasy aimed at through the screen of the object, in which the desire of the spectatorial subject of enunciation overruns the 'figured' diegetic subject

of enunciation. "The phantasy on the plane of the enunciation corresponds to the 'I' of the énoncé."[58]

Object and temporal pulsation of the signifying chain, apprehensibility, and phantasy

The signifyng chain is a mobile splitting between meaning, the unconscious, and a passage between signifier and object.

I have constantly stressed . . . the pulsative function, as it were, of the unconscious, the need to disappear that seems to be in some sense inherent in it--everything that, for a moment, appears in its slit seems to be destined, by a sort of pre-emption, to close up again upon itself, as Freud himself used this metaphor, to vanish, to disappear.[59]

In the case of the scopic field, it is the look which carries this function of pulsation.

But it is further still that we must seek the function of vision. We shall then see emerging on the basis of vision, not the phallic symbol, the anamorophic ghost, but the look as such, in its pulsatile, dazzling, and spread out function, as it is in this picture [Holbein's The Ambassadors]. This picture is simply what any picture is, a trap for the look.[60]

But the structure--of the chain of signifiers and object it produces, of the subject as an apparatus for the look, of the scopic drive--entails that the look, as the object a of the scopic field, cannot be apprehended.

The subject is an apparatus. This apparatus is something lacunary, and it is in the lacuna that the subject establishes the function of a certain object, qua lost object. It is the status of the object a insofar as it is present in the drive.[61]

It is here that I propose that the interest the subject takes in his/her own split is bound up with that which determines it--namely, a privileged object, which has emerged from some primal separation, from some self-mutilation induced by the very approach of the real, whose name, in our algebra, is the object a. In the scopic relation, the object on which depends the phantasy from which the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation is the look. Its privilege--and also that by which the subject for so long has been misunderstood as being in its dependence--derives from its very structure. Let us schematize at once what we mean. From the moment that this look appears, the subject tries to adapt him/herself to it, s/he becomes that punctiform object, that point of vanishing being with which the subject confuses his/her own failure. Furthermore, in all the objects in which the subject may recognize his/her dependence in the register of desire, this look is specified as unapprehensible.[62]

Object, splitting, satisfaction/pleasure

Given the characterization of the scopic object as unapprehensible, and the object as the excentric cause of desire (which cannot be satisfied by an object), how could this version of the psychoanalytic theory of the scopic field account for the undoubted fact of experienced satisfaction and pleasure in the spectatorial register (the relation of the spectator to films), and the infolded relation of spectatorial and diegetic registers (spectatorial pleasure and satisfaction around fictional-diegetic pleasure, or spectatorial satisfaction/pleasure around fictional-diegetic frustration and unpleasure)?

To answer this, we need to elaborate the relation of the object--and particularly the scopic object--to pleasure, satisfaction, the drive, and desire, by way of the 'mystery' of the object. The "mystery" is that the drive can attain its aim of satisfaction without necessarily satisfying a biologically defined and biologically func-

tioning need.[63] The biological function narrowly defines its conditions of satisfaction. The paradox of the satisfaction of the drive stems from variability, the freeplay or lacunary form of its object. This freeplay or variability is a way of defining the instance of the object a. Consider the oral drive and its split relation to biological need (nutrition, food) and the object. Whereas any food (despite, even against 'taste' and desire) can meet the biological need for nutrition as a practical function, in its function the oral drive can even be satisfied by silence-as-object:

> [The oral drive may be satisfied by] a mouth sewn up, in which, in analysis, we see indicating as clearly as possible, in certain silences, the pure agency of the oral drive, closing upon its own satisfaction. In any case, what makes us distinguish this satisfaction from the mere auto-eroticism of the erogenous zone is the object that we confuse all too often with that upon which the drive closes--this object, which is in fact simply the presence of a hollow, a void, which can be occupied, Freud tells us, by any object, and whose agency we know only in the form of the lost object a. The object a is not the origin of the oral drive. It is not introduced as the original food, it is introduced from the fact that no food will ever satisfy the oral drive, except by circumventing the eternally lacking object.[64]

The scopic field, defined in particular by the look and the eye, demonstrates most precisely the function of the object a which--lacking, lost--eludes the capture of the aroused look:

> . . . the look, whose ever-encroaching character is no less suggestive, for, by so many spectacles, so many phantasies, it is not so much our vision that is solicited, as our look is aroused.[65]

> Recollect what we learned about the look, the most characteristic term for apprehending the proper function of the object a. This a is presented precisely, in the field of the mirage of the narcissistic function of desire, as the object which cannot be swallowed, as it were, which remains stuck in the gullet of the signifier. It is at this point of lack that the subject has to recognize him/herself.[66]

It would seem here that further steps might be most effectively made by reference to the conceptual structure, from Lacanian psychoanalysis, which couples need-demand-desire with privation-frustration-castration.[67] However, the relation of the scopic field to the register of filmic enunciation calls for a different, adapted framework, adapted to put stress on the issues of textual-analytic criticism. A full such adaption is not possible here; only a few notes can be given. Privation would seem to be only pertinent in the diegetic register, but figurational forms may work to palpably 'deprive' the spectator (his/her look) in the enunciational register. The concept of frustration/satisfaction (including both as a couple) is most of interest when used to relate spectatorial frustration/satisfaction in enunciation as a function of diegetic frustration/satisfaction. Applying the psychoanalytic concept of desire to the diegesis alone results in playing into the imaginary politics of criticism as pseudo-analysis, a 'diagnosis' of the character as person. The concept of desire, as theorized by psychoanalysis in structure, is only incisive in film analysis when it is deployed to trace the congruent, but disjointed effects of desire between the fictive diegetic subject and the spectatorial subject, as extrapolated from the filmic text and discourse. (The reading to be done of the scopics of the car lot scene will follow this agenda, developing it further as it is put into practice.)

More specification is needed for the relation of the object to satisfaction and pleasure, and for the relation as the impossible real.

> The real is distinguished . . . by its separation from the field of the pleasure principle, by its desexualization, by the fact that its economy, later, admits something new, which is precisely the impossible . . . By snatching at its object, the drive learns in a sense that this is precisely not the way it will be satisfied. For if one distinguishes, at the outset of the dialectic of the drive, need (Not) from the pressure of the drive (Bedürfnis), it is because no object of any need can satisfy the drive.[68]

The object a is therefore to be aligned with desire and a marginal impossibility radical pleasure (jouissance), across from the drive, and its satisfaction, within the field of the pleasure principle. We may pass by a comparison of the oral drive (and the breast as its object) to the scopic drive (and the look).

> To this breast in its function as object, object a cause of desire, in the sense that I understand the term--we must give a function that will explain its place in the satisfaction of the drive. The best formula seems to me to be the following--that la pulsion en fait le tour. I shall find opportunities of applying it to other objects. Tour is here to be understood with the ambiguity it possesses in French, both turn, the limit around which one turns, and trick.[69]

Each of these movements--a 'circuit around', and 'a tricking diversion'--need amplification for the scopic register, but in reverse order.

The oral drive tricks the object by locating its satisfaction in an intermediate place between biological function (need) and phantasy (desire): in organ pleasure, i.e. 'mouth pleasure'. ("Even when you stuff the mouth--the mouth that opens in the register of the drive--it is a not the food which satisfies it, it is, as one says, the pleasure of the mouth."[70]) This pleasure is separate from biological need, yet still within the bounds of biological homeostasis as the defining limit

of the pleasure principle, a limit which desire crosses as it moves with the drive out from the body (the organ) around its object.[71] But in that movement, the drive turns around the given object exploited in any particular instance of satisfaction, and aims desire at the object a. Whereas the oral field is strongly intertwined around a self-preservational need (and demand), "At the scopic level, we are no longer at the level of demand, but of desire, of the desire of the Other."[72]

How can satisfaction be differentiated from pleasure in the scopic field?

Scopic satisfaction can be construed, by comparison with the oral field, as an imaginary satisfaction of a fictive need. In this split movement of eye and look, this "dialectic of the eye and look"[73], the look is 'tamed' and 'pacified', or 'laid down' before a representation which is connected with (mis)recognized (lured), future (proleptic) satisfaction. This can be explained in the particular example of a represented object offered by Lacan, the grapes painted by Zeuxis, which lure and attract hungry birds to peck.[74]

> The painter gives something to the person who must stand in front of his painting which, in part, at least, of the painting, might be summed up thus--You want to see? Well, take a look at this! He gives something for the eye to feed on, but he invites the person to whom this picture is presented to lay down his/her look there as one lays down one's weapons. This is the pacifying, Apollonian effect of painting. Something is given not so much to the look as to the eye, something that involves the abandonment, the laying down, of the look.[75]

This 'feeding' suggests quite directly an equation of human and animal relation to the object-in-image, which will be subsequently

re-positioned in our argument. The eye's appetite is further specified as aggressive hostility and voracity, as crystallized in the supposedly universal myth of the 'evil eye'[76] and in envy--"the eye made desperate by the look":

> Such is true envy--the envy that makes the subject pale before the image of a completeness closed upon itself, before the idea that the object a, the separated a from which s/he is hanging, may be for an other the possession that gives satisfaction, Befriedung.[77]

The eye is put by psychoanalytic theory on the side of aggressivity and sadism.

On the other side, that of the look and desire--or more precisely the look as a way for the subject to 'sustain him/herself in a function of desire'[78]--it seems the issue may be approached most effectively by way of the perversion(s), voyeurism/exhibitionism, as a structure of the return of the look from the other.[79] In the scopic field, the fundamental activity aimed at is the "making onself seen."[80] This is a phantasy, a scenario of the subject in action with the look as object, a circularly moving look which goes out around an object towards the other, and moves in return to encompass the looking/desiring subject. This "outward/return movement" of the look, and the circularity of this structure of desire in the scopic field account for the reversibility of voyeurism and exhibitionism,[81] the aptness of their description in grammatical terms as active/passive relations. But this structure exceeds the imaginary satisfaction of the eye, within the homeostatic constraints of the economy of pleasure, since:

What one looks at is what cannot be seen. If, thanks to the introduction of the other, the structure of the drives appears, it is really completed only in its reversed form, in its return form, which is the true active drive. In exhibitionism what is intended by the subject is what is realized in the other. The true aim of desire is the other, as constrained, beyond his/her involvement in the scene. It is not only the victim who is concerned in exhibitionism, it is the victim as referred to some other who is looking at him/her.[82]

The subject will realize that his/her desire is merely a vain detour with the aim of catching the jouissance of the other--insofar as the other intervenes, s/he will realize that there is a jouissance beyond the pleasure principle.[83]

These delineations of the scopic field and its object have now pointed further to the lure, phantasy, and the Other.

Scopic object as lure, trompe-l'oeil, or phantasy

These determinations around pleasure and desire/jouissance allow a crucial distinction within what is 'usually' conceived as the object of desire, including the scopic object (the object afforded to, invested by a look). "But the object of desire, in the usual sense, is either a phantasy that is in reality the support of desire, or a lure."[84] How can this opposition (phantasy/lure) be developed in terms of the scopic object?

The picture is a lure in which the look is caught and trapped in a way that the eye becomes the object a, symbolizing the fundamental lack of castration.

Generally speaking, the relation between the look and what one wishes to see involves a lure. The subject is presented as other than s/he is, and what one shows him/her is not what s/he wishes to see. It is in this way that the eye may function as object a, that is to say, at the level of the lack ($-\phi$).[85]

This is to be compared to the instance of the represented grapes, the birds' lured eyes, and the birds' failed action, the lack of pleasure (oral, scopic) for them.

It is important that in the parable of the birds, "the stress is placed not on the fact that these grapes were in any way perfect grapes, but on the fact that even the eye of the birds was tricked (trompé) by them."[86] What is crucial is not "extraordinary verisimilitude (vraisemblance)" (since the successful trick "does not imply in the least that the grapes were admirably reproduced"), but the image's status as "something more reduced, something closer to the sign, in something representing grapes for the birds."[87] The scopic object is not predominantly aligned with the imaginary (with imaginary reproductive equivalence, as vraisemblance), but with the real (in an encounter with the vraisemblable, the disruption of the impossible, a failure of action despite of plausibility: "the little we know of the real shows its antinomy to all plausibility [vraisemblance]"[88]), and with the symbolic (the reduced sign). Thus even in the imaginary capture of the lure, the scopic object is formed by reference, as a signifier.

Now we must elaborate the 'opposite example' to Zeuxis's represented grapes: Parrhasios's trompe-l'oeil painting, on a wall, of a veil, which deceives Zeuxis into asking "Well, and now show us what you have painted behind it. By this he showed that what was at issue was certainly tricking the eye (tromper l'oeil). A triumph of the look over the eye."[89] This "opposition" is:

> that of the natural function of the lure and that of trompe-l'oeil. . . the opposite example of Parrhasios makes it clear that if one wishes to

trick a human, what one presents to him/her is the painting of a veil, that is to say, something which incites him/her to ask what is behind it.[90]

The opposition between two representations allows psychoanalytic theory to specify (human) desire and the object _a_ in the scopic field (emblematized in _trompe-l'oeil_), against natural animal need/demand in the lure. In both, the dialectic of look and eye involves a 'taming' of the look ("_dompte-regard_ [taming of the look] is also presented in the form of _trompe-l'oeil_"[91]), but _trompe-l'oeil_ involves desire and hence the scopic object as the object _a_, combined with the satisfaction (organ-pleasure) of the eye:

> What is it that attracts and satisfies us in _trompe-l'oeil_? What is it that it captures our look and delights us? At the moment when, by a mere shift of our look, we are able to realize that the representation does not move with our look and that it is some other thing than it seemed, or rather it now seems to be that other thing. . . This other thing is the object _a_, around which there revolves a combat of which _trompe-l'oeil_ is the soul.[92]

Thus the two examples, even as a structural opposition, overlap, in that in both, the scopic objects (grapes, veil) are arbitrary signifiers. In the former, _vraisemblance_ is partly overlapped by a signifying function. In the latter, _vraisemblance_ is given over to a signifying function, referring to what is "beyond appearance"[93] in the immediate scopic field. The veil is related to desire and the object _a_, since Zeuxis's desire to see comes by way of a relation to an other (in a spoken demand to an other painter), in which the Other's desire assumes and enjoys mastery (Parrhasios's ruse assures his competitive

'triumph' over Zeuxis, at the moment that the Zeuxis's eyes are tricked), and since the veil is an object caught in a signifying exchange (words, dialogue, legible representations, competition) in which the object (veil) causes desire but does not, cannot 'satisfy' it as object. (Further elaboration of the veil as scopic object would entail a more complete analysis of the logic and structure of the phantasy, a line which moves beyond the limits of utility for the analytic reading intended here of Psycho's car lot scene.[94])

In this complex of the veil-desire-phantasy-object a, the lure still has an 'essential function', as an object which masks, thereby mediates what is given to the look and eye in the scopic field. Lacan specifies the lure as a mask involved with sexual difference and violence.

> The lure plays an essential function therefore. . . It is no doubt through the mediation of masks that the masculine and feminine meet in the most acute, most intense way. Only the subject--the human subject, the subject of desire that is the essence of man--is not, unlike the animal, entirely caught up in this imaginary capture. He maps himself in it. How? Insofar as s/he isolates the function of the screen and plays with it. Man, in effect, knows how to play with the mask as that beyond which there is the look. The screen here is the locus of mediation.[95]

Since the object a "is never found in the position of being the aim of desire",[96] analysis of the scopic object must be itself aimed at finding the cut or separation which relates the represented (figured) object, via the screen and the mask, to the object a within the phantasy scenario supporting the scopic subject as 'desiring subject'.[97]

Scopic object and Other

It is essential to recall that it is in the Other that the subject has to map the object of desire and that it is at a certain moment of the relation of the subject to the Other that the a surges up, assumes its form and its function.[98]

Analysis of scopics also encounters the relation of the subject to the Other as a problem of the relations of meaning, effect, and power in the scopic field. Analysis of the filmic fragment would therefore need to address this dimension by an interrogation of the relations of the diegetic register within itself (as énoncé), then the spectatorial instance of the look as related to the diegetic look (enunciation), and then the enunciational relations of the filmic discourse, anonymously forming the relations of the diegetic and spectatorial instances of looks.

Scopic object a and the real

Previous attempts, starting from psychoanalytic theory, to analyze filmic fragments in the psychoanalytic terms of the real founder, too quickly, too easily, into the pre-conclusive form of literary-poetic 'epiphanies': a celebratory, not analytic construction of discourse.[99] The gambit, with Metz,[100] of a patient, slow analytic elaboration of distinctions, labels, and relations as the conduct of film analysis, holds, I believe, a greater appeal and likelihood of productive efficacy, in expanding knowledge by a circumscribing of the real and the "object as nameless index of the real."[101] This is the

gambit of an analysis which at the same time recognizes the effect of the fall, fading, or zero-relation of the subject in the scopic field in relation to the look (including by force the analyst's look) as object a:

> The look may contain in itself the object a of the Lacanian algebra where the subject falls, and what specifies the scopic field and generates the satisfaction proper to it is the fact that, for structural reasons, the fall of the subject always remains unperceived, for it is reduced to zero.[102]

Against the fascination of induced by a filmic representation, the analyst's work is deployed against the 'most direct' power of the Other operating across the cultural text, since the film without doubt can function as a "fascinum . . . precisely one of the dimensions where the power of the look is exercised directly."[103]

Reading the Scopic Chain in the Car Lot Scene

> The phantasy is the support of the subject of desire. The subject sustains herself as desiring in relation to an ever more complex signifying ensemble. This is apparent enough in the form of the scenario it assumes in which the subject, more or less recognizable, is somewhere, split, divided, generally double, in her relation to the object, which does not usually show its true face either.[104]

The excursus through psychoanalytic theory above--in its construction and logic, inclusion/exclusion of themes and elements, its ordered succession--was a strategically chosen and ordered construction, aimed in advance at the steps in the reading of a chain of seven scopic

objects in the car lot scene. This reading, about to begin, is thus also a reading in retroaction of psychoanalytic theory; not an application in subsidiary relation to those theoretical constructs, but rather a mutual relation.

The reading moves through seven objects, which are pulsations, pulse beats of a signifying chain. These objects are initially determined by the formal networks of point of view, and also alternation, subsegmentation, CHR code, and spatial figuration (the 180° line). The seven objects are:

1) a nothing
2) license plates
3) the newspaper
4) Marion's body
5) the patrolman's look
6) the stolen bills
7) Marion's luggage

Object 1: a nothing. Not a just a simple lack or absence, the absence of the patrolman in the point-of-view alternation of subsegment I manifests a functional absence, a signifying zero-value in relation to the preceding highway scene and its many minutes of alternation between Marion's look and the patrolman's car following her. Here, in the alternation of her look (shots 2, 4) and the empty streets (1, 3, 5), an apparent, but always imaginary mastery of the scopic field is

figured. As much as her desire comes to be figured in looks, so too is the negative pressure of the scene's scopics figured in a look: the other's look as a phobic object. This pressure on the realm of figuration stems from the potential upsurge of the patrolman's look. Marion is 'on the street', open in space to that look which irrupted on the street in Phoenix (her employer), and by the highway (the patrolman, in their first encounter). "The phobia is produced, as a rule, subsequent to an initial attack of anxiety which was experienced under certain circumstances--on the street, on a railroad train, or on an occasion of being alone, for example. For the moment the anxiety is stilled, only to reappear on every occasion on which the conditions that assure protection cannot be met."[105] This pressure works not just as the figurative presence of the other, of the other's look as object (i.e., the patrolman's look), but the absence it would signify through its power, the dread of failure and fading of the phantasy scenario around the lover as object. "Dread is not the fear of an object but of confrontation of the subject with the absence of an object, with the lack of being in which she is caught, in which she loses herself and to which anything is preferable, even the forging of the most strange of objects, the phobic object."[106] But in her mastery of the look and scopic field, this opening subsegment remains (against its prior context) quite pacifying, a pleasingly marked detente in narrative tension.

The chain thus commences with an instance of the taming of looks (Marion's, the spectator's) around an absent object (another look), a

taming which produces an imaginary/symbolic position for the diegetic subject, and appeases, pleases, relaxes the diegetic and spectatorial eye.

Object 2: the three license plates. The pattern of point-of-view alternation in subsegment II propose this scopic object, alone in frame in close up (CHR, FRM codes) (shots 8, 10, 12), alternated with Marion's look. This second link in the scopic chain is to be read as a more marked instance of desire-in-looking: the plates promise to Marion, in her scopic mastery, the shielding assurance of her anonymity, her mask or envelope of camouflage so that her drive may reach Sam. Thus the plates as scopic object play on the overlapping status of the object as 'natural lure' and 'phantasy screen': "the being gives of herself, or receives from the other, something that is like a mask, a double, an envelope, a thrown-off skin, thrown off in order to cover the frame of a shield."[107]. The figuration is worked by metonymy, in which State identities of property and public visibility (California, Arizona) mark the diegetic terms of the desire. The Arizona plate is metonymized too, in scopic terms, back to the patrolman's look (he saw the plate in an identical close up), so that it spurs the phobic, threatening, mortifying aspect of the scopic relation. So the filmic discourse begins again to move away from the detente in narrative tension of object one, building on the threat implicit in the plates as at the same time it promotes a spectatorial phantasy--a proleptic scenario of spectatorial voyeurism--of the

lovers' meeting, as a repetition of the film's opening sexual scene, a proleptic drive in which the spectator assuredly invests an expectation of an excessive pleasure which would overrun the limits of the narrative-representational 'pleasure principle'.

The desire is therefore excessive, within spectatorship, but also inside the diegetic fiction. In the demand, desire exceeds the particularity of any object. Marion's action, a demand to buy the car, exceeds particularity in that--as the figuration makes the spectator realize, latently or manifestly--her desire exceeds any demand for a particular car. The 'multplicity' of the plate, the staging of the vision signify that it is the close-up plates, not the auto as functional or useful machine, which is her fascinum.

The metonymy of the plates as scopic object correlates precisely with the determination of the object a as small, detached, lost object, a "self-mutilation" produced, inflicted, in an encounter with the real as trauma (dustuchia); the après-coup of signification goes back around the object to the prior encounter with the patrolman's look, the moment when Marion's identity was scopically arrested and seized by his look (down at her as she awakes to his knocking, and when he looks at her license plate).[108] Now desire enfolds that dustuchia by cutting off that part, that token of identity and (deliberately) losing it. The mastery still enjoyed by Marion as looking subject is figured as an action assuming its power to control her figuration, her 'public body' of identity in the social sphere of visibility, the street. The scopic object becomes assumed as a lure, so that "the subject is presented as

other than she is", in a way that, for her narrative adversary, "what one shows him is not what he wishes to see."[109]

The object a beyond the 'veil' of the plates--Marion's anonymity and accession to her lover as spectatorial/diegetic phantasy--forms the terms of intelligibility and tension of the diegetic development of much of the remainder of the scene's action. The object is what is repetitively demanded by Marion of California Charlie in the imaginary register (in the myriad of specular relations of car salesman/buyer, sharp/victim, man/woman): her insistence lies in her repeated demands, which provides the haste and pressure of the scene "figuring demand in its repetitive function."[110] She interrupts Charlie twice in shot 20, in shot 25 she rushes into settlement of the price without test-driving the car in its 'particularity'; in shots 42-43 she interrupts Charlie again, overwhelms his suspicion, challenges him ("Do you think I've stolen my car?"). Even though the object aimed at (anonymous union with Sam) is already obvious lost, her demand (for the car) is repeated, over and over, even as the terms of her action of demand 'diverge' (e.g., she comes to know of the patrolman's look, then Charlie becomes overtly suspicious, then he sees the patrolman, and so on). "The object being lost, the subject can only repeat that which cannot come back . . . demand does not couple onto itself but is repeated, at each turn/trick [tour], with a divergence [ecart] which demonstrates that it does not seize the object which subtends it."[111]

Object 3: the newspaper. Marion looks at this as at a lure, driven to finding something which she needs, in practical terms. Almost imme-

diately, she is seen not seeing, by the patrolman, by the spectator. The metonymic slippage from the plates to the paper is an obvious movement connected with the text of the social and public order, with their definition and maintenance of public identities. The passage from the second to the third scopic objects is ironized by the succession from the emptily differential signifiers of the plates (strings of numbers and letters which 'have no meaning' in themselves, but are merely different from other plates), to the paper as a social text, supposedly 'full' of information. Gulled by the paper, Marion will take a place as the fourth scopic object, in the pulsative re-positioning of subject/object relations in the unstable scopic field of the look. "You grasp here the ambiguity of what is at issue when we speak of the scopic drive. The look is this object lost and suddenly refound in the conflagration of shame, by the introduction of the other. Up to that point, what is the subject trying to see? What she is trying to see, make no mistake, is the object as absence."[112]

On that ground, we can reconsider the first phase of the scopic chain, its first three objects (a nothing, plates, paper). These constitute, in condensed and displaced form, an object a which is Marion herself, future, anonymous, and absent from her past unsatisfaction, her 'undesirable life' and her crime. With the irruption of the patrolman's other look, the 'conflagration' of shame and guilt turns the scopic balance of power, the politics of the look, against her. stripping her of apparent diegetic and scopic mastery, forcing a new tension (and spectatorial pleasure) in the visibility of her body, the object of her crime (the bills) vis-à-vis the patrolman's look.

The climactic fatality of the narrative turn "marks the pre-existence to the seen of a given-to-be-seen"[113]--pre-existence, an ideology of the fatality of legal power and sexual different, where the scopic object a is to be interpreted as the "blind spot", the position where in reading her look, Marion's phantasies her success in the anticipated car exchange and purchase, the loss of her past life and Arizona identity (as object), and the public ignorance of her crime (as a failure of the Other). At this moment of the third scopic object suddenly everything seems to be put into order for Marion as if, after all the hazards and traumatic encounters (with her boss's look, the patrolman's look) of the prior narrative movement, her imaginary mastery enjoys a relation to the real, in a splitting, anticipating an identificatory accession to her lover by enjoying an (deceptively) apparent cutting and separation from her past. In this, this third object is an instance of the "constitution of the object at the very place of the splitting and obliges the putting into place . . .[of] an identification to the object of desire, or better, a realization of the subject as the cutting of that object, the sole moment in which the relationship of the subject with her world can be put in order. . . the object a is that which irrupts at the point of the Other's failure, at the point of the signifier's loss (namely the loss of this object a)."[114] That is why this third pulsion of the scopic chain is blind spot, with a dual movement (and phantasy) of proleptic identificatory movement forward, and a disjunctive cutting off from the past--as the scopic object a surges up 'before' Marion's eyes and 'behind' her, with

the spectator assuming custody of both movements. "The object a surges up as the sole possible support of the subject, and the phantasy as this some thing which the subject foments, tries to produce at this blind spot."[115]

On the diegetic level, the first three objects are solidary with Marion's desire, and her status as a subject sustained in a phantasy of what is 'beyond' the veil of the scopic object(s), but Marion's demand passes from this privation (the practical, 'real' need of a means of anonymous movement in public), into figurative-symbolic frustration and castration. This is being read by the spectator through the spectator's look; however, the spectatorial subject is split between positions of legibility and partnership in Marion's desire in its diegetic figuration, and of desire and satisfaction of partnership (knowledge, but not spatial-figurative position) with the look of the law onto Marion's body as object. This instance shows well how the spectatorial subject as demand and desire moves through demand for an intelligibly unfolding narrative, into dynamic figurative patterns constructing scopics, into a coordination of desire(s) between diegetic and spectatorial subjects through a congruence of looks.[116] If the patrolman's look is a phobic object, the spectator's satisfaction comes from the imaginary/symbolic position propped onto the traumatic dustuchia, the 'real' encounter (in the diegesis and figuration) by which Marion's look is unseeingly caught within the patrolman's look. The satisfying pleasure is voyeuristic in its relations of scopic power, that power being understood here as that of the

look as master of the visible, a master-signifier of visual field. "What the voyeur is trying to see, make no mistake, is the object as absence"[117]: the paradox of the lapidary psychoanalytic dictum specifies well the film's figuration. Marion's look 'sees nothing' in the paper, nor does she see the patrolman's look; in her look at the object(s) (the nothing, plates, paper), she looks proleptically 'beyond' a veil to enjoyment of her absence from her her past. The failing absence of her look at this moment (gulled by the paper, lacking vigilance, unseeing of the patrolman's surveillance), and the diegetic impotence for her of even such a look even when she does possess it later (when she 'returns' the patrolman's look), form the figurative imaginary signifying her castration within the diegetic sphere.

The spectator's blind spot, in the politics of sexual difference figured in the scopics, is that the spectator's jubilation and pleasure in sharing a master-view (look) is only an effect of the patterns of enunciational access to figuration. What is repressed is the political/ideological consequences of the spectator's ('past') blindness in sharing Marion's spatial location for shots of the patrolman (15, 17) which would have been Marion's look, if she were not castrationally blinded. Here textual analysis can force out for consideration the interplay of the three scopic instances by rupturing the spectatorial filmic phantasy of 'omni-vision',[118] and by discerning the partiality of the 'master look' in that dimension of filmic enunciation of vision.

Object 4: Marion's body

Marion's body as scopic object is the figurative locus of the splitting discussed above, in the encounter with the patrolman's look: "the very split that occurs in the subject in relation to the encounter."[119] This encounter makes the visible body the fatality of a scopic field whose 'phenomenology' (and politics) is an expandable, englobing subjection to the other's look,[120] to a "seeing, to which I am subjected in an original way" (i.e., as 'origin' or production of the embodied subject):

> the essential point [is] the dependence of the visible on that which places us under the eye of the looker [voyant] . . . What we have to circumscribe . . . is the pre-existence of a look--I see from only one point, but in my existence I am looked at from all sides. . . The look is presented to us only in the form of a strange contingency, symbolic of what we find on the horizon, as the thrust of our experience, namely, the lack that constitutes castration anxiety.[121]

These passages, in which Lacan is also carrying on a criticism of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the visible and invisible, mark the ideologically productive divergence of psychoanalysis as a frame for textual analysis, to read cultural texts such as Psycho, reading beyond the play of the visible and invisible in a film's ordering of its images and visible domain, to a reading of the ways such texts inscribe simultaneously blindness and guilt on the woman and her body, confusing these as vanity and a vain project of action: the woman in the figure of the "subject as nihilated--nihilated in the form that is, strictly speaking, the imaged embodiment of the minus-phi [(- ϕ)] of castration."[122]

The split around the body as scopic object, the way that Marion struggles to adapt herself, could be diagrammed with the same superimposed optical triangles which Lacan exploits to map the relation of the look, the screen/image, and the subject 'turned into a picture under the look'.[123] At her place between them, Marion forms her split image(s) on both sides of a screen of ignorance separating the patrolman and Charlie, (mis)recognizing herself in her guilty image for the former, and offering the mask of the (overly) willing customer to the latter.



In the triangle of looks among the three diegetic characters, if the symbolic privilege is on the side of the patrolman, then, even when the other two members of the triangle have come to recognize the patrolman's look, any supposed scopic reciprocity among them remains only imaginary--the patrolman's look is dominant, and this fact of power remains inseparable from the cultural figuration of the woman's body under the masculine look. This is the edge that a subversive reading and cultural politics would need to 'lift up' in order to upset the text's politics: the misrecognition of the woman, her body, her desire by the narrative determination of scopics--Marion as "subject is presented as other than she is."[124]

As the triangle of looks is completed by the diegetic unreeling of actions, Marion and Charlie's relations as imaginary are 'focussed' and resolved into the symbolic dominance (guilt, the guilty subject under the three men's look), which could be figured as a simplicatory transformation of the prior diagram. The putative truth is revealed in that the screen, as this figures her power and control, is destroyed, and Marion is 'guilty as seen'. This effect is worked to culmination in shot 47 by the multiplication of the men, and by a redisposition of looks, frameline, and object, so that Marion is off-screen. In that disposition, the look-as-truth is the arresting fascinum for the spectator.



The climactic movements of the shift of looks (shot 20, when Marion sees the patrolman's look; shots 35-36-37, when Charlie sees Marion's look off to the patrolman, and sees the patrolman; and the tableau of the three men's looks in shot 47) are the movements of a fascinum, the way the scopic chain is:

> always punctuated by a series of moments of arrest in which the actors pause in a frozen attitude. What is that thrust, that moment of arrest of movement? It is simply the fascinatory effect . . . of arresting movement and, literally, of killing life. At the moment the subject stops, suspending his/her gesture, s/he is mortified. The anti-life, anti-movement function of this terminal point is the fascinum, and it is precisely one of the dimensions in which the power of the look is exercised directly.[125]

Object 5: the patrolman's look

What is not immediately obvious, but what must be crucially drawn out of the textual analysis of the scene's figuration of looks for an ideological reading, is the fact of a split in the figuration of the patrolman's look: while the spectator's look is made complicit with the patrolman's look (in that the patrolman is seen first by the spectator), nonetheless the spectator's look is not made figuatively equivalent to the patrolman's in terms of scopic space and the placement of the look.[126] Thus the supremacy, not of the patrolman's look, but of the enunciating agency of the filmic figuration produces the spectator as split subject. In the spectator's experience of the scene, the patrolman's look is enjoyed in satisfaction, but also barred from the spectator's desire for omni-vision (on the metapsychological level). Hence for the spectator desire to see, the patrolman's look--and the power, meaning, pleasure it promises, latently, as an abstract object and concretely as a scopic/symbolic position giving access into the scene--is "radically lost, that is to say, equivalent to what we can call the object of castration,"[127] a scopic castration, despite and amidst the spectator's enjoyment of the scene. This effect is redoubled in the moment of the mobile framing of shot 46, which puts the patrolman's look out of sight for the spectator, so that, in a play of voice and vision already analyzed under the heading of interpellation, the spectator--as much, or more than Marion--can be called into subjection under the law's embodying figure.

Textual analysis finds that the patrolman's look weaves together, in a node, a large number of important textual/discursive features and processes:

1) the symbolics of the eye in the énoncé and enunciation of film: the symbolics of Hitchcock's bodily appearance as enunciator in the films, his insertion of his own look into the scopic field proposed by the diegesis, as Bellour[128] has analyzed this, together with the particular role played by optical devices such a glasses, holes, and so forth, so that in a rebounding series of instances, for diegetic characters and spectators, "I am photo-graphed";[129]

2) Marion's demand as a program of action (proairetics), under the power of the patrolman's look as a domination of hermeneutics (how will his look turn narrative action and outcome?);

3) the instance of ideological interpellation operating through the film;

4) the signifying effect of sexual difference as it is disposed by the diegetic situation, and by the figuration of the scopic relations around the patrolman's look;

5) the loss of vraisemblance in the diegesis/enunciation (the patrolman's reappearance, his action, Marion's persistence), against the continuing pleasure for the spectator in the register of enunciation;

6) identification through the look as a scopic "object a, insofar as, dissimulated in the Other [ie., in the patrolman, by the split analyzed above], the object orients the identificatory movement at the same time that the object gives the movement its stopping point"[130];

7) Marion's failure in her 'hysterical' acting out of her desire, a failure effected by the patrolman's look, in the way that this effect produces a relation desire between the patrolman as diegetic Other to Marion and enunciational (extra-diegetic) Other to Marion and the spectator. It shows the "pivotal function of the object a since from then on [from the irruption of the a] it reveals itself to be the sole support of the O[ther]: the a is that which the Other desires in the subject failing in the phantasy."[131] In her failure, the fading of her plausible project, and still repeated demands, in her questioning looks off to the patrolman, the film figures and operates the subversion of Marion's desire into the form of a question: "What does the Other want of me?"[132] In the address of the "Hey!" is not only the legal interpellation but the principle of desire across sexual difference, and of a cultural regime of sexual difference in which, according to Lacan's fatalism, 'there is no sexual relation'.

Object 6: the stolen bills

We can begin with figurational function: the bills are figured in the text primarily for the sole function of 'showing something' about Marion; remember that their functional use in exchange for the purchase is elided from explicit figuration in the scene. The bills are figuratively associated with the plates by multiple figurational relations: (1) by the same musical theme (called "Temptation" in the film's production materials) which plays during subsegment II and now in subsegment VII); (2) by a metonymic equivalence in exchange (part of

the cash will buy the 'part' of one of the California cars seen earlier in close up), and (3) by a similarly virtual and indifferent multiplicity and anonymity (of the glimpsed trio of similar-looking plates, or of the stack of virtually identical $100 bills--above and beyond the small festival of surprise, fascination, and pleasure which accompanies the upsurge of the cash into the visual stream). The latter figurational factor, especially, marks the matching relation between Marion's goals/objects of desire (anonymity, Sam) and the eclipsing or fading of the subject of these scopic objects. From link to link in the signifying chain, even as diegetic meaning is preserved, produced, and extended in these signifiers/objects, Marion's desire is anonymized as it is played out into relations with her 'thing' (the object to which she is related by her look).

The sixth scopic object is of note in that it strikes up a briefly renewed 'private' partnership of scopic access between Marion in the diegesis and the spectator. That this is motivated, diegeticized, or naturalized by the "laws of urinary segregation"[133] as a cultural conframe ordering sexual difference within a narrative, remains only an irony whose likely function is to gloss and occult the disposition of sexual difference under legal-ideological interpellation. Ominously, the figuration continues the splitting of Marion's body as masks: she, and the bills in her hand, are specularized in two by the bathroom mirror.[134]

Object 7: the forgotten luggage

Anonymity, forgetting, vision: the final scopic object surges up, something overlooked and forgotten, whose recall by a male voice and look repeats chain's fundamental politics, extends it into one more variation, and thus gives the scene conclusion. Marion's oversight with the luggage is matched by the rather oneiric transformation of the scopic staging: three men, in a line, looking at the woman-object. This final scopic object is critically intricated into the work of ideological interpellation, as analyzed in subsection five above, which masks the law of sexual division into a diegetic operation. The luggage is the conclusive dustuchia, reaching back for its latent determination, within the scene, to the moment when Marion is seen not seeing the patrolman's look behind her as she scans the newspaper. Now that scenario is repeated, transformed, and re-centered: she is seen not having seen her thing, and she is seen seeing this failure herself. The conclusive scopic object determines its prior context as Marion's failure to adapt herself to the difficulties (the real impossibilities) of her diegetic situation, her project of action as it has been affected by the patrolman's reappearing look. As such, the conclusion's scopics directly metaphorizes her failure, as she moves off-screen towards his look's vanishing point, she adapts herself as failure into the status of guilty subject for that look. "From the moment that this look appears, the subject tries to adapt herself to it, she becomes that punctiform object, that point of vanishing being with which the subject confuses her own failure."[135] In the seventh object, the patrolman's look 'returns' most powerfully and conclusi-

vely, as a hallucinatory return, out of the plates and paper in which Marion's and the spectator's looks earlier had found effects either of pacification (Marion, in the diegesis) or satisfaction (the spectator's enjoyment). 'A return of the repressed in the real'? The Lacanian formulation, if not adroitly treated, would blind us to the immense work of the imaginary and symbolic in this scene's figuration of the woman, her body, and her action. What is real in this scene's action is its inscription of that vision of sexual difference, law, look, and aggression.

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The only way to recapitulate is to stress the filmic text's mediation of the spectatorial subject's scopic drive as a movement, stitching and suturing out and around this chain of objects.

> Everything Freud spells out about the partial drives shows us the . . . circular movement of the thrust that emerges from the erogenous rim only to return to it as its target, after having encircled something I call the object a. I suggest . . . that it is in this way that the subject attains what is, strictly speaking, the dimension of the capital Other.[136]

Thus the scopics of spectatorship are a matter of 'making onself seen' as a production of the looking spectator.[137] The reading of the scopic chain also 'makes visible' its constituting and reconstituting of the spectatorial looks with particular but diverse effects. Across its moves and zig-zags, four major operations were traced:

(1) the constitution of the spectator's look at/with Marion, and the enjoyment of that look;

(2) the spectator's look at Marion is appropriated by the figure of the patrolman, in split fashion;

(3) the patrolman and spectator are 'seen' by Marion, i.e., the spectator is seen as 'like' the patrolman, in shared partnership with his power of scopic positioning; and

(4) the spectator sees his/her own look, sees themself seeing, in a metaphoric multiplication, "the illusion of the consciousness seeing itself see oneself, in which the look is elided"[138] at the scene's end, in the three men's look as a significant oneiric figuration: "It is that their fascinated look is the subject himself."[139]

1. See Hitchcock 1974; a complete set of frame enlargements from all the scene's shots, and a diegetic summary of action are in Crawford 1982.

2. The scene is ignored, for instance, by commentators such as Durgnat and Rothman, undoubtedly on the grounds that it is too impoverished to deserve elaborative commentary. The expression comes from Bellour (1979: 126).

3. See Section 12 above.

4. Bellour 1979: 252.

5. In saying this I re-emphasize that the level chosen, and the number of subsegments produced by analysis are variable. Even on a given level, different weightings of the codes could produce correspondingly different numbers of subsegments. A research project of statistical analysis of the analytic table as a cluster matrix is in progress to push this line of analysis a little further in the direction of formalization and quantification.

6. In the way that Jakobson develops the 'zero-sign' as a signifying blank.

7. I.e., absolutely not shared in the image (not in an over-the-shoulder shot). Cf. the types of setups found in The Maltese Falcon, in Section 6 above.

8. Since the stress here is on the material and graphic side, I prefer saying écriture filmique (in, say, Ropars' sense; see Ropars/Sorlin 1976, and Ropars-Wuilleumier 1981), rather than 'discourse' or 'enunciation'.

9. With low semantic load.

10. For 'rhyming', Bellour 1979: 111, and passim.

11. Palindrome: typically, a verbal construct whose letters can be put in reverse order to form the same signifier, e.g. 'A man, a plan, a canal, Panama'. As a context for this move, consider Lacan's stress on the work of figures in discourse as a splitting of meaning (1966a: 466-67).

12. Bellour 1979: 130.

13. Browne 1975.

14. The 'sameness' is congruent to the effect briefly studied, at the end of Section 12, for the long-duration shots in India Song. In the car lot scene, this actional 'inertia' is distributed into separate

shots, and is intelligibly alternated with other shots and actions; nonetheless, this figuration in a persisting bodily fixity produces a certain uncanny, unnameable threatening sense and action.

15. See Heath's categories, in 1975b: 101-108.

16. Hirst 1976: 403.

17. Althusser 1971: 174-75. Here and below gender designations in quotations are deliberately altered so as to stress reference to the female, for purpose of reference to our analysis of the car lot scene.

18. While the fact that Leigh disappears from the film at a point one-third into its duration is a commonplace, it is usually unnoticed the figure of the patrolman undergoes a similar treatment. As this textual analysis of one scene demonstrates, the patrolman and Marion form a couple, in a certain, quite telling, ideological fashion: as 'instrument' and 'material' of ideological work.

19. Cf. the bar as theorized in Section 5 above, Lacan on the ubiquitous voice distributed by machines (Lacan 1977b: 274), and the analyses of the filmic sound-track by Doane (1980) and Altman (1980).

20. It is easy to indicate some beginning points in a further elaboration of the utility of the legally interpellated subject for social reproduction of the conditions of production (see Althusser 1971: 127-28, 132, 162). In a word, what this analysis suggests is that the art-entertainment ideological apparatus provides the form of the subject-repressive state apparatus relationship, with the patrolman occupying the place of the capital Subject.

21. See MacCabe 1979: 301-302. MacCabe refers to Houdebine's suggestion of a counter-example in which the patrolman's hailing finds the wrong individual--this supposedly, for Houdebine, demonstrating the Lacanian domination of the letter. What this analysis of a filmic fragment shows is that the overdetermination of address ensures that the interpellation never goes astray in the final instance.

22. Pêcheux 1982: 125-26, 209-10. Pêcheux leaves this very provocative idea as an unelaborated suggestion. Also see note 26 below.

23. Barthes 1972, 1979.

24. In the way she puts herself in the victim's position by being blinded by the lights, unable to see, and thus loses her way off the highway; but more importantly, in the moments when she reveals the falsity of her registered name, and reveals herself as being in flight from a crime. In this, her anonymity is stressed as the diegetically 'practical' pivot opening her to voyeurism and murderous violence.

25. Macherey/Balibar 1981: 56.

26. See Heath 1981: 105-106 on the overlapping of the imaginary and symbolic with the ideological; Heath develops this as a criticism of the overwhelming equation of imaginary and ideology in Althusser and Pêcheux.

27. Macherey/Balibar 1981: 53.

28. This textual analysis of a fragment from Psycho suggest the possibility of a textual analysis which would move across the entire surface of the film, studying the ideological formation of the 'agent of the Law' against a historical context. Psycho seems to play off three different formations of that agent against each other: (1) the Law as unintelligible power--in the figure of the patrolman, (2) the Law as family, propriety, and ignorance (the Sheriff and his wife, in their cliched small town domesticity and revealed ignorance of Norman's violence), and (3) the Law as the isolated knight-hero detective, 'private' (outside the cynical legal institution)--in the figure of the detective Arbogast (who also fails when he is outside his native urban milieu, familiar from Chandler's and Hammett's novelistic fictions).

29. Macherey/Balibar 1981: Part 2.

30. Bellour 1979: 308. On the ending as hallucination, also cf. Macherey/Balibar 1981: 53, on the ideologically necessary "mark of hallucinatory reality."

31. 'Opaque': as opaque as his dark glasses, which simultaneously hide his eyes while figuratively emphasizing his look. Cf. Bellour 1979: 308.

32. MacCabe 1979: 303.

33. 'Terminal' in the sense that, 'after' the work of ideology is finished, the body--and sexual difference in the meaning of the bodies figured in the narrative--is not relevant as individuality. Consider that as the filmic narrative ends, Marion has been reduced to indifference as one in a series of victims, and that the determination of her fate has been moved aside as incidental to the thrill of 'explaining' the psycho and his violence.

34. Lacan 1977b: 103, 182.

35. Bonitzer 1979: 116.

36. That is, beyond any sort of imaginary diagnosis of Marion's neurosis as a semantic complex in the énoncé and diegesis. The constant risk is that of diegeticizing everything considered in analysis (cf. Metz 1977a: 40-45, 59 fn 12.

37. Heath 1976: 62-64, and Branigan 1975 and 1981. The notion of 'congruence' is mine, in preference to immediate reference to an 'identification' of looks, as in Heath.

38. This demand is not an essential given, but a produced effect for/with the subject in a given institution of cinema.
'Becomes object of desire', that is, in and through figuration, not directly because of metapsychological relations to film (screen as dream-screen, etc.). What is of most import is not desire as figured in the énoncé (for diegetic subjects), but the ways in which desire models the relation of figuration to spectatorship.

39. Green 1966 is a good discussion of the object a, beginning with the schemas. Heath 1976 also anchors his discussion of Lacan on the schemas.

40. Safouan 1979: 110-11.

41. Lacan 1977b: ix. Also see the text by Juan Nasio in Leclaire 1971: 109.

42. E.g., Nasio in Leclaire 1971: 106.

43. This 'minimal' intelligibility of the scene depends on spectatorial competence with figuration in interpreting point-of-view patterns, and upon extra-diegetic 'world knowledge' about the social activity connected with car purchasing, and with the prior diegetic context (Marion's desire, her theft) which forms the starting premises for the narrative's issues and trajectory.

44. Leclaire 1971: 76.

45. Leclaire 1971: 54-55.

46. Leclaire 1971: 79-80, Lacan 1977a: 242, 315.

47. Lacan 1977b: 103.

48. Lacan 1977b: 105.

49. Lacan 1977b: 118.

50. Conté 1970: 131.

51. Conté 1970: 131.

52. Leclaire 1971: 51-52.

53. Lacan 1977a: 292-325, and 1977b: 138-40.

54. See the discussion of the verbal category of person in Section 1 and its use in the analysis of Section 3; also see D. Percheron on 'focalization' in Collet 1976: 100-103.

55. This formula is more apt than the 'present' as presence.

56. The point in the movement of an engine when, theoretically, the camshaft cannot be turned by the cylinder's force through the connecting rod, since they are in perfect alignment.

57. E.g., in point-of-view editing. See the discussion of the verbal category of person in Section 1, and in the film analyses of Sections 3, 6, and 7.

58. Safouan 1973: 79.

59. Lacan 1977b: 43. Also: "the beating of causation" (Lacan 1977b: 76), the "temporal pulsation" in which the object is rhythmically breathed (143-45, and 188).

60. Lacan 1977b: 89.

61. Lacan 1977b: 185.

62. Lacan 1977b: 183.

63. Lacan 1977b: 179.

64. Lacan 1977b: 179-80.

65. Lacan 1977b: 274.

66. Lacan 1977b: 270.

67. See Conté 1970: 111-24 for these conceptual triads.

68. Lacan 1977b: 167.

69. Lacan 1977b: 168.

70. Lacan 1977b: 167.

71. Lacan 1977b: 31.

72. Lacan 1977b: 104.

73. Lacan 1977b: 102.

74. Lacan 1977b: 103, 111-12.

75. Lacan 1977b: 101, also see 109, 111.

76. Lacan 1977b: 115, 118-19.

77. Lacan 1977b: 116.

78. Lacan 1977b: 85.

79. Lacan 1977b: 181.

80. Lacan 1977b: 195.

81. Lacan 1966a: 849, 1977b: 200. Cf. Lacan's diagram of the drive, 1977b: 178.

82. Lacan 1977b: 182-83.

83. Lacan 1977b: 183-84.

84. Lacan 1977b: 186.

85. Lacan 1977b: 104, also 89, 92, and 102.

86. Lacan 1977b: 103.

87. Lacan 1977b: 111-12.

88. Lacan 1977b: ix.

89. Lacan 1977b: 103.

90. Lacan 1977b: 111-12.

91. Lacan 1977b: 111.

92. Lacan 1977b: 112.

93. Lacan 1977b: 112.

94. See, for instance, Lacan 1970.

95. Lacan 1977b: 107.

96. Lacan 1977b: 186.

97. This formulation is imprecise in the way it neglects the opposition Lacan tries to make between the support and cause of desire. Despite the earlier quotation (note 95), Lacan elsewhere has denied that there is a 'subject of desire' (see Lacan 1966b: 9).

98. Conté 1970: 133.

99. Consider the ending of Heath 1976: 66.

100. Metz 1977a: 9-26.

101. Leclaire 1971: 21.

102. Lacan 1977b: 76-77.

103. Lacan 1977b: 118.

104. Lacan 1977b: 185.

105. Freud 1963c: 64.

106. Lacan 1957: 32.

107. Lacan 1977b: 107. Cf. Conté 1970: 124.

108. On 'self mutilation', Lacan 1977b: 83, 62; on the dustuchia as encounter, and on dreams reported by Freud and Lacan of awakenings at a knock as dustuchia, Lacan 1977b: Ch. 5.

109. This is a deformation of Lacan's epigrammatic slogan, 1977b: 104.

110. Conté 1970: 115-16.

111. Conté 1970: 116.

112. Lacan 1977b: 182.

113. Lacan 1977b: 74.

114. Conté 1970: 134.

115. Conté 1970: 135.

116. 'A coordination of desires', i.e., for a repetition of the bodies, action, the sexual scene which begins the film. Heath gives a coherent schema of looks in narrative cinema, 1976: 62-63.

117. Lacan 1977b: 182.

118. Metz 1977a: 61-106, esp. 65-70.

119. Lacan 1977b: 69.

120. If the imaginary and symbolic need to be defined, it is clear that the other is Charlie, and the Other is the patrolman, as these statuses and relations are determined by the filmic discourse.

121. Lacan 1977b: 72-73.

122. Lacan 1977b: 88-89, where Lacan discusses the iconography of the Holbein painting, and the anamorphic, 'spaced out' figure of the skull figured under the two men's symbols of vanity.

123. Lacan 1977b: 91, 105-106.

124. Lacan 1977b: 104.

125. Lacan 1977b: 117-18.

126. I.e., in point-of-view shots of Marion from the patrolman's spatial position.

127. Conté 1970: 132, and also Lacan 1977b: 103.

128. Bellour 1979: 271-91, and his other analyses of Hitchcock films in Section III.

129. Lacan 1977b: 106.

130. Conté 1970: 105.

131. Conté 1970: 135.

132. Lacan 1977a: 312-13, 316.

133. Lacan 1977a: 151.

134. See Bellour's discussion of the mirrors dispersed through the figuration of Psycho, 1979: 296-97, 300-301, 304, 309.

135. Lacan 1977b: 83.

136. Lacan 1977b: 194.

137. Lacan 1977b: 194-95, where Lacan discussed the "subject-making" effect of this circular movement.

138. Lacan 1977b: 83.

139. Lacan 1977b: 251. Lacan is speaking of the vision of the wolves sitting on the tree, from Freud's Wolfman case.

SECTION 14: Analysis

Hiroshima mon amour

The above analysis of Psycho laid its main emphasis on figurational processes such as subsegmentation, alternation, and scopics, as a way to delineate a comparatively tight and efficient/effective regime of nameability and narrativity, in place and in operation for the spectatorship of the car lot scene. Such an emphasis put the analysis extremely close to the text's materiality, its film-work, and the play of codes: for instance, the analysis began by building up an analytic table covering the car lot scene's 47 shots.

Here, in an analysis of the opening of Hiroshima mon amour[1], the choice of emphasis falls instead on a somewhat more abstract pattern of six 'discursive dimensions', which are treated as multiple and conflictual, dynamic agencies, constituting and disrupting an initial regime of narrativity, most specifically in its aspect of nameability.[2] Therefore, this analysis aims at the passage in discursive movement, from instance which constitute to instances which disrupt narrativity, instead of a concern with the consistency or constituent semantics of the narrative énoncé.[3]

The fragment from Hiroshima, the opening 133 shots (sometimes designated as the 'prologue'), was chosen out of an intuitive impression that this fragment was a particularly dense example of a divided text, and of an uncertain, 'open', or partial initial constitution of narrativity.[4] The fragment has been made the object of some critical analysis, as part of readings of the filmic text as an

entirety, in terms of a phenomenology of the image as trace (Mayne), formal counterpoint of image and word (Van Wert), or a 'creative' non-realist cinematic discourse (Hanet).[5]

In a sense, this analysis follows the lines of the brief sketch concerning narrativity in India Song, but moves its focus on the discursive dimension closer to an expansive microanalysis of a much larger textual fragment. Although the usual ensemble of textual codes are not stressed or systematically deployed here, this microanalysis carries its reading of the filmic text along a somewhat different and novel bias.

The reading will also differ from the theorical model of Section 12 by expanding its focus to give more consideration to the sound track as a textual region producing/disrupting narrativity.

A major difference is that this analysis of a phase of filmic discourse will not be done via step-by-step unfolding of the filmic text (in its syntagmatic, sequential order). The intelligibility and force of this line of analysis of filmic discourse are most strengthened by a disposition of the analysis under the headings of the six 'discursive dimensions', so that significant strategies and processes of discourse can be deduced, and drawn together closely for consideration.[6]

This analysis of discourse is explicitly partial and selective. Under each of the six headings, only a few major instances of discursive constitution/disruption of narrativity are studied.

Reference to the filmic text will, however, still be made by a set of 14 'segments' (again in a deliberately unspecified sense[7], the

découpage being dictated by major alternation, but without receiving explicit subsegmental analysis). These are:

I: credit title, and shots 1-5: the two bodies

II: shots 6-12: the hospital

III: shot 13: the two bodies

IV: shots 14-35: the museum

V: shot 36: the two bodies

VI: shots 37-61: re-creation/documentary film clips, wounded bodies

VII: shot 62: the two bodies

VIII: shots 63-73: children and women

IX: shot 74: the two bodies

X: shots 75-105: bomb blast, demonstration, memorials

XI: shot 106: the two bodies

XII: shots 107-126: the future, the river Ota

XIII: shot 127: the two bodies

XIV: shots 128-132: the city and lyric narration

The 'discursive dimensions', employed to map the operation and explain the effects of the constitution/disruption of narrativity, are drawn from a number of researches in the new and burgeoning field of 'discourse process' study, or text-linguistics. Nearly all of that research, at the intersection of cognitive psychology, psycho-linguistics, and linguistics, concerns only verbal discourse. Oftentimes the researchers seem unaware of the general semiotic import, for non-verbal discourse, and for 'mixed' verbal/nonverbal discourse,

of the problems being addressed and the theoretical models which these researchers outline. Adapting and deploying some elements of those researches for a textual-discursive analysis of film is just a first small step in a much-needed interdisciplinary movement of collaboration, and exchange of paradigms--which could only strengthen and transform textual analysis of film, in the way that it has been formed during the last decade.[8]

The six dimensions of discourse fall into two groups.[9] The first two dimensions (Dominance and Address) concern cohesion, the connectedness of the surface text. The remaining four dimensions (Frames/Schemas, Phoricity, Logical Relations, and Focus) concern coherence, the connectedness of the concepts and relations, 'underlying' the text's surface, which form its 'textual world'.[9]

(1) DOMINANCE of action/object: the formal dominance of either of these narrative constituents (their ratio) in the figuration of the image or sound regions of the text.[10] Figurational codes, such as the ones used in earlier analyses, will be implicitly but unsystematically employed to specify changes in dominance, challenges to dominance, and changing functions of the dominance of action/object as these constitute/disrupt legible narrativity for text and spectatorship.
(2) ADDRESS: forms of visual/aural access to actions and objects figured in the text, and positioning implied in such address. How do modes and rhetorics of address[11] of the text's images and sounds, and changes in address, affect the spectator, so the constitution of

narrativity is promoted or upset? Do the rhetorics of address and the logic of narrativity conflict--with what results? How do rhetorical choices of visual/aural access produce effects (pleasure, unpleasure) connected with the manner of figuring the seen and the heard--how do these effects assist or block narrativity?

(3) FRAMES/SCHEMAS: the 'frames' of common referential knowledge about objects/events, or the small actional programs studied as cognitive 'schemas' in discourse processing.[12] How does the filmic discourse call up, and then subsequently confirm or disrupt, the effects of continuity and intelligibility conventionally afforded by frames and schemas?

(4) PHORICITY: the signalling, by discourse to the spectator, that a textual and narrative constituent (action, object) needs a particular semantic context for its minimal determination and comprehension, and the function of that relation between constituents for semantic comprehensibility and integration.[13] The three underlined terms here need explanatory expansion. First, the signalled phoric context can be manifested and available earlier (anaphora), or later (cataphora) inside a given text (endophora), or be assumed as available outside of it (e.g., the 'extra-textual' domain: exophora). Anaphora, as a relation of new semantic determination to an already given context, is most importance (antecedence): the referring back of discourse to the increasing, and (typically) increasingly determined context available in the prior text. This reference is 'managed' by discourse under a 'contract' of enunciational relations with spectators, in which narra-

tivity is often a major term. Second, the function of the phoric relation between constituents can be the sort of figurative relation studied as rhetorical tropes (metaphor, metonymy), where narrative semantics are troped. Third, the integration (non-integration) of phoric relations affects the cohesion and coherence of narrativity. Thus this dimension directs attention to textual constituents which are phoric, that is, which signal the need for the spectator to relate them to some context for minimal semantic determination and integration. How are these phoric elements managed? Is phoricity used by discourse to constitute or disrupt narrativity?

(5) LOGICAL RELATIONS: the semantic relations, such as entailment, expectation, or negation, formed in discourse, between actions, objects and other narrative constituents.[14] This dimension focuses on the effects that logical relations have, constituting or disrupting narrativity, since narrativity (actions, objects) carries with it a set of logically pertinent interrelations. How is logical consistency or coherence maintained to constitute narrativity; how do logical contradictions and paradox disrupt it?

(6) FOCUS: the figurational focus onto action and object by discourse, either as <u>progressive</u> movement into newly unfolded text and topic, or as <u>localizing</u> expansion of given material.[15] How do discursive focalizations of progression or localization affect other discursive features (such as dominance or frames/schemas in their operation), so as to assist or block the constitution of narrativity? How do progressively focussed movements of discourse (built on actional

schemas or logical relations) increase or decrease cohesion/coherence for narrativity? How do localizing movements of discourse affect cohesion/coherence?

Analysis of the prologue

Dominance

Conventionally, narrativity corresponds to a dominance of action over object within a legible actional schema and referential frames defining narrative objects. This textual ratio is troubled from the first shots of the prologue. In segment I, the possible schemas and frames offered by the film's title ('Hiroshima' as a historical schema of events, or frame of information about nuclear war and its aftermath, or the schema of melodramatic narrative cued by 'mon amour') are blocked from any easy and foundational constitution of narrativity by the figuration of the bodies. The figuration (scale, framing, dissolves) make it difficult to read a legible, nameable actional progression, even when the figuration of the dissolves (= temporal passage across elided time/action, according to cinematic conventions) explicitly asks the spectator to read actional progression. Simultaneously, the figurative effects of the dust and sweat which cover the bodies have a difficult legibility, either as plausible and readable action, or as objects. (In the film's production, an opening shot of an atomic mushroom had been planned--which, as a counter-example to the discourse of the filmic text as produced, would have

anchored and determined the metaphoric/metonymic semantics of the object: the dust as fallout.[16])

A second instance, which begins in segment II, is the disjunction between the sound and image tracks as this sustained effect (there is no immediate diegetic 'synchronization' of image to sound until the prologue is passed) relates to action/object dominance. This is probably the single most disruptive discursive instance troubling narrativity. A segment such as segment II approaches narrativity, and a dominance of action. The editing, even in its condensed form (establishing exterior shot, medium-long interior shot, and the close ups, now with 'human' CHR-code presence, and medium shots) accords, as a figurational pattern for action, with the conventional action schema of 'touristic visiting (seeing)' which the voice over provides as a label. But by segment IV, the absence in image of the looking female character, and the multiplication of shots of objects (without an easy logic for this excessive figurational articulation), troubles the narrativity promised by that prior actional schema as a dominant, despite and against the effect of (1) the repeated verbal labelling of action by the voice over ("I saw... I saw...") and (2) the point-of-view figuration, associated with the actional schema of looking, in the form of mobile camera, at eye-level, at a 'walking' speed of movement, in synchronization with the voice-over nomination of objects (seen in the image).

The sheer effect of the objects figured, in segment IV, is an instance orchestrated for culminating intensities which are not chan-

nelled into legible actional schemas. The museum artifacts and photos, as objects, do not offer any sufficient legible actional schema,[17] and the voice over only weakly constitutes narrativity around them as an uncertain 'succession' of viewed objects. Thus these objects carry a dominance of non-narrative effect, an effect of pain in looking, which moves and rises in intensity, from a bent and burnt bicycle, to fused clumps of bottle caps, to bottled strips of skin and tufts of hair, to culminate in an extreme close-up view of a photo of a man's charred head and scalp. In segment VI, the discourse takes off from segment IV's figuration of the object, as an indefinite (and antecedent) plateau of unpleasure in looking, and intensifies the painful effect to a culmination at a burned and gaping ocular socket of a woman. The intense effect of this dominance of objects overmatches the weak and uncertain narrativity constituted around the alternational series of the two bodies (segments I, III, V, VII, and so on), where narrativity seemed, initially and provisionally, partially constituted around the armature of an actional schema of 'argument' (the man's and woman's voices, their claims and denials of what she has--or not--seen). But that 'actional scene', after segment I, becomes only a silent (dialogue-silent) counterpoint in the text's alternation; the discourse does not develop it as a locus and chain of narrative, according to the necessary unfolding and specifications which would establish its actional dominance within a regime of narrativity, so that the 'scenes' at the hospital and museum could be taken, within narrativity, as subordinate ('quoted' and embedded) actions, as figurationally 'imaged' acts (flashbacks) of 'memory' ascribed to the woman as narrative agent.

Address

The defaults against narrativity by the instances of action/object dominance described above furthermore carry consequences for the dimension of discursive address of the text to spectatorship.

The contradiction between the male and female voices, begun at the end of segment I, is repositioned by discourse so that spectatorship is directly implicated in it: at the end of segment II, while the spectator does see the hospital in image, the male voice over denies that it has been seen. This implication of spectatorship into a logical paradox (a verbal negation of an action of seeing fused with, imprinted over the image of the object seen) strongly disrupts narrativity, at an important early moment in the text's initial elaboration by its discourse, and further in the aspect of epistemological stability conventionally expected for the access to the narrative text.[18]

A second factor here embedded in this discursive instance is that, while the status of seeing (as a fundamental access to the film) is being unsettled, the absence of the looking woman (her body) within the images' frame affects the point-of-view rhetoric of the image track so that this image track becomes disturbingly 'mis-addressed' to the spectator. 'Mis-addressed' in that the spectator's visual access is being heavily stressed by the aporia or contradiction around seeing being produced in the logic of the voice over (assertions, negations of actions of seeing), so that the spectator's visual access is not determined and imaginarily certified, according to conventions of cinematic

representation which would stipulate it (in the instance of a voice over narration) as a silent partnership in vision between a diegetic character's look and the spectator's look. This thrusts the obvious 'subjectivity' of the visual rhetoric of access all the more fully onto the spectatorial side of the filmic enunciation,[19] while the textual side still lacks a legible and dominant actional schema. This unconventional, 'off-balance' distribution and un-framing of figured subjectivity impedes narrativity.

A further consequence of these discursive features is that the verbal second-person form of the spoken narration (voice over from an unseen origin[20]) assumes an excessive address. The voice-over speech, with its 'you [tu]' form, especially during the culminating segment XIV, overruns its weak, insufficiently determined diegetic frame and, in its open address to the spectator (implicated by point-of-view rhetoric), foregrounds the indeterminacy of the discourse, its 'failure'--even after several minutes of film time, through 133 shots--to determine the basic positions and determinations which would allow a substantial regime of narrativity to emerge, in partnership with the spectator's cognition of action/image.

Frames/Schemas

If the dimension of discursive address works as an instance disrupting narrativity by way of an 'excess', the dimension of cognitive frames/schemas seems to more evenly, alternately constitute and disrupt narrativity. This effect takes the form of a rupture between frames and schemas.

The beginning (shots 108-115) of segment XII composes, in its voice-over narration, a briefly expanded but quite legible actional schema of the events of a city's destruction in atomic bombing. The future tense of the voice-over narration present some measure of difficulty, given its unusualness, but this aspect can be integrated.[21] The image track is legible as figuring a series of various cityscapes (largely unpeopled) as sites for the actional schema (phases of destruction), within a certain metaphoric relation, but not one which stretches phoricity to a disruptive breaking point against narrativity. Hence the image track is solidary with the narrativity very explicitly proposed, available, and in process of constitution through the actional schema being named in narration. But this brief discursive movement--and some others like it--is not intermeshed into a chain of hierarchy of schemas, marked out across the whole space of the prologue. The filmic discourse in the prologue accumulates schemas (in various amounts of definition and elaboration), as intermittent phases of discourse, but without sustaining and elaborating them, ordering them (i.e., over, within, after each other), up to a level sufficient for narrativity to become established as a discursive dominant. Segment XII is exemplary in the way discourse dissolves a partially constituted regime of narrativity. Shot 116 could be integrated, with some difficulty (i.e., the switch here in voice-over narration to the present tense, which breaks with the eight-item series of tense-specified actions named in the preceding shots), as a successive phase of the actional schema in terms of its voice over information ("New

forms of vegetation rise up from the sand.") and the image of the plant. But the ironic co-presence in the image of a packet of "Peace" brand cigarettes does not conform to those semantic determinations, and thus troubles that coherence of narrative semantics around the object and the action ('re-growth'). Shot 117, even as it might seem, momentarily, to solidify narrativity by inserting specific actants into the actional schema (image/narration: four young men in school uniform in a circle/ "Four students await together a fraternal and legendary death."), breaks up the narrativity by figuring an action (and actants), narrated in the present tense, which seem most appropriately to be situated within the historical frame of 'Hiroshima 1945'. That semantic determination of a frame is much easier[22] for the spectator to construe, although that construal of shot 117 is thereby not homogenous with the discourse of the preceding shots of the segment and its proposed narrativity. With shot 117 the musical theme, unifying the segment as a figurational unit since its beginning, ends. Shot 118, a silent image of a plant on the sand, and shots 119 on, which begin a description of the river Ota (in Hiroshima), complete the dissolution of the potential narrativity initiated at the segment's outset.[23]

This constituting/disrupting movement of segment XII demonstrates the dysfunctional split, in the prologue's discourse, between referential frames and narrativizing actional schemas. The former persistently supply a minimal threshold of intelligibility to most of the images, and to much of the narration:[24] 'factual' knowledge about the Hiroshima events or atomic warfare in general makes the images and ver-

bal statements locally interpretable. But although actional schemas are signalled which briefly organize successions of shots legibly as nameable narrative for the spectator, these are not sustained, nor hierarchized, nor in coherent successive relation between themselves. Narrativity, and its constitution around an intelligible actional schema, persistently 'slips' throughout the prologue. The dérapage carries more effect, since according to the conventional agenda of narrative-filmic discourse, this prologue would be a crucial zone of overture where the spectator attends to the filmic discourse with intensity, in order to participate by contract in the formation of some of the most important semantic determinations of the text.[25] Instead, the prologue accumulates a cognitively-semantically disunified jumble of topics (schemas, frames, actions, objects) which will function as a painful, locally meaningful but globally uncertain prior context for the diegesis and discursive regime which will begin constitution in a somewhat sparse, but still conventional satisfactory manner immediately after the prologue.

Phoricity

Phoricity "embodies an instruction to retrieve from elsewhere the information necessary for interpreting the passage in question."[26] Five instances can be analyzed to demonstrate that phoricity functions as an instance by which the prologue's discourse lures and refuses narrativity.

Maintenance of continuity around narrative action, as discourse unfolds the text, is achieved by the phoric linkages which a spectator

makes (or 'computes', to use the jargon of the cognitive psychologists). The passage from segment I to segment II forms the first instance breaking the phoric solidarity prerequisite for narrativity. Since the speakers heard in segment I are not sufficiently determined, the tenuous construal of segment II as a 'response' to the male voice's contradicting negation ("You saw nothing in Hiroshima. Nothing.") and female voice's assertion ("I saw everything. Everything.") is marked, and disturbs the enunciational relationship of the spectator. And since the speaking woman is marginally, insufficiently determined as the figurative subject of vision for segment II's images, the phoric relation between images, their figurative origin,[27] and spectator (looking, hearing, and cognitively processing these textual materials) is unconventionally difficult, and threatened.

In a second instance, phoric relations are 'jammed', that is, the pace of their indication, in discourse, runs obviously too fast, into a multiplication which prevents their normative integration by the spectator. The conventional editing pattern for the figuration of space around an action of 'entering a building', as a stock constituent of narrative action, would allow at most one or two large-scale exterior shots, before figuring the actional agent in much closer framing performing a successive action (of whatever larger schema is being employed and unfolded).[28] Segment IV begins (shot 14) with a long shot of the museum exterior, with voice over ("Four times to the museum."). In 15, the male voice counters with an inexplicable[29] question "Which museum, in Hiroshima?", over another large scale view.

These are followed by four more shots of the exterior and of interior stairways; in no shots are characters seen (no dialogue; musical theme continues from shot 14). This figurational excess calls insistently, intensely, for the spectator to determine some phoric semantic relationship among these different images. But amidst a context of multiple figurational defaults (non-determinations of 'necessary' elements for the emergence of narrativity), the spectator can likely find no plausible inter-reference easily available which could draw an acceptable connection between the shots. The discourse is not fantastic; the succession of images very weakly maps the spatial succession of the actional schema of 'entering the museum', but the excess of shots/images blocks that mapping from assuring legibility.

In a third instance, discourse insistently figures and foregrounds certain objects in ways which signal their phoric status, their need for contextual determination. This is not simple 'foreshadowing' as a technique of representational density and narrative suspense, in a regime where phoric references are only partly determined by the dominant regime of narrativity, but that regime assures later (cataphoric) determination. Since the prologue's discourse inhibits the construction of dominant narrative determinations or of a focus of dominant/marginal semantics, the spectator is consequently all the more closely, although less coherently, focussed on each aspect of the textual material as discourse unrolls it, so that the effect of uncertain, withheld, or blocked phoric determination is intensified. The particular instance in the prologue is produced by a number of images,

which stand out figurationally to a small degree. These could be assigned semantic labels such as 'hands' (shots 13, 60, 73), and 'emergence' (45: a Japanese woman emerges from underneath the rubble; 47,48: worms and ants emerging from the soil; 116: a plant with narration "New forms of vegetation rise from the sand."). Instead of a manageable (and 'computable') allusion, in a restricted economy of discourse and semantics, this chain participates in the 'excessive economy' of the prologue,[30] whose discourse is traumatic in that excess of material and lack of determination. The chain thus participates in the partial (and still controlled) frustration of spectatorship during the prologue, in which the demand for narrativity is frustrated by the filmic discourse. The chain is eventually and fairly obviously semantically integrated into the narrative text, as a cataphoric metaphor for the woman's 'history' (past actions of her confinement and liberation), but the degree of cataphora (posterior determination) involved, in the absence of any narrative dominant, participates in the discourse's strategy for staging these metaphoric materials as a disruptive instance.

In a fourth instance, the filmic discourse plays phoricity against a potentially constituting actional schema to simultaneously offer and deny the constitution of narrativity. In the final passage of segment X (shots 88-105), images of Hiroshima souvenir shops, memorial plaques, and large monuments are joined to voice-over narration argues, denies, asserts the action of memory/forgetting:

Her: Listen to me. Like you, I know what forgetting is.
Him: No. You do not know what forgetting is.

Her: Like you, I am endowed with memory. I know what forgetting is.
Him: No. You are not endowed with memory.
Her: Like you, I too have tried to struggle with all my force against forgetting. Like you, I have forgotten. Like you, I have desired an inconsolable memory, a memory of shadows and stone. I have struggled, for my part, with all my force, each day, against the horror of no longer understanding at all the reason for remembering. Like you, I have forgotten. Why deny the evident necessity of memory?[31]

Discourse here seems to be forming the split between the image and voice as a metaphoric relation, where the narrative will be formed by the actional schema and agents named in the narration ('remember ==> struggle ==> forget'; 'you, I'). But as the passage develops, the image/voice split becomes a disrupting force against the coherence of narrativity promised by the opening lines of narration. No narrative progression, of an actional schema, can be easily read in the succession of images. (They do retain a minimal, but static semantic coherence by reference to the knowledge frame about Hiroshima as a city.) On the other side, the demand for phoric reference to a determining context becomes more and more pronounced, as the verbal thread accumulates actions of 'struggle', 'desiring', and so on, but without the necessarily increasing representational specification into which an actional schema must be inserted for conventional narrativity to emerge and be sustained. Spectatorship is frustrated in its active attention and search for determination. The spectator can only look to the static, accumulative metaphoric images of 'memory' <u>simultaneously</u> given. Searching for an anaphoric determining context in the <u>earlier</u> text provides the spectator only with the context of the museum as another sym-

bol of failed or false memory of Hiroshima's past; but that context is semantically insufficient (it does not determine the rationale for that memory through the museum as having the metaphysical importance of this daily struggle) and uncertain (since the action of seeing/remembering through the museum has itself been earlier so strongly affirmed by the text's images and female voice) that such anaphoric reference does not suffice to solidly constitute narrativity. As in the example discussed above, this instance is part of a discursive strategy to move the spectator through a range of materials, frames, and schemas, while leaving them temporarily incoherent, and nonetheless available for a subsequent, point-by-point re-determination. For example, each of the terms of this actional schema of 'remembering/forgetting' will later be re-figured and re-determined as a symbolic pre-text for the coherent diegesis which the film later constitutes.

A last instance of phoricity involves semantic distance and psychic effect. In the well-known passage in segment VI, the woman's voice over describes the emergence of flowers across the city's ashes 15 days after the Hiroshima bombing; this narration is coupled to graphic images of children's burns and wounds (shots 53-57). The discursive strategy here seems to rely on establishing a phoric unity between image and speech, a relay of literal equivalence: in prior shots, the woman labels objects (e.g., shot 49: a dog in some newsreel footage; "Dogs were photographed. For eternity. I've seen them."). Then this frame (and force) constituting a small regime of historical narrative as speech/image equivalence are overturned by the metaphoric

split between a series of flowers individually named in speech, and a succession of horrific wounds seen in separate shots. The overturning disrupts narrativity, and turns its force into a non-narrative effect of painful looking, still caught in the discursive frame of vocal narration, held against the voice's nominations of what is supposed to be seen, and the wrenching semantic distance of (meta-)phoric cross-reference, traversed by the spectator equating the burned flesh and bursting flowers of Hiroshima. The force which a conventional schema provides to narrativity (narrative development as carried by the vocal nomination of successive shots: a dog seen "on the second day", the flowers appearing after "fifteen days"), and an enunciational format of bi-referential image/voice derived from documentary generic practice, are played by the prologue's discourse, not to dissolve narrativity in a simple move of loss, but in order to make the dimension of phoricity the scene of a scarring overture of effect onto the film's spectator.

Logical Relations

> It is on the level of logic as a signifying relation that the discourse produces its effects: what its work pulverizes . . . is the possibility of referring to a logic of action insofar as this would come from a supposedly real logic.
>
> --Ropars[32]

The conventional logic of narrativity is one of pseudo-causality: post hoc, ergo prompter hoc. All the analysis of the prologue so far demonstrates the degree to which that spectatorial construction of a logical relationship, across a series of actions, remains intermittent

and blocked. This strategy culminates in the semantic value-contradictions of the lyrical incantation narrated by the female voice over the final segment XIV, where her voice states, repeatedly, "You kill me. You do good for me", a verbal complex which, while intensifying the relation to a "tu", offers a difficult relation to the earlier verbal exchanges, their minimal actional construction attaching to them (as 'argument' with legible 'motivation'), so that narrativity again slides into irresolution.

The semantic coherence of the text can also be defined and analyzed by way of comparison of the logical implications of its different determinations.[33] A number of instances in the prologue seem pertinent, beginning with the absolute contradiction, in the voice-over speech of segment I, between the woman's assertion ("I saw everything.") and the man's negation ("You saw nothing."). This instance plays a series of variations on the Batesonian logical-perceptual paradox, of an action of 'seeing' simultaneously achieved and denied within a single logical frame (e.g., shots 50-51: the assertion/negation of the action of seeing the newsreel footage, heard 'over' the newsreel images).[34] The filmic discourse would then seemingly be caught in the same problematic of the structural-material impossibility of figuration negation as/in image, which Freud encountered in his analyses of the figuration of logic by the dream-work.[35]

However, textual analysis can show how the logical relation of contradiction or negation has passed from <u>verbal</u> figuration into the <u>aural</u> and <u>graphic</u> textuality of the prologue: into the text's alter-

national network, its image/sound conjunctions.[36] An instance of this transformative re-figuration of negation can be read in segment IV which begins with the woman asserting that she has seen the museum, and the man's question "Which museum in Hiroshima?" (a paradoxical turn, as discourse, in that the identity of the museum--as the historical museum of the bombing--is already well established by anaphoric contexts, for the spectator, by the film's title, and by the images of the hospital patients and their burns).[37] His denial is subsequently transformed and re-figured into the music--into a jaunty, circus-like piano theme which begins at shot 21 inside the museum. This music determines the semantics from the man's point of view, according to his values, as a transformation of his denial of her seeing: as a statement 'seeing the museum could only be a circus-like spectacle for your eyes' through the musical signifier, and its conjunction with the images and woman's spoken assertion of an action of seeing.

Two other instances translate the logical contradiction in speech into a figurational pattern: 'control' of alternation, in a way which binds logical relations and sexual difference. The woman's verbal statement seemingly has the power to 'initiate' an alternational shift away from the bodies, to 'produce' images of that which she nominates in speech. This enunciational figure occurs in the first shots of segments II and IV, when the hospital and museum appear in image in synchronization to her assertions of having seen them. And further, the male voice seemingly has the discursive-enunciational power to terminate those image-sequences, and to alternate back to the image of the

bodies (as in shots 12, 35). A further and thorough analysis of alternation would demonstrate that this pattern undergoes transformation into a multiplying interplay with other strands of the film's text and discourse in the prologue.

In these instances, filmic figuration takes over the logical relations implicit in verbal statements, and multiplies their effects of paradox and contradiction into the textual depth and volume (its graphic and aural matters and weaves), so that the conflict of constitution/disruption of narrativity becomes a process operating manifestly and latently in the text and discourse of the film.

Focus

Another aspect of the last discursive instance analyzed consists in the distinction between progressive and localizing operations of discourse as it forms the filmic text. The 'woman's discourse'[38] seems--in part--the source of movement, or the sort of progressive change of focus which directly assists the formation of narrativity. Her verbal narration, and the images textually juxtaposed to her narration, are the zone from which brief, tentative phases of narrativity do emerge for momentary constitution: actional schemas are explicitly labelled, she is the agent, the image track 'conforms' to the schemas, giving cohesion/coherence to the schemas and to the images as legible successions, with legible logical links.[39] The 'man's discourse' comes to characterize itself as a anti-narrativizing force in the enunciation, in the way it 'localizes' without any resultant gain in

cohesion/coherence, denying and blocking the unfolding of the schemas implied in the woman's speech and the accompanying images, and returning the alternation of the image track back to the scene of the bodies--the scene which is perceptually difficult to read, either to the measure that the sexual difference of the bodies is initially illegible, or in the way that a legible and progressive actional schema for the bodies' sexual action seems unnameable and indiscernible throughout (compare segments I, III, V, VII, IX, XII, XIII).[40] The rhetorical figure of this 'locale'-izing blockage of narrativity, across sexual and national difference, would surely be that of comparison,[41] as figured in the join of shots 126-127 in a dissolve, in which the images of the bodies and of the river and city are superimposed into an embrace. This trope of comparison would then dictate the woman's impassioned incantation of desire over the series of shots of the city's body, which is entered by the tracking camera of segment XIV. The climax of the prologue's discourse, figuration, and text assumes the form, not of a still-awaited regime of narrativity, but of an erotics of motion, body, and place guided by the woman's voice.

NOTES for Section 14

1. See Resnais 1962, and Duras 1960.

2. Narrativity is here principally understood as it was defined in Section 12. But another way to define narrativity might be a ratio of high/low informativity concerning narrative semantics; on 'informativity' as a textual regime, see de Beaugrande/Dressler 1981: Ch. 7.

3. For this emphasis on passage and process, cf. the parallel dichotomy in Chafe 1979, who contrasts and chooses a 'flow model' over a 'hierarchical model' for the linguistic description of the syntax of an orally recounted filmic narrative.

Genette's pioneering study of 'narrative discourse' (1972), for another example, remains closer to the énoncé (of Proust's novelistic text) than to enunciational process and passage.

Ropars addresses a similar, but subordinate feature in Resnais's film Muriel (establishment and rupture of temporal relations), but she proceeds by way of figurational elements (figure, color, sound, and image-track determinations) (Bailblé/Marie/Ropars 1974: 195-263), rather than in terms of discursive dimensions as instances.

4. For counter-examples to the prologue's discourse, consider the overtures of The Maltese Falcon or An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge, as these were analyzed in Sections 6 and 3 above.

5. Mayne 1978; Van Wert 1978: 218-33, 252-63; Hanet 1973, especially pp. 63-64, where she briefly approaches our problem, but since she takes diegesis as a preconstructed zone of signification (not an enunciational process), she cannot bring into view the conflict of instances around narrativity.

6. The density of filmic textuality, and the overlap of discursive processes, render a step-by-step approach too awkward for an effective discussion, when the object of analysis is discourse as a movement and strategy operating through instances.

7. Bellour 1979: 123.

8. Furthermore, most research on discourse processes aligns itself with empirical testing. As was noted in Section 12 above, the way I wish to draw these lines of research into the project of textual analysis of film includes an effort to discover lines of research, which can combine empirics of testing with exploration of theoretical problems pertinent to the film analyst's effort to read the film.

9. On cohesion/coherence, de Beaugrande/Dressler 1981: Chs. 1, 4; Advances in Discourse Processes 1980b: Ch. 1; and Fowler (reference in note 15, below). Cf. Genot (1979: 3) on 'surface structure' versus

'semantic representation'. The latter need not be an atemporal (non-narrative) semantic pattern, such as Greimas's 'semiotic square' (Greimas/Courtés 1979).

10. On the 'dominant', Jakobson 1978.

11. For point-of-view rhetoric, Branigan 1975, 1981, Browne 1975, and the discussion of the verbal category of person in Section 1 above. Little work has been done on the modes of aural address, although certain instances of the overdetermined address of dialogue have been treated as part of general analyses of films.

12. Advances in Discourse Processes 1980b: Ch. 6; de Beaugrande/Dressler 1981: sec. V.16; and van Dijk 1980: sec. 6.6. Also see Tannen, "What's in a Frame? Surface Evidence for Underlying Expectations," in Advances in Discourse Processes 1979: 137-81, and on schemas, Rumelhart 1975 and 1977.

13. On phoricity, as studied in verbal discourse by cognitive science, see S. Rochester and J. Martin, "The Art of Referring: The Speaker's Use of Noun Phrases to Instruct the Listener," Advances in Discourse Processes 1979: 245-69; H. Clark and S. Haviland, "Comprehension and the Given-New Contract," in ADP 1977: 1-40; and J. DuBois, "Beyond Definiteness: The Trace of Identity in Discourse," ADP 1980a: 203-74.

14. On logical relations as these form semantic coherence of texts, Bellert 1970, and T. van Dijk, "Connectives in Text Grammar and Text Logic," in van Dijk and Petöfi 1977: 1-63. On basic logical relations in semantics, Leech 1974: Ch. 13. On logical inferences among elements of a narrative-actional chain, W. Warren, D. Nicholas, and T. Trabasso, "Event Chains and Inferences in Understanding Narratives," Advances in Discourse Processes 1979: 23-52.

15. R. Fowler, "Cohesive, Progressive, and Localizing Aspects of Text Structure," in van Dijk/Petöfi 1977: 64-84. Notice that there is not a simple automatic equivalence of a progressive discourse movement with narrativity.

16. See Duras 1960: 21.

17. There is a weak sequentiality in the segment's images, which could be read as a figure of causality: a model of a bomb and photo of a mushroom cloud are followed--but not immediately--by images of the burned artifacts and wounds.

18. Conventional narrativity would certainly permit the expression of logical contradictions within the frame of the énoncé (diegesis), but not within the frame of the enunciation (access).

19. At a moment when spectatorship may be latently confronting a specular image of its look, in the accumulation of metaphoric images of blindness, such as the empty eye sock of shot 52, and others.

20. Specifically: the bodies are not seen to speak.

21. Cf. the section on the verbal category of tense and narrative, in Section 1, above.

22. I.e., 'legendary' for whom? The implication is that this is a historical event from 1945 being narrated in the 'historical present'.

23. E.g., it is difficult to find an actional schema to correspond to the description of the flow of the tides in the river's estuary, or a knowledge-frame which will relate to the description of the river water's changing colors, and relate to a narrative context. These difficulties block passage into narrativity.

24. With the exception of the images of the two bodies (segments I, II, V, etc.), the narrated argument, and the lyrical incantation of segment XIV.

25. Again, consider the openings of The Maltese Falcon and An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge as counter-examples in which narrativity is solidly, efficiently, and informatively constituted around frames and schemas.

26. M. Halliday and R. Hasan, quoted in Rochester/Martin, Advances in Discourse Processes 1977: 245.

27. 'Figurative', since one can hardly speak of the bodies as a sufficiently determined diegetic origin.

28. Consider, as an example of that figurational convention, Cary Grant's return to the Chicago hotel in the first shots after the bus-stop/airplane scene, in North by Northwest.

29. This instance is analyzed below, in the subsection on logical relations.

30. Here is an opening to historical-poetic study of formal norms: could a typological description be made of the degrees openness/closure of narrativity, a typology would could then be historically specified?

31. Note that the script (Resnais 1962) incorrectly distributes this dialogue among the shots.

32. Ropars, discussing Resnais's Muriel, in Bailblé/Marie/Ropars 1974: 243.

33. Bellert's (1970) method applies to verbal texts; coherence is tested by comparing the logical entailments of the separate sentences composing a text. In the prologue, the difficulty is not only that of contradictions among elements of a logical network, but that the logical network is so weakly knitted together.

34. See the second instance discussed in the subsection on address, above.

35. Freud 1965a: 347-55, 545.

36. Furthermore: alternation, in its conventional employment as a figurational pattern, would seem to carry a semantic determination as a logical connective 'and' (cf. van Dijk in van Dijk/Petöfi 1977). But as the prologue unfolds, it becomes progressively more difficult for the spectator to establish and maintain actional, causal, spatial, or temporal relations or determinations to 'fill' the form of that logical connective. The alternational movement 'loses' its sense, and thus blocks narrativity.

37. The inference of 'logical expectation' (see Leech 1974: 291, 294-95) is that there is a possible or plausible reference to another museum.

38. I.e., as this 'discourse' is figured within the general filmic discourse.

39. Fowler, in van Dijk/Petöfi 1977: 77.

40. Cf. note 36. The alternation is at first a minimally localizing, anti-cohesive force. It is 'open' and available for a semantically cohering schema and determination. After a certain time (surely by the unreeling of segment X), the frustration experienced by many spectators (over the non-appearance of determinations) has changed the effect of the alternation into a localizing, non-progressive force blocking narrativity.

37. Fontanier 1977: 377-79.

SECTION 15: Issues

1. Typology of narrativity and practices of spectatorship

The multiple and functional differences between the 'regimes' (economies) of narrativity in Psycho and Hiroshima mon amour suggest that the construction of a typology of narrativity is an important issue. Such a typology could then enter the agenda for research in the historical poetics of cinema, for specification in the contexts of 'genres', 'national cinemas', 'technology', and 'authorship'. By this approach to film history as a series of changes of economies of filmic discourse, textual analysis of film refashions the conceptual frame of 'historicity' and the mode of historiographic writing in productive ways for those committed to the field of cinema/film history.[1]

But not only cinema poetics could draw on typological researches. It further seems possible and desirable to begin to differentiate and characterize various practices of spectatorship, based upon the types of discursive economies proposed by bodies of films. Narrativity would be here only one among a number of important categories at work. This line of research would incite more developed and specific accounts of spectatorship as a process of cognition, interpretation, reception, and transformation of meaning and effect. Such research on spectatorship could be productively coordinated to the perspective of textual analysis.

2. The look: object, action

The telling manner in which the look--persistently from the outset of this series of theoretical sketches and textual analyses, culmi-

nating in the analyses of Chapter Four--has come to dominate consideration of action and object in the narrative filmic text and discourse needs to read and deconstructed in its turn. Psychoanalytic investigation, and the cognitive aspects of discourse processes, seem to have been necessary stages of development in this series of essays, so that analysis of the look could advance beyond studies of the formal/rhetorical pattern of point of view, into the full analysis of the look as a dynamic nexus fusing action and object. In this sense, the analyses of Psycho and Hiroshima mon amour deconstruct the theoretical distinctions, separations, and program with and under which this thesis began.

3. The look: A program for analysis of its figuration

The textual analyses of filmic fragments have educed numerous aspects of the figuration of the look, in its imaginary and symbolic dimensions. Given the concern of this work with the methodology of textual analysis, it could be asked if a basic and general program for analysis of the figuration of the look could emerge from these theoretical sketches and concrete textual analyses. Such a program might concentrate upon a four-element series of (1) an imaginary site of the look, (2) sight as an imaginary field of space defined by the look from that site, (3) symbolic insight as a privileged knowledge by the look, and (4) the symbolic power in narrative terms to incite effective action. An more developed outline of this program appears elsewhere.[2]

4. Identification

The two analyses of this chapter advance the program for research on filmic identification sketched in Section 12. The analysis of Psycho suggests that identification can be traced as a temporal pulsation of 'beats' where actional nomination and the figuration of the look intersect as phases. These phases develop a large semantic formation, aligned with narrativity. This is a considerably more subtle, and fine-grained model than is current in most consideration of film spectatorship. The analysis of Hiroshima mon amour offers a diverging counter-example, where such identification and narrativity (in nameable and sustained actional schemas, and in point-of-view figuration) are only intermittently constituted, only to be disrupted by the movements of filmic discourse, so that these features are not formed as the consistency and stability of a discusive/textual regime as found in the scene from Psycho.

While the notion of 'audience identification' is a familiar convention, the rigorous analysis of identification has become, recently, a predominant and ideologically pressing issue in film theory and criticism. Textual analysis of film, its methodological scope, and the theoretical perspectives and insights it affords can significantly form the terms under which the issues and cultural politics of identification can now be addressed.

5. A topology of the spectatorial subject-in-process

The research on the look as object and action, carried out at the micro-textual level, poses the question of the possibility of a topo-

logy of the spectator as filmic subject. This would not be an extension of the general metapsychology of the cinematic subject, but would depart from metapsychological theories in order to construct a topological model designed to account for processes and effects at the microtextual level of the shot. In particular, it would mark out the topology of the imaginary and symbolic registers constituting the filmic subject, in coordination with the imaginary and symbolic operations of the text. This theoretical move would aim to overcome the limitations of formal researches on filmic textuality which--in the absence of a developed model of spectatorial subjectivity--slide towards a too limited perspective onto the filmic text as énoncé.

6. Textual analysis as deconstruction: ideology, culture

This chapter's analyses broach a number of large issues of culture and cultural representations around law, violence, and sexual difference, in ways which lay emphasis on the ideology of textual and discursive forms. As such, these analyses offer some good ground for specifying the relation of textual analysis of film to the project of deconstruction of ideology as cultural criticism. Textual analysis of film does not stand in an anterior or supportative relation to the critical project of deconstruction. Their relation, in the zone of cultural texts and politics addressed by film analysts, is most effectively conceived as one of force and space. The dismantling force of textual analysis of film, as it reads the formal lines of a film's semantic register, draws the critical subject over the threshold into

the ambit of deconstructive criticism, where an avowed politics of culture in its texts, institutions, and practices of production/ reception begins. The trajectory of textual analysis therefore draws on the heterogeneity of the regions its traverses: from the physio-psychological domain of cinema perception, to the sociality of common competence in the codes (technical, conceptual, rhetorical, narrative) by which films modulate the domain of perception, to the critical perspective of textuality which affords a standpoint for analysis of the processes, products and strategies of film, to the domain of ideology where a critical practice can intervene among audiences and films.

In the traditional field of 'film studies', textual analysis of film shapes such a deconstructive politics in multiple, even trans-valuational ways: teaching film analysis, inducing a measure of textual and critical literacy in it audience and readership, textual analysis of film takes the form of the production of a provisional 'rational sphere' where the meanings and effects around cinema are questioned through the effort of reading/writing 'on' film as choice and transformation of the past and future of us as subjects of films.

NOTE for Section 15

1. On this relation of analysis and poetics of film, see Crawford 1983a.

2. Crawford 1983b.

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Supplement

***The Maltese Falcon,* Warner Brothers, 1941**



5

6 a

6 b

7

8

14

15

16 a

16 b

16 b/c (1)

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21

22

23 a

23 b

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28 a

28 b

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29 b

29

***Psycho,* Universal Pictures, 1960**



14 A

14 B

15

16



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

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20 A

20 B









21 -25 A/B

26-31

32-35 A/B





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


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



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

46 A-E

47 A-D